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Nonwaged peasants in the modern world-system: African households as dialectical units of capitalist exploitation and indigenous resistance, 1890-1930

Wilma A. Dunaway

Abstract: Colonialism did not transform African peasants into waged labor. A majority of peasants worked as forced laborers, often unpaid, and they returned to their agricultural household labor as soon as they completed work assignments mandated by the colonizers. Colonial Africans resided in mixed livelihood households in which nonwaged labor forms (both free and unfree) predominated, and very few became dependent on wages. For a majority of colonial Africans, informal sector activities, tenancy, sharecropping, and subsistence production on communal plots were not temporary nonwaged forms on an inevitable path toward proletarianization. Wage earning was not the primary mechanism through which these households were integrated into the modern world-system. Instead, these households primarily provided nonwaged labors to capitalist commodity chains that, in turn, extracted surpluses from them and externalized costs of production to them.

Keywords: Africa, African colonialism, African peasants, indigenous resistance, forced labor, nonwage labor, households, proletarianization, semiproletarians, modern world-system
Compulsory labour will raise the native outside of his barbarism and give him the economic notions and activities that he misses today.
— Belgian Congo Agriculture Minister (1916)

Introduction

In 1902, the Rhodesian Prime Minister summarized the position of all colonizers on the African continent when he stated: “Europeans do not want native peasants. We want the bulk of Africans working in our mines and farms” (Bond 1998: 92). In 1920, the Kenyan Governor insisted that Africans needed to be dragged out of their “uneducated and unproductive idleness to the labour market” where they would be taught to work “under good European supervision.” In 1922, the Governor General of the Belgian Congo instructed his provincial subordinates to “make the native work. ... Every adult native must be strictly obliged to work” (Nzula et al. 1979: 65). Despite such chest pounding by the colonial powers, only about 1 percent of all African adults had been transformed into wage earners by 1930 (Berg 1964). Black Africans were still “cultivating their own fields, maintaining their own herds” in 1932, a French colonial official complained (Cooper 1996: 51). At the end of colonialism, the vast majority of Africans were still tied to the land, and few resided in households that were dependent on wages (Rodney 1982: 53).

European rivalry for territory played out on the ground in bloody rivalry and genocidal practices until the 1884 Berlin Conference divided Africa among the colonial powers. This study directs attention to the subsequent 1890 to 1930 era when Africans were dispossessed of a majority of their lands, as England, France, Belgium and Portugal came to control a majority of the continent (see Map 1, website). By this time, there had been more than 300 years for wage labor to become a dominant feature of the modern world-system. In Europe, the Industrial Revolution had unfolded, and proletarianization was occurring rapidly. Moreover, western colonizers had experimented extensively with slavery in the New World and had banned it. Consequently, we should be able to expect those colonizers not to replicate slavery-like labor in early twentieth century Africa.

This study seeks to fill a gap in the scholarly literature by examining whether the four major colonizers engaged in similar mechanisms of labor exploitation

all over the continent. In order to assess how widespread colonial land and labor policies were, I utilized 107 case studies that encompass all of colonial Africa (see Bibliography, website). This study is informed by the work of several African scholars, especially Walter Rodney and Samir Amin, and by the early Africanist research of world-systems scholars Giovanni Arrighi and Immanuel Wallerstein. So as not to generalize trends carelessly to the entire continent, I drew upon numerous sources to develop colony-by-colony tables that reconstruct labor strategies systematically (see Tables 1 and 2, website). To as great an extent as possible, I drew upon primary sources that provide insights into the labor philosophy of the colonizers (e.g., Trzebinski 1985). I also sought out oral histories and interviews with African peasants who were alive during this period (e.g., van Onselen 1996).

Land dispossession to pressure Africans toward proletarianization

Historically, capitalism has expanded geographically in order to acquire new areas of raw materials (Amin 1976: 35), and “accumulation through dispossession” has been “a necessary condition for capitalism’s survival” (Harvey 2003: 91). Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Africa was one of the few remaining areas of the world with massive stores of natural resources that had not yet been exploited to fuel economic growth in Western Europe (Rodney 1982). To put it in the vulgar words of an African settler, Europeans “wanted plenty of land, and they wanted it quickly” (Ward and White 1971: 101). From the vantage point of an affected peasant, colonial incorporation represented dispossession on five traumatic and disruptive levels:

1. Displacement from land, elimination of commons and redistribution of ecological resources to colonial capitalists.
2. Transformation of traditional rural communities around the export of agricultural and extractive resources and exploitation of indigenous laborers.
3. Displacement of local governance by repressive colonial states and through the co-optation and empowerment of local comprador elites.
4. Cultural change, especially colonial redefinition of work and establishment of new divisions of labor grounded in race, ethnicity, gender and/or class.
5. Restructuring of households and gender relations around land and labor patterns through which colonizers could maximize their surplus extractions.

To effect integration of African territories into the capitalist world-economy, European colonial states and settlers transformed the vast majority of African territory into state-mandated and privatized “enclosed economic zones” (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009: 137) that included:

- Land leases for monocultural agroecosystems: production of crops for export and cultivation of crops to provision industries and European settlements inside Africa.
- Extensive deforestation for grazing large herds of cattle and work animals and for commercial poultry farming.
- Land concessions for extractive enclaves.
- Private monopolies over vast rainforests for tree plantations and timbering.
- Land concessions for the exploitation of indigenous plants and animals (e.g., ivory, rubber, palm oil).
- Removal of African settlements for construction of trade related infrastructure (ports, roads, railroads) and water systems.
- Speculation in the land itself.

Since the livelihood security of peasants “rests upon maintaining rights in land and rights in family labour” (Gutkind and Waterman 1977: 233), Europeans sought to disrupt both these economic supports through the elimination of traditional African land uses. While redistributing a majority of the most economically productive areas to Europeans, colonial states delimited African access to ancestral lands that had been used for diverse traditional activities (Ward and White 1971). British policy summed up the philosophy of all the colonizers: “What is wanted is surely a policy that would establish once and for all that ... the ownership of land must be in the hands of the white races” (Wallerstein and Martin 1979: 203).

Europeans were also convinced that restricting ecological access would be the most effective mechanism to anchor labor relations between landholders and Africans. The colonial states followed three strategies to circumvent indigenous land rights. First, they defeminized the land by eliminating women’s traditional land rights and by ending the control of matrilineal clans over land allocation (Pachai 1973). Colonial states reduced “the multiple, overlapping use-rights of

men and women” into unilateral male control over land (Hodgson 1999: 64). The second strategy lay in deepening the structural inequalities among Africans. Colonial states co-opted indigenous leaders to serve as an administrative extension of coercive policies. African leaders were required to assign workers to meet colonial labor levies, and they collected colonial taxes for 10 to 30 percent commissions. In addition, village leaders policed their own people for compliance with land and labor regulations (Ward and White 1971: 115, 148, 418). Their wealth accumulation and power to allocate workers became the framework for the emergence of a tiny wealthier, more privileged African *comprador bourgeoisie* that represented the interests of European capitalists in indigenous communities (Amin 1976).

The third strategy was the segregation of a majority of Africans onto the least productive lands, coupled with market controls that privileged Europeans (Bond 1998: 206). The colonial states introduced mechanisms to prevent African competition with settler agricultural outputs and marketing. While Europeans enclosed large livestock ranches, the colonial states ended traditional African migratory herding (Gutkind and Waterman 1977: 237). Colonial policies insured that higher market prices went to European crops and livestock (Bond 1998: 198-206). Produce Marketing Boards purchased African crops “at figures that were way below world market prices” (Rodney 1982: 168-69). In addition, colonial states restricted government subsidies and technological advances to Europeans. None of the colonial powers intended “to modernize African agriculture. White settlers introduced European agricultural methods, but these were generally beyond the means of the peasant. ... Where Africans tried to modernize, the state actively intervened to protect white farmers from African competition” (Klein 1980: 25). The result of these policies was a steadily declining quality of life among Africans, as evidenced by repeated famines, chronic hunger and malnutrition (Rodney 1982: 236).

**Why did Europeans resort to forced labor?**

In simplest terms, Europeans desperately needed laborers, but they were not ready to stimulate the transformation of peasants into free wage laborers. First, European ideologies about race, class and gender shaped labor policies in ways that prevented proletarianization. A majority of the trading companies that were authorized to operate in colonial Africa were derivatives of the firms that had been most deeply enmeshed in the international slave trade (Rodney 1982: 236).
Moreover, these colonial powers had utilized slave labor on plantations and in other enterprises earlier in the nineteenth century (Wallerstein 1989). Repressive colonial practices toward African workers were shaped by that past human trafficking. Each of the colonial states banned slaveholding by Africans in the hope that these emancipated Africans would become workers for Europeans. However, all the states retained practices from the era of international slave trading (Cooper 1996). In 1902, the German Governor of Cameroon openly acknowledged that "domestic slavery exists and must exist; if not the land will be economically ruined." In 1910, a French governor admonished settlers to “carefully but steadily work toward a transition from slavery toward free labor.” A Swiss missionary observed that Africa’s public forced laborers were “slaves sent by the various chiefs to work off the taxes” of their communities (Weiss 2000: 154-56, 160). Indeed, colonial records document a sizeable slave trade in females and children in public works and long-distance porterage (Akurang-Parry 2000, 2002). Moreover, European reliance on laborers secured from African trading in pawns and slaves continued unabated into the 1930’s (Lovejoy and Hogendorn 1993: 270-74).

It is doubtful that colonizers ever intended—or indeed knew how—to proletarianize Africans because they came from societies in which wage workers did not meet Marx’s (1957, vol. 1: 189, 272) standards for an ideal type proletarian (Lebowitz 1992:19-20). When the African land grab began in the late nineteenth century the legal rights and mobility of European wage workers were still tightly constrained. European states criminalized several of the actions that Marx defined to be the essential characteristics of “free” wage workers. It was a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for wage workers to leave a job before it was finished. In most western European countries, it was also a crime for workers to leave the work site without authorization. In addition, workers could be sent to the house of correction for breaches of conduct, disobedience, sloppy work or leaving before the work day had ended (Steinfeld and Engerman 1997: 112-115). Moreover, Europeans had a great deal of historical experience with forms of slavery, labor indenturement and debt bondage. In the New World, colonizers relied heavily on white indentured servitude and African enslavement (Tomlins 2001), and labor indenturement and debt bondage were widespread among European peasants during the first four decades of African colonialism (Lenin 1966, vol. 4: 138; Northrup 1995: 45-66). Little wonder that the colonial states established similar legal constraints on African laborers.
French labor policies reflected the ideology summarized by the Governor of the Ivory Coast who was convinced that the colonizers could only proceed “bit by bit to free labor.” Another French colonial administrator argued that forced labor was necessary “to modify the primitive mentality of the native” who was “apathetic, incapable of any regular or sustained effort or labor” (Cooper 1996: 36, 480n18). The Belgians claimed to be civilizing Africans through compulsory labor that would elevate them out of their precapitalist barbarism (Nelson 1994: 125). Even though England terminated such regulations for its own workers in 1875 (Hay and Craven 2004), the British colonial states patterned African labor policies after repressive eighteenth- and nineteenth-century “Masters and Servants Ordinances” that:

- prohibited workers from leaving an employer before completion of the contracted time,
- allowed employers to pay wages in kind rather than cash and legalized debt bondage,
- legalized labor indenture and debt bondage,
- and made it illegal for workers to leave employers to whom they were indebted (Howard 1980; Ward and White 1971: 117).

Most so-called wage work was not voluntary. The Belgians and the British implemented worker registration systems that required every male older than fourteen to carry waged work documentation at all times in a metal container around the neck. This system was intended to deter workers from leaving employers before the end of specified work periods and to prevent workers from leaving employers without settling debts. This system was also used to identify workers who had not yet been assigned for migration to distant extractive industries. To implement these kinds of worker controls, the colonial states shifted the onus of forced labor recruitment onto indigenous leaders. Through “Native Authority Ordinances,” the British required village leaders to police, try and punish worker violations, such as failure to appear for work, low productivity, and leaving a work site without authorization (Ward and White 1971: 115, 162-64, 418). Village leaders were also responsible for administering brutal and demeaning punishment. One Belgian colonial official reported: “When I felt it was necessary to whip someone, I ordered a native chief ... to do it” (Klein 1980: 60).
Proletarianization did not occur for a third reason. Most colonial capitalists were land rich and cash poor. The colonial states and/or trading companies required settlers who leased land to prove assets of 500 pounds in livestock, tools, buildings or equipment. Because there was no requirement to prove cash liquidity (Trzebinski 1985: 158), most settler farms “were under-capitalized.” Between 1895 and 1930, there “was a drastic scarcity of ready cash,” and a vicious credit system developed (Bond 1998: 43, 53). “A chain of debt leading to the wholesalers was the basis of agrarian exchange relationships. ... The grip of mortgage capital was an irksome burden, and farmers were deeply conscious of the greatly unequal exchange relations that their own dependence on the credit of others imposed” (Keegan 1986: 44, 97). In Zimbabwe, for example, banks issued script that settlers had to exchange at trading posts or mine stores, locking farmers into noncompetitive pricing for agricultural supplies and household needs. Because of “the smallness of the financial resources at the command of would-be European farmers” (Arrighi and Saul 1973: 196), most of them “did not pay in cash” to businesses or to African workers (Klein 1980: 250).

Extractive industries experienced repeated cycles of cash shortfalls. Between 1900 and 1930, these industrial capitalists were trapped in a vicious circle in which inadequate investments and labor shortfalls fueled each other. Capital investments in mining dropped cyclically when the mines or timbering concessions encountered labor difficulties. As late as 1930, the colonial states “had not yet, after years of vigorous repression, secured a guaranteed cheap labor force for mining” (Phimister 1988: 46). In this context, proletarianization is a transformation that “threatens the cheap labour basis of an export-oriented economy”; free wage labor “is not accepted by capital without a struggle” (O’Brien 1984: 140). Thus, elimination of peasant households ran against the interests of these under-capitalized colonizers in two ways. On the one hand, “proletarianization of the peasantry would bring about the emergence of a black agrarian bourgeoisie bound to compete in the markets of produce and of factors of production.” On the other hand, Europeans could keep wages lower if they shifted the costs of African survival to peasant households that relied on nonwaged livelihoods (Arrighi and Saul 1973: 340). Because they lacked the fiscal liquidity to offer the cash that might attract greater numbers of African workers, settlers were more likely to fall back upon coercive measures to secure their labor forces (Bond 1998: 94).
Coercion policies, labor exporting and debt bondage

African forced labor was neither a passing phenomenon nor a set of labor practices that impacted only a small proportion of the population. Between 1895 and 1930, agrarian and extractive capitalists competed aggressively for African laborers, farmers most often suffering the worst shortfalls (Bond 1998). Colonial primary documents are filled with settler accusations that Africans had too much leisure time, that too few of them were waged workers, and that insufficient African labor time was being made available to settlers (Arrighi and Saul 1973: 187). Agrarian capitalists continually faced labor shortages because their colonial states prioritized extractive industries (Bond 1998: 142-49). Thus, “the labour problem dogged every settler’s existence.” For example, Kenyan farmers “could not break new land because African workers could not be found to clear the bush” (Trzebinski 1985: 125, 150). In this context, Europeans imposed on Africans a capitalist definition of work. Many of the traditional labors in which African men and women engaged to produce survival needs were re-defined to be the past times of backward, idle people who did not know how to work hard. Indeed, Europeans did not think Africans worked at all because “real labor” produced profitable export goods for the world market. Colonial capitalists used their powerful political connections to impress upon politicians and administrators in their home countries the need to enact regulations that would authorize the colonial states in Africa to compel Africans to work. For instance, Lord Delamere, one of the wealthiest Crown land grantees of Kenya, wrote the London colonial office in 1908: “It is wrong for young African men to loaf about while coffee is literally blackening on our trees for lack of hands to pick it” (Trzebinski 1985: 150). Wrapped in rhetoric about “transforming barbarians for their own good” (Anderson 2000: 459), colonizers employed the same ideology to defend forced labor that they had previously used to justify slave exporting. For example, Portugal’s 1914 Labor Code admonished its African colonial states to “have no scruples about obliging and, if necessary, forcing the savage Negroes of Africa to work—or, in other words, to improve their situation through work so as to gain the best means of existence in order to civilize themselves” (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988: 228). Rather than pay wages to Africans that were equivalent to white worker rates, Europeans implemented the kinds of savage, coercive labor mechanisms that had worked so well in past centuries of colonialism in other parts of the world.
Deindustrialization, taxation and consumption policies

Initially, colonizers implemented three strategies that were designed to push Africans into money exchanges. First, the colonial states prohibited many indigenous handicrafts and small industries, particularly traditional production of cloth, salt, soap, iron, and pottery (Rodney 1982: 231). Second, the colonial states introduced European imports into indigenous communities, including ploughs and tools (Bond 1998: 198-206). The British pursued the policy of aggressively marketing sugar, tea, coffee, and manufactured cotton cloth. By encouraging purchases on credit, Europeans manipulated the supply of consumer goods in order to coerce labor flows (O’Brien 1984: 133). Third, all the colonial states implemented a variety of taxes on crops, houses, animals, as well as a poll (head) tax. Settlers repeatedly put political pressure on colonial states and on their homeland governments to legitimate greater use of compulsion through taxation systems (Ward and White 1971: 114; Rodney 1982: 165-67). In 1908, Kenya’s Governor contended that “taxation is the only possible method of compelling the native to seek work” (Berg 1964: 404). These taxes put significant strain on African communities and households. In French West Africa, for example, peasant communities annually paid 175 million francs in poll and cattle taxes (Gutkind and Waterman 1977: 130). Little wonder that Europeans thought they would compel wage labor from all males older than fourteen (Berg 1964:403-404).

Even though taxation and changing consumption patterns introduced greater need for money into indigenous communities, these practices did not spur very much African proletarianization. On the one hand, taxation generated only temporary, unreliable labor flows that were erratically distributed over the year (Berg 1964: 406). “Farmers lost crops for lack of reliable manpower” because Africans resisted full-time wage earning. “Once they had earned enough to pay their hut tax,” they returned to peasant agriculture and trading (Trzebinski 1985: 132). Clearly, land dispossession and coercive monetary policies did not automatically trigger proletarianization (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009: 138), for Africans could more quickly earn the money they needed for taxes through nonwaged methods. In 1908, the Inspector of Rhodesian Mining Compounds reported that the pay scales at extractive industries were not competitive enough to keep African households from prioritizing their informal sector activities. “An African woman cultivating a little extra land,” he complained, “can earn...
more in a month than the migrant wage earner could earn in three months in the mines” (Berg 1964: 404).

Since agrarian and extractive capitalists were unwilling or unable to raise wages, short-term labor needs forestalled any political patience with the gradual transformation of Africans into free waged workers (Bond 1998: 198-206). The colonial states preferred repressive mechanisms that were (1) less costly and (2) that permitted employers the degree of control over Africans that they needed to maximize productivity, meet debt obligations, and provide rapid profits to investors. As a result, European farmers, extractive industrialists and businessmen acquired most of their laborers through coercion.

**Coercive labor recruitment**

Adapting a term that was part of local dialects during the international slave trade, Europeans and Africans referred to labor recruitment as "blackbirding," clearly demonstrating that everyone recognized that coercion was involved in these work contracts.

Veiled force was everywhere inherent in the system of formal and informal recruiting. ... The system had three players: recruiter or “labor agents,” European administrative officers, and African chiefs. Together this powerful trinity did more than any other force to provide the labor sought by European enterprises in Africa (Berg 1964: 408).

Blackbirding was a “profitable calling” that attracted small farmers or traders whose function was to round up manpower “by any means necessary.” Since they were paid a commission for every laborer they contracted, recruiters “were not fastidious as to the means by which they coerced Africans to work” (Trzebinski 1985: 132). Moreover, indigenous chiefs did the dirty work while the government engaged in empty rhetoric about freely chosen wage labor (Cooper 1996: 480n17). Between 1890 and 1910, the South African mine companies “employed recruiters with unlimited brandy, who went among the native kraals and persuaded groups of natives” to sign labor contracts (Goodfellow 1931: 146). In the Belgian Congo, recruiters staged village raids in which they threatened public floggings of local leaders. To avoid such degradation, leaders immediately “contracted” the required number (Berry 1975). In several British colonies, labor recruiters kidnapped “women and cattle and kept them until their husbands and owners came and offered to go to work” (Mason 1958: 226).
Recruiters wielded the power of their states behind their actions, as the colonial official was the first line of contact for local leaders. In similar fashion, a 1913 French colonial official indicated that: “one brutal fact has always dominated the labor problem in the colonies. Without the ... pressure of administration, nine-tenths of the European undertakings would have to be abandoned because of lack of labor” (Berg 1964: 410-11). On the one hand, refusal to allocate workers might cause colonial officers to withdraw their cooperation when needed with indigenous problems. On the other hand, indigenous leaders acted out of self-interest to protect the privileges and wealth received from colonial officials. In return for fees, they employed coercion toward villagers, including physical restraint, temporary seizure of land or livestock, or threats. When offers of wealth or status were not enough, colonial officials pressured recalcitrant leaders through heavy-handed threats. After a Rhodesian leader failed “to produce a number of his men who had deserted from the mines,” a state employee and a black policeman applied brute force. Over two or three days, they destroyed cattle and huts until the village leader returned the laborers. A decade later, a colonial official told the same village that “it is the wish of the Government that your men will work at the mines two months a year. If they do not do so, other measures will be introduced which will seriously affect them” (Makambe 1992: 295, 298).

Even though some local leaders resisted, the recruitment system was effective because so many local African leaders acted as a *comprador bourgeoisie* to meet European labor demands (Amin 1976). Bribes and gifts were “the recruiter’s stock in trade,” and these community leaders typically received “a per capita bonus for men supplied,” as well as “payments according to the length of service of recruits” (Berg 1964: 409). The states also allocated prisoners to private enterprises. Africans who were incarcerated for non-payment of taxes or for breaking pass laws were assigned to employers through a system of hired prison labor (Nzula et al. 1979: 88). In addition, Europeans could acquire workers by paying the fines of incarcerated workers in return for a state labor indenture (van Onselen 1996: 72).

**Forced labor for public works**

All the colonial states set annual quotas of forced, unpaid labor for public works (Rodney 1982: 167), as construction of public infrastructure required great numbers of Africans (see Table 2, website). Public labor disproportionately
impacted poor Africans and certain ethnic minorities, and it involved frequent impressment of women and children (Okia 2008). In the Gold Coast colony, for instance, the British required 4,000 public workers daily (Thomas 1973: 79). Through its repeated conscriptions of African laborers for public works, the Kenyan state employed more Africans than all the private enterprises (Anderson 2000: 549). European road and railroad systems were achieved through conscription of hundreds of thousands of Africans, including women and children (Saul 1985: 222), and almost none of these laborers were paid wages (Klein 1980: 263-64). The British drove thousands of Sierra Leone peasants from villages into forced railroad labor (World Guide 2001). To build the Brazzaville-Pointe Noire Railroad between 1921 and 1933, the French annually imported 10,000 Africans from other colonies, 25 percent of whom died from starvation, accidents, and disease. Similarly, forced laborers lived in dangerous conditions to construct the Kenyan water system between 1911-1917 (Willis 1995). The line between public forced labor and waged labor for private enterprises was not closely drawn by any of the colonial states. Consequently, states often conscripted Africans for plantations and extractive industries under the “public” rubric (Rodney 1982: 166-69).

Compulsory labor cultivation of export crops

Any examination of African agriculture needs to begin with the recognition of an historical reality that was ignored in most of the case studies I consulted. Between 1890 and 1930, women traditionally provided most of the agricultural labor over about 60 percent of the continent. In the other 40 percent, males controlled agricultural decision-making, but women provided half or more of the labor (see Map 2, website). Consequently, colonial implementation of compulsory crops, cultivation quotas, and forced fieldwork impacted women disproportionately. Moreover, women absorbed traditional male workloads when men were impressed into migrant labor. When colonial states instituted “plant-more-crops” campaigns, women supplied a majority of the agricultural labor for these export strategies, under threat of fines, incarceration or overseer beatings (Nzula et al. 1979).

Europeans redefined the absence of men from fields to be indolence and vagrancy because they recognized that men would have to be compelled to abandon traditional livelihoods. Arguing that black males had “no right to be idle,” the colonial states enacted several regulations to coerce African males into
European agricultural work. Taxes and cultivation quotas were imposed on African communities, and traditional nonwaged work was redefined to be loafing or vagrancy, offenses for which males could be incarcerated (Cooper 1996: 479). All the colonial states imposed regulations that required regular work from African males and specific work allocations by African settlements. However, these colonial strategies captured far more labor from women and children than from males. On the one hand, great numbers of males were committed for migratory extractive labor. On the other hand, village leaders were unwilling to assign men to tasks females had traditionally done (Nzula et al. 1979).

European farmers and planters needed African laborers for seven export crops (see Table 1, website), and export agriculture was organized around four different cultivation groups:

- plantations operated by trading companies,
- individually-owned mid-size to large plantations,
- compulsory crop cultivation by Africans, and
- small farms primarily dependent on white family laborers or white sharecroppers.

Because they produced a majority of the most valuable export crops and livestock, plantations received the highest level of state assistance in securing laborers. Plantations and companies secured workers through colonial statutes that required African settlements to provide labor quotas. All the colonial states mandated the establishment of “labor camps” near plantations. This strategy exported more males from villages, but 40 to 50 percent of the workers were still women and children (Ward and White 1971: 163).

All four colonizers allocated concessions to trading companies and required adjacent African settlements to supply laborers (Thompson and Adloff 1975; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009: 83-110). In French West Africa, for instance, Africans had to supply 21 million days of statute labor for plantations (Gutkind and Waterman 1977: 130). French colonies routinely exported male and female forced laborers from one colony to another to meet the needs of sugar or cotton plantations. For example, the French forced nearly 40,000 Upper Volta laborers to migrate annually to Ivory Coast plantations, about one-third of them women (Cooper 1996: 41). In addition, the French assigned black soldiers to local
compulsory crop cultivation or forced them to relocate to distant plantations (Gutkind and Waterman 1977: 130).

The Belgians and the Portuguese mandated compulsory cultivation on state-subsidized plantations. Each African household was required to cultivate an assigned plot and to produce a minimum level of compulsory crops. In Mozambique, cotton plots were laid out along the roads to make policing more efficient. African households had to meet weekly output targets, and low productivity or absence from work was punished with fines or imprisonment. In Portuguese colonies, compulsory African labor accounted for one-third of all marketed crops (Saul 1985: 218, 222).

Because they received less state assistance, individually owned plantations and mid-size farmers secured workers through labor tenancy. Predominant in those areas with greatest numbers of European settlers, this labor strategy occurred most frequently in British colonies. Labor tenancy tied laborers to specific landholders through annual labor contracts, and the states made it illegal for workers to leave employers without permission, especially one to whom they were indebted (van Onselen 1996: 152). Indigenous populations that were situated on lands assigned to British settlers were redefined to be squatters. “For the privilege of living on private estates and receiving land sufficient for the cultivation of their foodstuffs,” colonial Malawi law read, “the natives ... will pay a certain rent to the European landlords” (Pachai 1973: 686). In order to avoid total dispossession, Africans were now required to pay annual rent to Europeans in the form of 180 days or more labor (Cooper 1980; Kanogo 1987).

A glimpse at South African agriculture will provide a sense of the significance of this labor strategy. In 1920, there were 1.3 million Africans in 260,000 peasant households working as tenants on European farms. Each cultivated about three acres, only 18 percent of them owned ploughs, and only about a third owned any working livestock. The British “Native Servant Act” mandated a minimum of 180 days work for the farmer, landholder permission to leave the premises, and landholder permission to sell goods or services. In addition, landlords had the legal right to “cane” a tenant or to charge fines for disobedience or low productivity. Moreover, their labor contracts passed to new owners if the farms were sold (Nzula et al. 1979: 74). British farmers routinely disciplined African workers with slavery-like brutality. They flogged men for absence or desertion from work sites or for low productivity. They shackled
women by their ear ornaments for refusing to work young children in the fields. And they shot above worker heads to speed up harvesting (Trzebinski 1985: 125-26).

An early Belgian Congo policy declared that the duty of the colonial state “is to create a race of peasants attached to the soil and capable of extracting a sufficient profit from it.” Following this philosophy, the Belgians mandated the crops to be grown by Africans in three categories: export crops, food for waged laborers in extractive industry, and foods for local consumption. Export crops were rationalized into land use zones, with African households required to meet cultivation quotas. The countryside “was organized into purchasing zones,” each monopolized by a trading company that set prices and exploited tens of thousands of Africans who were assigned cultivation parcels (Klein 1980: 55).

The Belgians compelled nearly 60 percent of the African population, including women and children, to work in a highly regimented fashion. Any male or female older than ten who was absent from the fields “would be brought before the police judge,” and whippings were routine. According to a Belgian missionary:

> We try to create vital needs that they can only satisfy by earning money, but at the same time, we use pressure, or threaten harassment, and we use methods which are strangely reminiscent of those used by slave traders. … We demand a constant return from them. … They are plagued by supervisors, whose interference deprives them of any liberty. … In order to keep the native population submitted and working regularly, there is a special group of agricultural agents. … They are responsible for the increase in production. These functionaries … soon exhaust the legal means of forcing natives to work harder (Klein 1980: 62).

Africans were not even permitted to return to subsistence activities in the period between crops. Women wove baskets that would be needed to harvest and to transport the crop to market while men constructed platforms for drying the cotton in the sun. After harvests, women and children were “busy cleaning the cotton,” and they were over-represented among the porters who transported the cotton to market. Claiming “charitable intentions,” a Belgian provincial commissioner bragged that “compulsory crops deprive the native of 11 months of liberty. … [T]he native is no longer free to act [and he must] submit himself to more and more strict rules of order, perseverance and work” (Klein 1980: 55, 62-68).
Similarly, the French mandated crops and policed agricultural labor. In Cameroon and Chad, the colonial state set a quota of peanuts to be produced by each village, and local chiefs were instructed to supervise forced field labor. All villagers between the ages of 15 and 50 were required to work, and a colonial African clerk supervised cultivation and reported infractions. No wages were paid, but police were used to keep people working. After the crop was sold, a share of the profits was allocated to village leaders (Sturzinger 1983; Geschiere 1983).

**Compulsory labor for harvesting tree plantations and non-mineral resources**

Colonial capitalists exported coffee, tea, and cocoa from tree plantations, but they also needed large numbers of laborers to harvest indigenous resources (especially ivory, palm oil, rubber, bananas, and coconuts). All the colonizers routinely used forced laborers for these types of public monopolies. Villages located within the company’s land area or plantation were required to supply laborers. Between 1875 and 1908, Belgium’s King Leopold employed forced labor for ivory gathering and rubber tapping using horrific degrees of brutality. A contemporary settler observed that thousands of African men gathered and carried rubber to trading stations in “unceasing” lines, driven by overseers with whips. In addition to using militia to capture laborers, these extractive capitalists held wives hostage “until the Chief of the district brought in the required kilogrammes of rubber.” After three decades of "the Rubber Terror," the Congolese population was less than half what it should have been. Nearly 4 million died from over-work, disease or starvation, and the birth rate plummeted because men and women were forced to live apart. In subsequent decades, Belgium committed fewer atrocities in tree plantation harvesting, but its labor organization remained highly militarized and regimented (Hochschild 1998: 126, 130, 161-62).

Between 1900 and 1930, all four colonizers employed similar labor mechanisms to export rubber, timber, bananas, palm oil, and coconut oil for use in European and U.S. consumer commodities. Colonial states allocated land concessions to trading companies for exploitation of natural resources. Each of those concessions divided its territory into small worker settlements around a trading station staffed by Europeans and policed by African militias (Ekechi 1981). Because timber from the Gabon was the most profitable export from French
Equatorial Africa, the colonial state assisted private companies by setting production quotas for villages and by employing state forestry agents to supervise forced laborers (Rich 2005). In 1920, the Congo was divided among seven trading companies that exploited the forced labor of 20,000 workers. The companies systematically deforested large areas for tree plantations, destroying established villages in their wake. From the jungles, the companies collected rubber, ivory, mahogany, palm nuts, and timber while 24 factories processed palm oil and produced soap. Plantations around the “trading stations” cultivated coffee and cotton. Headed by a European agent and a contingent of African militia, each station extracted forced labor from a village of about 100 African adults. Weekly work production quotas were set, with fines and physical punishment meted out to those whose output was low (Nzula et al. 1979: 62-67).

To force Africans to supply labor, the French burned villages and massacred people. "Those who attempted to elude forced labor were arrested. Roped by the neck, and usually naked, they often died of starvation before they reached their work assignment." Nine months of the year they tapped and carried rubber, which permitted only three months to return to home villages. More than half the population died from mass starvation because there were too few laborers to produce food (Jonassohn and Bjornson 1998: 242). In all colonies, palm oil production was highly regimented and policed. Working twelve to fourteen hours daily under close supervision that involved frequent whippings, thousands of men gathered the fruit while hundreds more carried sixty-pound baskets out of the forests. In scattered clearings, women removed the fibrous parts of the fruit, then transported it to factories located twenty to sixty miles away (Klein 1980: 62).

Compulsory labor for exploitation of mineral resources

Despite the greater tonnage of these raw materials, mineral wealth was far more profitable for colonizers. All the colonial states exported valuable minerals that were exploited by several forms of forced labor mandated by public policies (see Table 1, website). Because these exports were most profitable in world markets, colonial states prioritized the allocation of forced laborers to these extractive enclaves. On average, industries that exploited copper, diamonds, gold, bauxite, and tin required 12,000 to 15,000 laborers daily. Even though iron, manganese, coal, and phosphate mines were smaller, they still needed 2,000 to 8,000 laborers daily (Rodney 1982). For that reason, one-tenth to one-fifth of the population of
each African village was absent to fulfill extractive forced labor requirements at any given time (Cooper 1996: 35). To move workers within and between colonies, colonial administrators developed regular circuits of migratory labor that were supported by networks of roads and railroads. Between colonies, the colonial states used coercive methods to insure flows of laborers to extractive industries. In addition, there was a significant amount of forced labor exporting between the colonial powers (Rodney 1982).

The Belgians primarily organized extractive labor flows through coercive recruitment of local males, by assigning quotas to African communities and by moving laborers from one province to another. Periodically, military impressment was used to meet an unexpected labor crisis, especially in the gold and copper industries (Rodney 1982). In the early 1920’s, the Belgians began to resettle laborer households in permanent camps near mines, in an attempt to create a core steady labor force, to lower worker desertion, and to increase household dependency on the consumer goods of company stores. In response to political pressures from extractive industries, French states increased labor quotas on African communities and enforced them with military force (Cooper 1996: 45-46). In order to produce diamonds and iron, the Portuguese required adjacent villages to meet labor quotas, using direct military force when necessary (“Discussion 1979: 280). In addition, the states exported Angolans and Mozambicans to work at British extractive industries (Rodney 1982: 167-68). Police tactics, military impressment, and coercion of African communities were used to acquire the numbers of workers exported annually. In 1920, Portuguese colonies were supplying nearly half the labor force for British mines in South Africa (Saul 1985: 220-21).

To sustain production of highly profitable diamonds, gold, and copper, British colonial states followed three strategies. About 42 percent of the entire British extractive labor force consisted of forced laborers imported from French and Portuguese colonies. Nearly one-third were secured through distant “circular migration” within and between colonies while the minority was derived from nearby African communities (Vail and White 1979: 256). British colonial states assigned labor quotas to African communities and relied on corrupt, coercive recruitment methods to acquire laborers (Berg 1964). For instance, forced labor accounted for more than two-thirds of the Gold Coast (today’s Ghana) mining work force. These gold mines required 15,000 workers daily, and most of them were forced laborers obtained from French colonies, Nigeria and those coerced to
migrate from distant provinces of the Gold Coast. The colonial state fined village leaders who refused to send workers, and companies advanced funds to recruiters so they could pay 5 shillings per laborer to bribe village leaders. To deter desertions, recruiters required workers to sign twelve-month indentures that bore penal sanctions if they did not complete their contracted periods. In addition, companies withheld wages until the end of the contract period (Thomas 1973: 79-87).

Women and children as forced laborers

Between 1900 and 1902, fifty caravans transported 6,373 laborers to Nigerian tin mines, nearly half of them women (Swindell 1992: 140). This staggering statistic provides one estimate of the degree to which females were part of the general circuits of forced labor. No matter how dangerous or back-breaking the work, women and children were routinely impressed to construct roads, military buildings, and railroads (Makambe 1992: 295; Nzula et al. 1979: 85). A laborer on the French railroad in the Congo described the work organization this way:

Men work on one side of the tracks, women on the other. ... [Women] carry large stones on their heads, level the ground and drag blocks along. ... The monotonous beating of a drum gives rhythm to the work. ... If we slow the Negro overseer brings down his whip on the shoulders of 50 or 100 male and female workers. This is how we build the road to civilization (Nzula et al. 1979: 85).

When men were away at distant labor assignments and households had not met tax obligations, the British conscripted women for road construction until taxes were paid (Saul 1985: 222). In addition, females and children were often the forced laborers who acted as porters to carry exports to distant markets (Akurang-Parry 2000). Women were also forced into prostitution at railroad work sites and at extractive industries of all four colonizers (Cohen et al. 1978: 64).

Because women and young girls accounted for a disproportionate share of the pawns whose labor indentures were sold to Europeans (Klein and Roberts 1987), they appeared in all types of occupations that whites ideologically considered to be “men’s work.” A Belgian provincial commissioner reasoned that “most African work has a familial character. Women and children from the age of 10th year participate actively in it” (Klein 1980: 66). Thus, women worked in compulsory export agriculture, at company trading stations in rainforests, and on

plantations. Since entire households were impressed as forced laborers for crop and tree plantations, women and children were over-represented at work sites (Grier 1994). The Belgians required women and men to provide 40 hours per month to company agents in extractive concessions (Nelson 1994: 89). Starting in 1910, the British implemented “quality control” standards in reaction to complaints from Liverpool about the amount of trash mixed in with agricultural produce and raw materials. Most of this processing was assigned to female forced laborers (Olukoju 1998).

**Debt bondage and indentured servitude**

Debt bondage probably constrained more African laborers than any other coercive strategy, and this mechanism was widespread in every economic sector. In many parts of Africa, Europeans took advantage of the traditional *pawning* system in which individuals indentured their labor (or that of family members) to repay debts. Because Africans engaged in this practice most frequently during food shortages, the cyclical combination of famines and pawning pushed more Africans into European labor contracts than taxation (Giblin 1986). As Africans sold thousands of these pawned individuals to Europeans, this form of debt peonage became integrated into capitalist commodity chains. Despite public controversy in Europe over pawning as a form of slavery (Akurang-Parry 2000), each of the colonizers legalized this form of debt bondage (a) by setting the wage rates at which pawns would work off their debts and (b) by trying pawns in colonial courts when they deserted European employers (Oroge 1985; Giblin 1986; Klein and Roberts 1987). Because of the lively European trade in the selling and mortgaging of these African labor indentures, Simon (1929) estimated that there were 6 million black pawns in the hands of white employers during the 1920’s.

There were several mechanisms through which Africans became indebted to their employers. The highest incidence of debt bondage occurred on plantations that relied on labor tenancy. Landlords and merchants routinely advanced goods to tenant laborers against their future crops, requiring them to sign labor indentures against indebtedness (van Onselen 1996: 72, 81).

Agrarian capitalists “failed to build wage labor systems” among these peasants because it was cheaper and more efficient to rely on labor tenancy and forced labor to extract work from African households. Rather than wage labor,
Europeans implemented “various forms of squatting, family farming units—with ruling classes extracting portions of the surplus through part-time labor service, rent, debt bondage, taxation or extortion” (Cooper 1996: 48). Debt bondage kept African households tied to specific landholders for long periods because colonial states prohibited workers from leaving employers to whom they were indebted. Moreover, Africans became trapped in debt bondage to both landholders and middlemen.

A peasant growing a cash crop or collecting produce had his labor exploited by a long chain of individuals. ... Cash crop peasants never had any capital of their own. They existed from one crop to another, depending on good harvests and good prices. Any bad harvest or fall of prices caused the peasant to borrow in order to find money to pay taxes and buy certain necessities. As security, they mortgaged their future crops to moneylenders in the middleman category. ... The amount of interest on the loans was always fantastically high (Rodney 1982: 154-55).

Always pressed for cash, landholders often sold labor contracts of debtors to distant extractive sites. In similar fashion, many middlemen doubled as recruiters, requiring delinquent debtors to submit to labor contracts with distant mines (Berg 1964).

The second point at which Africans were trapped in debt bondage was when they were employed by extractive industries. Organized like the international fur trade among eighteenth-century New World Indians (Dunaway 1994), Tanzania’s rubber “putting out” system transformed Africans into debt peons. The trading stations extended goods on credit, requiring that debtors pay in rubber. Using police and court systems, the British state held communities accountable for individual worker debts and incarcerated workers who did not pay. In 1909, the state was not concerned that an extended drought had lowered rubber collection. Through debt bondage, the traders expected to extract even greater surpluses the next year. “Small traders are happy to wait,” an official reported, because “the debt compounds itself somewhat, without the Negro being able to control it. [S]o that he will not forget that he has debts, new goods are offered to him” (Monson 1993: 125). In this way, companies could utilize debt bondage as a strategy to keep laborers working longer at declining wages. Forced to pay for company housing, workers were constrained to obtain their survival needs and to replace broken tools at company stores or designated adjacent merchants (Bond 1998: 47).

Through extending credit to increasingly deprived black workers, mine owners found the means to lengthen the labor cycle. ... Peasants who had specifically left the rural areas with the purpose of earning cash found themselves trapped by the credit system in its various guises. ... As the cost of living rose and real wages declined, so the credit system spread throughout the compounds. ... Their books of "work tickets" were printed with a special provision made for a space into which credit transactions were entered by the mine store. In many cases workers pledged their entire wages against the credit thus provided (van Onselen 1976: 162, 164-66).

The third point at which Africans became enmeshed in debt bondage was through transactions with Europeans who marketed imported consumer goods and agricultural tools. In addition to town merchants, all the colonial states licensed and granted monopolies to itinerant traders who sold goods in out-of-the-way African communities. By over-pricing commodities sold through an “advances system,” traders generated African debt bondage (Goodfellow 1931: 145). Since many of these traders and merchants also acted as labor recruiters, delinquent debtors could be forced to commit to long-term labor contracts with farmers or industries that paid their debts (Gutkind and Waterman 1977: 239). According to a Northern Rhodesian farmer, “laborers could only be gotten by taking Africans indebted to storekeepers in the rural areas” (Berg 1964: 403).

One of the worst labor forms that resulted from this kind of debt bondage was sex trafficking. From eleven different British colonies, white traders, merchants and farmers indentured women from indebted households to brothels and cabarets near copper, diamond, and gold mines (Booth 1985; Schmidt 1988; Grier 1994; Akurang-Parry 2002). It is quite likely that this type of sex trafficking occurred for extractive industries in all the colonies.

The taxation system also stimulated debt bondage (Yeager 1989: 11). On the one hand, village leaders advanced taxes in behalf of local households, compelling those residents to meet whatever forced labor was assigned to them. On the other hand, landholders, merchants and traders paid taxes at high interest rates for Africans, requiring them to provide labor in repayment (Saul 1985). In Portuguese and British colonies, hut taxes averaged about US$2.50 annually for each household. In those areas, the government wage scale was fixed at 1.5 percent per day of the amount of the African tax (Berg 1964: 403-404n21). At less than 4 cents per day, a household had to provide at least 67 days labor to generate the amount needed just to cover one tax.
Why did African peasantries persist?

Even though many scholars (e.g., Wallerstein and Martin 1979) have over-stated the degree to which colonized Africans were proletarianized, colonial capitalists were acutely aware of this problem. When questioned about repeated labor shortages between 1900 and 1934, one capitalist explained to British investors that Africans preferred “to be peasants, practicing mixed farming” (Bryceson and Jamal 1997: 187). Even though Africans engaged in numerous rebellions against Europeans, most of these uprisings were put down in genocidal fashion by the colonizers (World Guide 2001). Indeed, it was not this type of resistance that most helped peasant communities to survive the onslaughts of colonialism. How, then, did Africans resist European labor policies?

African resistance to depeasantization

Most Africans were embedded in households and in communities that obligated them to a diverse portfolio of nonwaged labors, and these were social obligations they could not easily abandon (Klein 1980: 94). This was not a context in which households juggled everything to make wage labor possible. Indeed, the reverse was true. Between 1890 and 1930, most Africans worked for wages temporarily. “Since it was traditionally considered a humiliation for a peasant to have to work for someone else, the workers saw their conditions as transitory. They became agricultural workers only under duress and they quit as soon as possible” (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988: 225). Little wonder that official European reports repeatedly criticized such cultural “peculiarities.” Despite repressive labor strategies, the Governor General of the Congo complained to trading company shareholders in the 1920s that “any wage worker is a possible cultivator. It is among the [peasant] producers that wage labor is recruited, and they become cultivators again as soon as they are dismissed” (Klein 1980: 68).

There were several mechanisms through which peasants met mandated labor requirements to settlers without breaking traditional ties. First, they organized wage work in short time periods that did not conflict with household or village responsibilities. Second, they avoided wage labor through nonwaged labor arrangements with Europeans. Peasants could “pawn” their own labor to a farmer or merchant to cover the cost of taxes or goods, and there was a “recognised practice for a Native to hand over a beast in security against
purchases or debts” (Bryceson and Jamal 1997: 188). Even though labor tenancy was exploitative, it kept family workers together in the same locale and avoided the kinds of diseases and physical disabilities that migratory workers experienced. Third, resistance strategies were common. Some village leaders resisted labor quotas, especially for distant extractive industries, by sending weak, young, elderly, and ill males. In addition, there was a high level of laborer desertion from both private and public work sites (Thomas 1973: 82, 102).

**Importance of the mixed livelihoods household**

However, it was the structure of peasant households that shielded them most from proletarianization. African households maintained a dialectical relationship with capitalism. On the one hand, peasant households subsidized capitalist enterprises in three ways. First, capitalists externalized much of the cost of production of colonial exports to the households and villages of laborers. According to a European settler,

> Market days are set in advance and the police come to the villages to alert people. ... In this forced culture, the black takes all the risks: drought, plant lice, caterpillars, insects, locusts, floods, poor land, the fluctuation of the world market, our savage has everything against him. The purchaser only knows and buys clean cotton (Klein 1980: 64-65).

African households also absorbed production costs associated with migratory extractive labor. Nearly one-quarter of the workers who were exported for extended road and railroad construction died annually. One-third of migratory laborers returned from extractive industries injured or suffering from a serious illness, some permanently unable to work (Rodney 1982: 186). Second, the burden of debt bondage accumulated during labor at a distant plantation or extractive site was often shifted to the entire household. Indebted migratory workers described “their deep shame in going home without cash or goods for their kin” (van Onselen 1976: 164).

Second, peasant households provided “a hidden subsidy to the accumulation of capital, underwriting the setting of wages and crop prices to Africans at levels even lower than might otherwise have been the case” (Saul 1985: 42-43). Wages were predicated upon the assumption that employers would provide remuneration at a level slightly below that needed for bachelor subsistence, leaving little for

household pooling (Wallerstein and Martin 1979: 203). “There were very few cases where the peasant was wholly dependent on the cash for his actual sustenance. The trading companies took full advantage of that fact. Knowing that an African peasant and his family could keep alive by their own shambas, the companies had no obligation to pay prices sufficient for the maintenance of a peasant and his family” (Rodney 1982: 157). Exported by the Portuguese to the South African mines, one Mozambican laborer made clear how significant the household was to survival. “I am a worker and I cannot do without a paid job. Everyone here has been to the mines—our grandfathers went. I do agriculture when at home because the wages are never sufficient for a decent life” (Bond 1998: 223).

African households subsidized capitalism in another way, for a majority of the village leaders shifted to women the community responsibilities of males who had been exported to capitalist employers. Colonial policies stimulated “gender differentiation in which women were obliged to stay on their farms while their men engaged in wage labour on the basis of circular migration” (Bryceson, Kay and Mooij 2000: 40). When males were away, agricultural production and crop marketing became the sole responsibility of women (Wallerstein and Martin 1979). Moreover, women and children were routinely conscripted to meet village agricultural labor quotas (Moore and Vaughan 1994). As a result, the costs of export production were externalized disproportionately to women (Gutkind and Waterman 1977: 235). As females had less time for subsistence food production, hunger and malnutrition rose among African households and communities (Rodney 1982).

On the other side of the dialectal relationship of African peasants with capitalism, their nonwaged livelihoods allowed them simultaneously to (a) avoid wage earning and (b) earn benefits from capitalists. These households “lived somewhere between the poles of peasant and proletarian” ("Discussion" 1979: 348), but most were closer to the peasant end of that continuum. Indeed, colonizers were not successful at eliminating the control of African households over the means of production, for most peasants had access to land.

A skirmish was fought between the African as factor of production to be moved about as capital saw fit and the African as a being fixed forever in his own culture. Young Africans sought to use capitalism even as it used them—to obtain money to build up herds or invest in agricultural improvement, to marry and set up a household. ... It took some doing on the part of governments to make sure that

pre-capitalist economies served as the mode of reproduction of capitalism, rather than the other way around (Cooper 1996: 45, 47).

To a greater extent than any other strategy, participation in rural informal sector activities permitted African households to buffer themselves against wage labor and taxes. Africans sold many kinds of goods and services to both blacks and whites (Gutkind and Waterman 1977: 238), and the traditional informal sector was not the passing phenomenon that western scholars have claimed (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009: 93). The informal sector provided income and resources to both women and men, thereby expanding the proportion of the indigenous population engaged in these forms of non-proletarianized labor (Gutkind and Waterman 1977; Bryceson and Jamal 1997; van Onselen 1997; McIntyre et al. 2009: 34). African households routinely marketed goods (especially water, fodder, firewood, roof thatching, handmade tools, food, beverages) and services (e.g., herbalism, midwifery, prostitution) to other Africans or to lower-income whites (Mandalas 1990; White 1990). Despite colonial prohibitions, African women continued to manufacture and to market cloth, pottery and salt for indigenous use (Maier 1986; Cooper 1993; Chuku 1995).

However, greater income derived from marketing to Europeans. African informal sector activities were directly integrated into capitalist commodity chains, including:

- food and clothing production for extractive waged workers and Europeans,
- services and artisan crafts that supported extractive industries (e.g., brickmaking, metal working, tool production),
- services and artisan crafts that supported European agropastoralism (basketmaking, tool production, blacksmithing, leather tanning, saddlemaking, and traditional veterinary medicine),
- hawking natural resources that could be processed by whites into profitable commodities or could be applied as inputs into agriculture or industries (e.g., animal hides for leather production, ivory, rubber, bird guano for fertilizer),
- and *head portage* (transport) of European crops and goods to markets.

Africans even continued to generate cash through production and trading in commodities that were restricted by colonial states to Europeans. Indeed, capitalists maximized profits through illicit black market practices that were often conducted by women at below-market prices. Despite the dual marketing
system, there was a continuing livestock trade controlled by ethnic groups that had specialized traditionally in this economic sector (Samatar et al. 1988). Peasants continued their clandestine diamond prospecting, operating a lucrative black market to Europeans and African elites, and half of all gold was panned illegally by Africans (Falola 1992: 108-111, 123; van Onselen 1996: 170). From repressive, militarized concessions operated by the Belgians and the French, peasants somehow collected and smuggled valuable mahogany and rubber to European firms in the coastal towns (Geschiere 1983; Monson 1993; Dumett 2001; Rich 2005). In their agricultural off-season, some peasants organized small trade caravans that used the cover of moving European export goods to transport illicit indigenous commodities to distant markets (Swindell 1992: 140). Igbo women continued to act as middle-traders of palm oil (Ekechi 1981; Chuku 1995). These informal sector activities persisted because they served the needs of both blacks and whites. Indeed, informal sector goods and services fed into capitalist commodity chains by supplying inputs for industries and farmers and by provisioning workers at industrial sites. The African informal sector “became articulated with new forms of employment and commodity production, albeit dominated by foreign merchant capital” (Swindell 1992: 156).

Conceptual reprise

Even though peasants have persisted through the longue durée of the modern world-system, it is not clear that today’s scholars understand their position within capitalism any better than nineteenth-century scholars did. Marx (1957, vol. 1: 546-47) predicted that capitalism would transform the peasantry into wage workers, by abolishing their ties to the land and rendering them “free” to sell their labor-power. Clearly, this linear proletarianization thesis does not help us understand colonized African peasants, for only a very small minority of their households were dependent on wages as late as the 1940’s (Arrighi and Saul 1973: 69). The vast majority of Africans remained independent peasants (Rodney 1982: 262), so colonialism resulted in impoverishment without proletarianization (Amin 1980: 138, 151-52).

World-systems analysis offers three key theses that help us understand colonial African peasants more clearly. According to Marxists and many radicals (Szymanski 1983: 85), wage labor is the defining characteristic of capitalism. However, world-systems scholars find this notion shortsighted. Wallerstein
argues that the modern world-system will never achieve full proletarianization and that the mix of nonwage and wage labor enables capitalists to maintain high profits ("Discussion" 1979: 357-58). If we assess the modern world-system in terms of how a majority of the world’s workers spend their lives, the defining characteristic of capitalism is not wage labor. Over the longue durée of capitalism, far more laborers have been employed in the informal sector. Moreover, more laborers have been trapped in contexts of debt bondage and forced and coerced labor than have ever been proletarianized. Consequently, wage labor would fall very near the end of a numerically ordered list of the types of labor that have characterized the modern world-system (Tabak 2000).

For a majority of colonial Africans, informal sector activities, tenancy, sharecropping, and subsistence production on communal plots were not temporary nonwaged forms on an inevitable path toward proletarianization (Amin and van der Linden 1997: 4; Bryceson, Kay and Mooij 2000: 208n7). According to Samir Amin (1975: 44), proletarianization of peasants is a rare exception to the normal operations of agrarian capitalism.[2] In addition to ignoring nonwaged labor of peasants, many scholars carelessly disguise forced labor and debt bondage under the rubric of proletarianization.[3] For example, John Higginson (1989) inaccurately argues that "coercion and forced labor are parts of the process of proletarianization in that they compel people to sell their labor power" ("Discussion" 1979: 361). World-systems analysis offers us greater conceptual clarity about contexts in which unfree peasants are integrated into capitalist commodity chains. Wallerstein (1987: 319-20) contends that the defining feature of capitalism has been its mixture of free and non-free labor, not the trend toward proletarianization. Thus, capitalist agriculture does not "require the emergence of a rural proletariat" (Brass 1999: 2). On the one hand, the presence of debt bondage, forced labor or slavery-like conditions do not relegate the peasant to a precapitalist economy (Brass 2003: 102). Indeed, unfree labor is a relation of production that capitalists find very profitable (Dunaway 2002). On the other hand, these households provide nonwaged labor, quite often as independent producers or contractors, so these are not the distorted forms of proletarianization that so many scholars have claimed them to be. Scholars almost consistently under-estimate or ignore rural nonfarm activities that do not involve wage earning in the formal sectors, but may be linked to capitalist production and/or profit accumulation (Bryceson and Jamal 1997; Dunaway 2008).
World-systems analysis provides a third creative approach for studying peasants. As we see in colonial Africa, peasants undertake a number of different types of nonwaged and waged work. That diverse portfolio of labors is organized within what Wallerstein (1983: 91) terms semiproletarianized households. These represent millions of structural units that enable capitalists to maximize their systematic extraction of surpluses from workers and to externalize costs of production to their households. In my own research, I have analyzed the ways in which the nonwaged labors of Native Americans (Dunaway 1994) and slaves on small U.S. plantations (Dunaway 2003) were integrated into capitalist commodity chains. But I have also employed it to analyze contemporary Philippine fishing peasants (Dunaway and Macabuac 2009). Through that diverse research, I have come to realize that we need a more nuanced argument that does not assume or imply a linear progression from peasant to proletarianization. I have found both feminist and radical approaches to be narrow and imprecise in their description of types of labor done by peasants and rural households. On the one hand, the term semiproletariat accurately describes a segment of the peasantry, but it fails to recognize that high proportion of peasants who rarely, if ever, rely on wage earning. On the other hand, I am also troubled by the popular use of the term by scholars who argue that peasants will inevitably make the transition to full-time wage earners (e.g., O’Brien 1984; Amin and van der Linden 1997; Bryceson, Kay and Mooij 2000). Households are more appropriately envisioned along a fluid continuum that more carefully recognizes women’s unpaid labors, nonwaged work and non-monetary resources (see Figure 1, website). It is crucial to make this distinction because a majority of the world’s people still earn their livelihoods through nonwaged labor in economic activities that are not transitional to wage earning (ILO 2007). Like most of today’s peasants, colonial Africans should be more accurately thought of as mixed livelihood households in which nonwaged labor forms (both free and unfree) predominate, with very little likelihood of future transition to household dependency on wages. Wage earning is not the primary mechanism through which these households are integrated into the modern world-system. Instead, these households primarily provide nonwaged labors to capitalist commodity chains that, in turn, extract surpluses from them and externalize costs of production to them (Dunaway in progress).

**Endnotes**

[1] This included 100 percent of cassava, 90 percent of maize, 67 percent of cashews, 67 percent of cotton, 43 percent of rice, 100 percent of groundnuts, 21 percent of copra, and 20 percent of tobacco.

[2] According to the ILO (2007: 5), nonwaged labor has steadily expanded in the Global South since 1950. The rural informal sector still thrives as significant source of peasant income, just as it did in colonial Africa. At present, the informal sector accounts for 78 percent of Asian workers, 66 percent of Africans and 52 percent of Latin Americans (ILO 2002). Worldwide, the informal sector accounts for nine out of every 10 women working outside agriculture (UN 2001: 122).

[3] Despite debt bondage, ties to the land, and other legal constraints, peasants have been erroneously described as “proletarianized” (Bryceson, Kay and Mooij 2000: 248). Exploitative sharecropping has been miscategorized as “disguised proletarianisation” (Banaji 2003: 76) or “proletarianisation combined with neo-feudalism” (Murray 2002: 647, 650). Harriss-White (2003: 24) carelessly describes the debt bondage of peasants as “savage proletarianisation.”

[4] I have conceptualized the semiproletarianized household in far greater depth than can be developed here (see Dunaway 2002, 2008, in progress).

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*Tables and other support materials are provided at the electronic archive (cited as website in notes) http://filebox.vt.edu/users/wdunaway/africa*


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