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The past of the futures: inquiries taking the lens of economic philosophy. Introduction to the special section

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Abstract: The relation between the past and the future serves as a point of departure for theories and perspectives in philosophy and economics. It is therefore not surprising that the economic philosophy also addresses this relation. The economist and philosopher Frank Knight had already pointed out a paradox in this relationship, which arises from the realization that the mere possibility of solving future problems rests on knowledge generated in the past for a future in which social reality may have changed. Building on this insight, our special issue brings together ontological, epistemological, pragmatic, and normative questions that arise in economics, philosophy, and ethics, and demonstrates how different conceptualizations of this relationship can shape core concepts in these disciplines, such as agency, change, and responsibility. We view uncertainty as an opportunity to rethink these concepts, highlighting forms of knowledge, judgment, and practical orientation that become indispensable once continuity can no longer be taken for granted and certainty fades. However, expectations, which are inevitably based on past experiences, do not rule out open possibilities.

Keywords: temporality, uncertainty, agency, possibility, judgment, responsibility.

Challenges

This special section was created in response to a call for papers issued by the *Working Group on Economic Philosophy and Ethics* in the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Philosophie (DG Phil) and *The Journal of Philosophical Economics*. The papers included in this section were presented at the *Annual Meeting of the Working Group on Economic Philosophy and Ethics* in St. Gallen in September 2025 or the *Economists' Philosophy Day* [1] in November 2025. Both events addressed the conceptualizations and understandings of the connections between the past and future with respect to time, uncertainty, and the epistemic and moral dimensions of socioeconomic action (TUEM). The events have also demonstrated the need for theoretical or philosophical frameworks to understand potential issues stemming from the TUEM area.

'Future' and 'uncertainty' are undoubtedly two of the most intriguing buzzwords in philosophy and beyond. In times of crisis, they receive increasing attention (Kuepers et al. 2023). The 2008/9 financial and economic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic provide recent evidence for this. Currently, the climate crisis presents an unprecedented challenge at all levels of socioeconomic action (Waddock 2026). This challenge is completely different from the uncertainty that actors face regarding the realization of their action intentions. As with technological risks, a common level of uncertainty emerges and discloses human exposure to the fragility of familiar horizons of expectation (Pelluchon 2023). And yet, attempting to cope with it presupposes a certain level of shared imagination and affective anticipation of *desirable* futures. The extent to which we can imagine radical future scenarios determines the specific utopias we dare to dream of. Can we, for example, as Arnould and Helkkula (2024, p. 1) have asked, 'imagine (...) a future in which the capitalist market economy is dethroned from its dominant position'?

'Uncertainty' usually has a negative connotation. In comparison, the connotation of 'future' tends to be positive. While this may be in a process of change, the word 'future' is still associated with problem solutions, change, and innovation. Both science and society share a fascination with new beginnings and transformations with other disciplines and subject areas. This is reflected in debates with prefixes such as 'new' (work), 'future' (skills), 'post' (capitalism, socialism, colonialism,

truth, growth, and apocalypse), 'next' (generation and the internet), and 'transformative' (AI and consumption). These prefixes attempt to establish relationality, coupling the past and the future or taking steps toward such a coupling while simultaneously addressing the new.

While the new and other positively evaluated forms of 'the next' are welcome, no one may want an 'uncertain future.' Scholarly approaches have specifically addressed this issue. One approach is to understand the origins of uncertainty and 'tame' it using scientific knowledge. This is especially the case when uncertainty is understood 'as a lack of knowledge about the future that goes beyond probabilistic risk' (Dorobat et al. 2026, p. 192). Another approach is to highlight the positive aspects of uncertainty by coining terms such as 'radical open future.' According to this concept, the future emerges from a realm of possibilities that remains closed to us unless we actively engage with it (Róna-Tas 2020; Svetlova 2021). For some authors, radical openness derives from the event itself which introduces an irreducible novelty that disrupts the continuity between past and future and thus discloses unprecedented possibilities. For Arendt (1958), it is natality that marks a genuine event, as a new beginning that cannot be deduced from what came before, and in which the human capacity for action is grounded.

Within the field of economic philosophy (*Wirtschaftsphilosophie*), it is emphasized that expectations about the future are subject to the paradox that the future cannot be understood without recourse to the past. Therefore, any expectation is generated by a reflection, re-actualization, or re-appropriation of past experiences and consequently always refers back to what is already known. Approaches to philosophy and economics have addressed the paradox of the future (Steele and Stefánsson 2021) and its challenges, particularly in the context of transformations and innovations.

Ontological, epistemological, pragmatic, and normative questions in economics, philosophy and ethics

Exploring the connections between the past and the future raises ontological, epistemological, pragmatic, and normative questions. These questions do not

arise in isolation from one another but are interrelated. The common denominator of all problems is that something that is of our making cannot be independent of us. Ontological questions concern identifying what is subject to change. The ontological problem is based on assumptions about the constitution of the social reality in which we act. Does this reality allow for a connection between past and future based on human action? How is such a connection established, and how can it be identified? Does it result from recognizable social mechanisms? For reference, the Laplace's demon has complete knowledge of the universe and knows all of its laws and future states (Schütz 1959).

The epistemic problem concerns the relevance and validity of the knowledge that actors have gained or can gain about the social world. As Frank Knight (1885-1972), representative of the first Chicago school of economics (Emmet 2009; Medema 2024) observed, economic action models that attempt to establish solutions for an unknown future based on present knowledge give rise to a paradox: we do things that we know, or at least suspect, will not work because the world (social reality) that our fallible knowledge describes has already changed. Knight ([1921] 1964, p. 313) saw the problem that our knowledge may not match the changes in the states of affairs that it addresses:

> We live in a world full of contradiction and paradox, a fact of which perhaps the most fundamental illustration is this: that the existence of a problem of knowledge depends on the future being different from the past, while the possibility of the solution of the problem depends on the future being like the past.

Epistemic aspects relate to our knowledge of the entities and relations we consider to be in the world. The epistemic problem, as Knight has put it, refers to the reasonableness of projecting knowledge from the past to future states when the conditions for the applicability of that knowledge have eroded. This is in line with the view of Husserl, who argued that the anticipation of something absolutely new in the sense of an 'unknown unknown' is impossible for consciousness, since it projects the future as a 'field' of expectations (cf. Husserl 2006) based on past experiences.

Therefore, it is impossible to assign probabilities to events or states under uncertainty. This contradicts the corresponding interpretations of Knightian uncertainty in decision theory (Arend 2024; for an overview of the various interpretations of 'Knightian uncertainty,' see Dorobat et al. 2026). Schütz (1972,

p. 267; Schütz 1959, p. 79) describes a new experience that cannot be linked to the past through anticipation as 'strange' (*fremdartig*). Since the strangeness of an experience can only be attributed against the backdrop of the individual's socially shared knowledge ('stock of knowledge,' Schütz 1959, p. 79), the future experience is nonetheless related to the past.

In line with Weber and Husserl (Prendergast 1986), Schütz can be interpreted as having developed the philosophical underpinnings of social scientific research, paving the way for interpretive sociology and qualitative research methods. In contrast, neoclassical economics has positioned itself within a philosophical research tradition related to the modern Anglo-Saxon concept of 'science.' This has given rise to different models of economic action as well as different understandings of the knowledge foundations of policies. These consequences are immediately apparent in the interpretation of the pragmatic aspects of the TUEM dimensions of socioeconomic action.

The pragmatic problem arises for lifeworld actors, science, and society. As Knight (1922, p. 192) has put it: 'It is doubtless quite generally true of every science that its study is motivated by both sorts of considerations, the quest for "truth for its own sake" and the desire to utilize truth in improving the conditions of life.' Knight also emphasized the normative aspects of economic action. As he explained, 'It is impossible to keep the idea of desire or preference, as a brute fact, free from critical implications as to what "ought" to be, unless the theorist has very clear ideas in both fields' (Knight 1922, p. 193). By portraying 'human action (…) as a process of aspiration and discovery' (Boyd 1999, p. xxiii), Knight introduced an element of openness into his approach to human or economic action.

With reference to the pragmatist philosopher William James (1842-1910), Schütz (1959; 1972) pointed to the interest of actors in the anticipation of future events. He argued that, in many cases, actors can correctly anticipate the structure and type of future events. Interest-based, future-oriented socioeconomic action gives rise to normative issues regarding critical reflection on the constituents of a decision-making process and the identification and justification of normative reasons (Finlay 2010). The normative problem arises from the need to reflect on and determine the goals and methods of instrumental action, as well as the axiological values used to evaluate them.

Economics

Economic theories of 'logical action' (for Pareto, see Mongardini 1975) have established a means-ends framework that has left its mark in other disciplines as well. Economic models of choice, if the choice is understood as a choice among a set of goods, are not adapted to a world of uncertainty. These models are perhaps the most parsimonious approaches in terms of what they require for explaining economic action (Hirschman [1977] 2013): Given an actor's budget constraint and preferences, the desired and (depending on the market process) achievable future state is a direct consequence of the past. The unexpected occurs in the form of unintended consequences of actions, or externalities (Koehn 2010; Neck 2014).

Neoclassical economic theory provides a specific conceptualization that, due to the notion of objective time, the auctioneer model, and other related assumptions about how actors can grasp their environment and achieve their goals, ensures that equilibria can be reached. Interpreted as a normative ideal, the state of equilibrium means that no one intends to change their plans. Therefore, uncertainty does not exist; the auctioneer coordinates action plans in objective time, and the only open question is the one about the solution that the auctioneer process brings about. The parties involved share the auctioneering process that realizes their futures.

According to Austrian economics, the foundation of economic action is knowledge. Its founder, Carl Menger (1840-1921), conceptualized economic and legal entities as problem-solving actors (Menger [1923] 1968; Milford 1992). Perhaps more than any other school of thought, Austrian economics has paid attention to the role of time, dynamics, and uncertainty in economic action (Shackle 1972; Lachmann 1959; 1970). Subjectivist Austrian approaches to economic behaviour developed under the influence of phenomenology, particularly that of Alfred Schütz, who was a member of the *Geistkreis* (mind circle) in the 1920s Vienna (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2014; Schnettler 2007).

Knight, a liberal in the style of Menger, institutionalist, philosopher, and advocate of the neoclassical idea of perfect competition (Langlois 2024), rejected the view that reduced the interest in understanding how actors deal with the connection between the future and the past, the relationship between means and

ends, and knowledge-based judgment to a timeless, one-dimensional concept of utility (Witt 2016). Knight was interested in the origin of profit, which he attributed to uncertainty. To address uncertainty and risk, Knight emphasized the roles of entrepreneurs and profits.

New perspectives in Austrian economics conceptualize uncertainty as constitutive of the emergence of firms (Dorobat et al. 2026; Haase 2023), contradicting transaction-cost-based explanations (Coase 1937). Post-Keynesian economists, following Keynes (1921) and Knight ([1921] 1964), have investigated the nature of future states. Reading the work of Knight and Keynes 'as a call to deal theoretically with unforeseen contingencies' (Svetlova 2021, p. 994), post-Keynesian researchers tried to answer the question of what can be known at all, including future states. However, a positive view of uncertainty, as a source of entrepreneurship, innovation, and freedom, remains the exception in economic approaches (Esposito 2013; Folta 2007).

As a source of particular 'logics of control' (Clark 1939; Esposito 2013), economics has left its mark on other fields of research, such as business research or public management. The respective 'logics' influence the choice of research questions or theories and thus the embodied ontologies and the knowledge to be gained about processes, practices or social mechanisms (Bunge 2004; Koehn 2020; Sawyer 2004). Business research tends to favour the possibility of control and planning based on scientific knowledge. This is evident in its efforts to solve the problems associated with the desired transformation of unsustainable business practices into sustainable future practices. The fixation with numbers in economics and business research can be understood as a way of 'taming' or 'mitigating' uncertainty (Dorobat et al. 2026). Certain cognitive tools, such as accounting or bookkeeping, are thought to help navigate uncertain business worlds. However, it is questionable to what extent something that is neither measurable nor insurable can be managed (cf. Chrisman et al. 2026, p. 5).

Philosophy

The interrelation between past and future and the associated dynamics of change have been discussed in philosophy since antiquity. Both Plato and

Aristotle tried to 'explain change, a phenomenon that many philosophers since ancient times have thought to be a paradox' (Milford 1992, p. 164). Although they addressed change differently in terms of form, essence, or ideal, both of them established analytical frameworks that linked past and future.

The challenge of uncertainty in philosophy encompasses at least epistemological, ontological, normative, and existential dimensions. Epistemologically, uncertainty is addressed in the context of the limits of human knowledge: The ancient sceptics, Agrippan and Cartesian scepticism, Hume's critique of the uniformity principle mark stages in a long-standing debate about the possibility and nature of knowledge (Williams 2001). Early empiricism and positivism (Bourdeau 2022; Creath 2021) promoted the connection between knowledge and action (Bacon [1620] 1902; for Comte, see Bourdeau 2022) and thus the human capacity to create and manage change, ideally at all levels of society. This view has had a significant impact on various scientific fields.

In epistemology, uncertainty is associated with the human inability to obtain reliable knowledge. In the absence of reliable foundations of knowledge in either empirical evidence or rationality, fallibilism can be seen as a response to epistemological uncertainty. For example, Plato contrasted knowledge with belief, arguing that only beliefs, not knowledge, are fallible (Williams 2001, p. 19). Unlike knowledge, 'uncertainty' is not an honorific term. It reminds us of the limitations of our knowledge and how it is acquired. We attempt to reduce, control, or enclose fallibility by improving the procedures or methods used to justify knowledge. However, uncertainty cannot be reduced, controlled, managed, or contained. It cannot be a variable in the quantitative analysis that addresses, for example, 'how uncertainty affects family firms' (Chrisman et al. 2026, p. 11).

Studying the connection of the past and the future also means delving deeply into the philosophical and phenomenological foundations of the social, cultural, or technical sciences. According to Husserl, uncertainty emerges in its radical form as open possibility (*offene Möglichkeit*, Husserl 1966, p. 43), which is characterized by indeterminacy. This indeterminacy is not due to a specific orientation toward the future, nor to various conflicting orientations toward the future, but rather to a fundamental openness: 'Wherever a consciousness has lost the mode of certainty and transitioned into uncertainty, there is also talk of

possibilities' (Husserl 1966, p. 39; our translation). Heidegger (1979, pp. 251 and 252) considers the anxiety associated with 'being-toward-death' as foundational to an awareness of existential openness, whereas Sartre regards uncertainty as a condition of human freedom.

In postmodern philosophy, the event designates not a self-contained occurrence, but a transformative break whose meaning emerges through repetition, displacement, and recontextualization. For Derrida, the event character of a sign depends on iterability: a sign, utterance, or mark can be repeated, cited, and detached from one context in order to function in another, where it may generate effects that cannot be fully anticipated or controlled (Derrida 1988). For Deleuze, the event is not simply identical with what happens in a concrete situation; rather, it is a virtual singularity, or point of potential transformation, that becomes actualized in specific circumstances without being fully reducible to them (Deleuze 1993). The new therefore does not arise through a simple break with repetition, but through repetition as difference, actualization, and recontextualization. In this sense, the event unsettles established expectations of the future, because its significance can only be retrospectively interpreted while remaining open to further transformation.

Ethics

The classical concept of responsibility can be understood as a paradigmatic example of the epistemically determined link between the past and the future. It presupposes a regular connection between action and action consequence, usually treated in terms of causality; an ontology that presupposes agents, actions, and action consequences; a model of the person (for Kant, see Westphal 2019; for Hobbes and Pufendorf, see Holland 2017); and philosophical concepts such as intentionality, volition, and will. The classical concept of responsibility exemplifies the difficulties that can arise from identifying the connection between the present (in terms of intentions and objectives) and the future (in terms of intended and unintended consequences).

The difficulty of unravelling the complexities and interconnectedness of the socioeconomic world has raised concerns about the applicability of the classical

model of responsibility in our modern, hypercomplex societies (Jonas 1979; Koehn 2019). Bertrand (2019) reflects on the difference between Knightian risk and uncertainty with reference to Hans Jonas's (1903-1993) precautionary principle and his ethics of the future. Jonas (1979, p. 7) interpreted humanity's technological options as 'weather lights from the future' (*Wetterleuchten aus der Zukunft*). Grounding his response in the 'anticipation of the threat by the awareness that the worst is possible' (Bertrand 2019, p. 5) or a 'heuristics of fear' (p. 8), Jonas developed an 'ethics of responsibility (a solicitude recognized as duty) in the direction of the future, which is the horizon of all existence' (p. 5). A path seems to emerge here that can be further developed by economics and ethics because 'in a world of uncertainty, the cognitive faculty of judgment was essential and unavoidable' (Langlois 2024, p. 4). Judgment is not only required when evaluating the options that have already been identified, but also when assessing which path or end should be chosen: Since '(s)ituations and options do not just exist out there in the ether' (Koehn 2020, p. 249), 'we give ourselves options' (p. 250; italics in original) in a process that, according to Knight (1922), takes time and is governed by knowledge, norms, and values. It is here that contingency, agency, and the human capacity to make judgments become the preconditions for diverse theories and practices of freedom and the points of entry for ethics and moral theory into the debate.

The special section

This special section addresses three major reasons for the deep-seated deficits in conceptualizing the connection between time, uncertainty, and the dimensions of shared futures. These deficits stem from a lack of awareness of the intersection between philosophical contributions and those of other disciplines to the TUEM field. They also stem from limited attention given to specific theoretical frameworks and from limitations resulting from considering only the interests of individuals and organizations rather than of entities that are not members of the public, community, or society—such as animals, plants, or ecosystems—or of the public, community, or society themselves. The articles in this special section contribute to the intersection of philosophy and economics. They reflect the consequences of choosing different theoretical frameworks (see the articles by Ivarola et al. and Stiefenhofer and Neesham) and the 'public interest' (see the article by Dutta) or

disastrous societal consequences of narratives launched by powerful, if not unethical individuals and organizations (see the article by Seewald).

Cicero thought that 'the honestum is always the utile' (Dutta, in this special section), an idea that could be approached using Schütz's (1959; 1972) argumentative framework. According to this framework, it is an anticipation perhaps based on past experiences. *Bishakha Dutta*'s article 'When rules run out: Cicero's *De Officiis* and the ethics of transparency in commercial transactions' revisits two classical cases: the Alexandrian grain merchant who possesses information about incoming ships during a famine, and the seller of a defective house who benefits from the buyer's ignorance. Both examples concern situations in which silence is legally permissible and financially advantageous, yet ethically problematic. The paper argues that Cicero's ancient moral philosophy offers more than a premodern reflection on virtue; it provides a systematic account of economic agency under uncertainty. By distinguishing between nondisclosure and concealment, civil law and natural obligation, apparent advantage and true utility, the article shows that transparency is not merely a moral supplement to commerce but one of its structural conditions. In this sense, Cicero reframes economic uncertainty as an ethical problem: when institutional rules no longer determine action, agents must deliberate about the trust, *fides*, and social bonds that make economic exchange possible in the first place.

Leonardo Ivarola, Alfredo García, and *Martin Szybisz* in their paper 'Beyond order: contingency, recursion, and meta-stability in economics' present a framing of economic action that differs from standard analysis. Drawing from the work of Quentin Meillassoux and Yuk Hui on contingency and critiques of economic equilibrium, they present an 'open-future' approach. Meillassoux's and Hui's approaches to absolute contingency can be interpreted as a theorization of an inherently uncertain world. Against the backdrop of absolute contingency, uncertainty emerges as a fundamental aspect of economic activity. This does not render equilibrium impossible, but rather questions the applicability of equilibrium models and, by extension, the notion of equilibrium as a normative ideal. While economic actors are still well advised to develop action plans that link the past, present, and future, they must be aware that the world on which their plans are based can change. Since this change can thwart their plans and make economic policy vulnerable, the authors recommend policy measures that exercise

caution in the form of making use of future scenarios. While patterns may emerge, it is uncertain whether they will persist over the relevant time period. For this reason, time is a factor that must be taken into account in this perspective. This is a problem that affects both policymakers and economic actors.

A key difference between the neoclassical and Austrian approaches stems from their understanding of time. Standard economic models treat time as an exogenous variable. Treating time as an endogenous variable complicates model building. It also necessitates deciding how to conceptualize time. The decisions or actions of the neoclassical individual are coordinated by an auctioneer operating within a framework based on objective time or a Newtonian time-space configuration. In contrast, the (subjectivist) Austrian individual must contend with both subjective and objective time.

The absence of model-based representations of endogenized time is the starting point of *Pascal Stiefenhofer's* and *Cristina Neesham's* analysis in their paper 'On the geometry of time in rational agency.' They take issue with the treatment of time in standard economic models, where it is typically introduced as an exogenous variable rather than conceptualized as constitutive of rational agency itself. Stiefenhofer and Neesham elaborate the idea that both objective and subjective time are important for the understanding of economic action. Rationality is understood as the factor that ensures the continuity of action within a temporal structure. Uncertainty arises from the fundamental openness of the chosen path within self-imposed constraints, making it inherent to action. This perspective is incompatible with optimization models. Their model of the temporal structure is based on three interpretations: agency as 'motion in a state space,' rationality as the preservation of continuity of action in this state space, and uncertainty as an inherent characteristic of action.

Like Ivarola, García and Szybisz, Stiefenhofer and Neesham adhere to rational action modelling. However, it can no longer be assumed that actions take a direction predetermined by the maximization of preferences. Furthermore, deep cracks are emerging between the paths of time enacted by individual actors. Uncertainty, a fundamental part of economic systems, is seeping through each crack.

This opens the door to one of the most debated and perhaps bizarre figures in economic analysis: the entrepreneur. The entrepreneurial role emerges from the

inability of economic models to conceptualize the 'cracks' as well as many other unexplained variables that are usually exogenized. In his paper 'Messianic economics. the entrepreneur as the agent of uncertain futures in modern economic ecosystems,' *Michael Seewald* traces the figure of the entrepreneur across economic theory and lifeworld conceptualizations. Seewald helps us navigate a world constituted by narratives and storytelling, guiding us through exemplary economic theory. He also demonstrates how systems of ideas can emerge from the social world when individuals are given the power and resources to fulfill their potential. Against this backdrop, it should be noted that, decades before the launch of this special section, economists rejected the idea that the discipline of economics creates and applies models that represent social reality. Along these lines, McCloskey (1983) proposed that economic theory substantiates debates in economics and policies with rhetoric rather than theoretical analysis and empirical evidence.

Conclusions

Economic philosophy can improve understanding of how the TUEM concepts are used in different research areas. The distinction between modelling individual actions and modelling socioeconomic realities exemplifies how framing a problem affects its understanding. Theorizing the connection between the past and the future at the level of individual action requires interpretation, understanding, and rationality. Perhaps the most elaborate analysis in this area has been developed by phenomenology. From this perspective, anticipation and projection, as well as the 'strangeness' of the unexpected, have a systematic place.

Contingency theory has dismantled the systematic connection. At the level of the actors, different 'logics of action' can develop. The idea that anything is possible cannot be represented by models that contradict this assumption. Taking this approach would likely create a new paradox. In contrast, the work of Stiefenhofer and Neesham introduces uncertainty into economic action, not into the world.

Models stem from a variety of theories, conveying their underlying ideas and values. Standard models depict entrepreneurs as operating in environments that are characterized by objective time, lawlikeness, or patternedness. This is a

world that can be shaken by exogenous shocks, externalities, or the activities of the 'irrational' or 'messianic' entrepreneur. The entrepreneur's role is to introduce something new to the world. This aspect sheds light on the limitations of Knight's approach to uncertainty. The idea of perfect competition that Knight was attracted to has problems being realized. This aligns with our contemporary knowledge that profit may have other sources as well, such as power. The narrative of the irrational entrepreneur with inexplicable foresight of future events or states aligns well with the 'logics of action' based on rationality because it contrasts with them and is external to them, or 'strange.'

Taken together, the contributions to this special section suggest that the relation between past and future is not adequately understood as a problem of prediction, planning, or control alone. It is also a problem of how socioeconomic actors inherit conceptual frameworks, narrative forms, institutional routines, and normative expectations through which futures become thinkable in the first place. Uncertainty, in this view, is not merely a deficit of information to be overcome, but a condition under which agents must form judgments, sustain practices, and take responsibility for courses of action whose consequences cannot be fully known in advance. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of ethics in enabling individuals to make decisions based on their judgment.

By bringing together perspectives from economics, philosophy, and ethics, this special section therefore invites a reconsideration of economic action as temporally situated, epistemically limited, and normatively exposed. Its aim is not to resolve the paradoxes of future-oriented action by means of a unified theory. Rather, it seeks to make visible the assumptions, distinctions, and forms of reasoning that shape how futures are imagined, narrated, modelled, and enacted, and how, in turn, these futures draw upon, transform, or unsettle the past from which they emerge.

Endnotes

[1] https://www.dgphil.de/world-philosophy-day-musings-from-prof-heisook-kim-international-federation-of-philosophical-societies-fisp/.

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Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

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