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    <title>Journal of Philosophical Economics - Latest Publications</title>
    <description>Latest articles</description>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 09 Mar 2026 23:40:46 +0000</pubDate>
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    <author>Journal of Philosophical Economics</author>
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      <title>Infinitely elastic? -the influence of the Efficient Markets paradigm on financial regulation</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper examines the influence of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) on financial regulation, using a perspective drawing on arguments from the Philosophy of Science discipline.The paper aims to show that, prior to the global financial crisis, there already existed a large body of empirically observed asset price anomalies, which may be seen to contradict the notion of elastic demand curves. However, proponents of the EMH tended to interpret these as corroborations, rather than refutations, through articulation of what Kuhn (1996) would characterise as ad-hoc hypotheses. The Information Hypothesis is identified as particularly influential in this respect. Furthermore, the paper makes the argument that, when supplemented with the Information Hypothesis, the hypothesis of elastic demand curves becomes tautological and thus unfalsifiable, violating Popper's standard for scientific theories. A potential lesson from this relates to more rigorous vetting of scientific standards in research used to motivate policy changes.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 13:08:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.16371</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.16371</guid>
      <author>Skrutkowski, Mathias</author>
      <dc:creator>Skrutkowski, Mathias</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper examines the influence of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) on financial regulation, using a perspective drawing on arguments from the Philosophy of Science discipline.The paper aims to show that, prior to the global financial crisis, there already existed a large body of empirically observed asset price anomalies, which may be seen to contradict the notion of elastic demand curves. However, proponents of the EMH tended to interpret these as corroborations, rather than refutations, through articulation of what Kuhn (1996) would characterise as ad-hoc hypotheses. The Information Hypothesis is identified as particularly influential in this respect. Furthermore, the paper makes the argument that, when supplemented with the Information Hypothesis, the hypothesis of elastic demand curves becomes tautological and thus unfalsifiable, violating Popper's standard for scientific theories. A potential lesson from this relates to more rigorous vetting of scientific standards in research used to motivate policy changes.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Keynes, Kalecki and Minsky -Post Keynesian champions in comparison or: joining forces, horses for courses or the necessity of discrimination?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The effort to pluralise economics requires informed choices about paradigms, understanding their features and affiliations. Theories must be compared based on their paradigmatic localisation. A hermeneutic analysis challenges the view that Keynes, Kalecki, and Minsky share a unified Post Keynesian paradigm. Kalecki's closed system contrasts with Keynes's open system, suggesting Kalecki may align more with new-Keynesian models. Minsky, however, shares Keynes's open system ontology. This indicates that 'Post Keynesianism' may misleadingly suggest coherence where significant differences exist.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Dec 2025 14:42:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.16549</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.16549</guid>
      <author>Heise, Arne</author>
      <dc:creator>Heise, Arne</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The effort to pluralise economics requires informed choices about paradigms, understanding their features and affiliations. Theories must be compared based on their paradigmatic localisation. A hermeneutic analysis challenges the view that Keynes, Kalecki, and Minsky share a unified Post Keynesian paradigm. Kalecki's closed system contrasts with Keynes's open system, suggesting Kalecki may align more with new-Keynesian models. Minsky, however, shares Keynes's open system ontology. This indicates that 'Post Keynesianism' may misleadingly suggest coherence where significant differences exist.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>From rational to behavioral: An epistemological bridge between Markowitz, Fama, and Shiller</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This article examines the epistemology of finance by analyzing how different theoretical perspectives shape knowledge and decision-making in markets. A comparative analysis is adopted to contrast the underlying premises of each perspective and their applicability in contexts of uncertainty, volatility, and structural changes in markets. The findings demonstrate that, while each theoretical framework provides valuable analytical tools, their combination offers a more robust understanding of financial behavior. The integration of these approaches, along with interdisciplinary methodologies, is essential for a more holistic and adaptable view of financial epistemology, allowing for a more accurate evaluation of the interaction between rationality, uncertainty, and behavior in contemporary global markets.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2025 13:34:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15444</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15444</guid>
      <author>Arango-Vasquez, Leonel</author>
      <dc:creator>Arango-Vasquez, Leonel</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This article examines the epistemology of finance by analyzing how different theoretical perspectives shape knowledge and decision-making in markets. A comparative analysis is adopted to contrast the underlying premises of each perspective and their applicability in contexts of uncertainty, volatility, and structural changes in markets. The findings demonstrate that, while each theoretical framework provides valuable analytical tools, their combination offers a more robust understanding of financial behavior. The integration of these approaches, along with interdisciplinary methodologies, is essential for a more holistic and adaptable view of financial epistemology, allowing for a more accurate evaluation of the interaction between rationality, uncertainty, and behavior in contemporary global markets.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ethics and Ends in Economic Definition</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Robbins’ influential definition of economics as the science that studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses has been widely adopted in economics textbooks. However, this definition reflects a teleological commitment that warrants further examination. This paper analyzes the teleological underpinnings of Robbins’ definition and argues for reincorporating ethical considerations about the desirability of different ends into economic analysis. To address this issue, the teleological character of Robbins’ definition will be examined first, which focuses on the means and takes the ends as given, in contrast to two historical conceptions of economics: as the study of wealth and as the science of exchange (catallactics). Subsequently, the paper will focus on homo economicus, the agent responsible for the execution of the means and who makes himself up as a teleological subject. Finally, the idea of how ethics can be integrated into a definition of economics will be presented.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2025 12:36:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15131</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15131</guid>
      <author>Rodrigo, Laera</author>
      <dc:creator>Rodrigo, Laera</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Robbins’ influential definition of economics as the science that studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses has been widely adopted in economics textbooks. However, this definition reflects a teleological commitment that warrants further examination. This paper analyzes the teleological underpinnings of Robbins’ definition and argues for reincorporating ethical considerations about the desirability of different ends into economic analysis. To address this issue, the teleological character of Robbins’ definition will be examined first, which focuses on the means and takes the ends as given, in contrast to two historical conceptions of economics: as the study of wealth and as the science of exchange (catallactics). Subsequently, the paper will focus on homo economicus, the agent responsible for the execution of the means and who makes himself up as a teleological subject. Finally, the idea of how ethics can be integrated into a definition of economics will be presented.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The role of ethical consumption in promoting democratic sustainability: revisiting neoclassical economics through Kantian ethics: Revisiting neoclassical economics through Kantian ethics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper examines the intersection of philosophical ethics and economic theory through the lens of ethical consumption, proposing its transformative potential to steer democratic governance toward sustainability. As awareness of environmental and social imperatives deepens, the demand for ethically produced and environmentally responsible products disrupts traditional economic paradigms focused on utility maximization and market efficiency. This shift, driven by increased transparency, equity concerns, and a commitment to values-based consumption, prompts a critical reassessment of foundational economic assumptions.Conventional neoclassical models, with their emphasis on rational agents and market equilibrium, often neglect crucial elements of sustainability, including ecological integrity, social justice, and intergenerational ethics. In contrast, a democracy rooted in sustainability prioritizes ethical imperatives, long-term accountability, and equitable policies to foster a just future. This paper contrasts the neoclassical, market-centred approach with the growing influence of ethical consumers who prioritize sustainability and moral responsibility over sheer utility, arguing that embedding these ethical dimensions into economic frameworks is essential for creating a consumption paradigm grounded in inclusivity and ethical responsibility.Drawing from White’s Kantian-economic model of decision making (2011) and Inglehart’s theory of intergenerational value transformation (1990), the paper illuminates how evolving societal values challenge traditional economic assumptions. Through a vector bundle approach with projection mapping, the paper proposes a model that integrates Kantian moral imperatives within economic structures, accommodating both fixed moral duties and flexible ethical preferences to capture value shifts over time. This approach envisions an economy aligned with post-materialist values, fostering ethical consumption and supporting sustainable societal well-being through a responsive, value-oriented democratic order.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2025 08:20:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15427</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15427</guid>
      <author>Stiefenhofer, Pascal</author>
      <dc:creator>Stiefenhofer, Pascal</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper examines the intersection of philosophical ethics and economic theory through the lens of ethical consumption, proposing its transformative potential to steer democratic governance toward sustainability. As awareness of environmental and social imperatives deepens, the demand for ethically produced and environmentally responsible products disrupts traditional economic paradigms focused on utility maximization and market efficiency. This shift, driven by increased transparency, equity concerns, and a commitment to values-based consumption, prompts a critical reassessment of foundational economic assumptions.Conventional neoclassical models, with their emphasis on rational agents and market equilibrium, often neglect crucial elements of sustainability, including ecological integrity, social justice, and intergenerational ethics. In contrast, a democracy rooted in sustainability prioritizes ethical imperatives, long-term accountability, and equitable policies to foster a just future. This paper contrasts the neoclassical, market-centred approach with the growing influence of ethical consumers who prioritize sustainability and moral responsibility over sheer utility, arguing that embedding these ethical dimensions into economic frameworks is essential for creating a consumption paradigm grounded in inclusivity and ethical responsibility.Drawing from White’s Kantian-economic model of decision making (2011) and Inglehart’s theory of intergenerational value transformation (1990), the paper illuminates how evolving societal values challenge traditional economic assumptions. Through a vector bundle approach with projection mapping, the paper proposes a model that integrates Kantian moral imperatives within economic structures, accommodating both fixed moral duties and flexible ethical preferences to capture value shifts over time. This approach envisions an economy aligned with post-materialist values, fostering ethical consumption and supporting sustainable societal well-being through a responsive, value-oriented democratic order.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bernard Mandeville ou la mauvaise conscience de l'économie politique</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Beyond the contradictory appreciations of Mandeville famous book, condemned and misinterpreted at the time of its publication, repressed later, Fable of the bees is more relevant today than ever. The two founding acts of modern political economy—namely progressive emancipation of moral since 13th century and Smith’s value theory in the 18th century—are invalidated by the apparent paradoxes presented in Fable of the bees. This double denial of a political economy which was yet to come is what makes Mandeville so subversive nowadays.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Apr 2025 06:51:11 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.14808</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.14808</guid>
      <author>Cartelier, Jean</author>
      <dc:creator>Cartelier, Jean</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Beyond the contradictory appreciations of Mandeville famous book, condemned and misinterpreted at the time of its publication, repressed later, Fable of the bees is more relevant today than ever. The two founding acts of modern political economy—namely progressive emancipation of moral since 13th century and Smith’s value theory in the 18th century—are invalidated by the apparent paradoxes presented in Fable of the bees. This double denial of a political economy which was yet to come is what makes Mandeville so subversive nowadays.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cultural Economics and Economic Epistemology: some Preliminary Considerations</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The works carried out in the 1980s and 1990s in Cultural Economics were premonitory in the sense that they raised problems that are relevant to question, from an epistemological perspective, the hardcore of the main theoretical matrices, and to analyze the evolutions of current capitalism, especially with respect to the different types of intangible capital and the growing financialization of economies. In this article, I do not intend to analyze in detail the main theoretical debates that characterize the development of economic science. My aim, which is much more modest, is to show to what extent what has been considered to be the specificities of Cultural Economics allows us to contribute to these theoretical debates. In a first part, I will explain the mechanisms that characterize the Cultural Economics, and show how, and to what extent, this economy allows refuting the substantial hypothesis used by the main theoretical matrices. In a second part, I will show to what extent the Cultural Economics implies the introduction of Historicity in economic analysis, and thus contributes to the main epistemological debates that have arisen in Economic Science.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2025 14:02:22 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.14631</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.14631</guid>
      <author>Herscovici, Alain</author>
      <dc:creator>Herscovici, Alain</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The works carried out in the 1980s and 1990s in Cultural Economics were premonitory in the sense that they raised problems that are relevant to question, from an epistemological perspective, the hardcore of the main theoretical matrices, and to analyze the evolutions of current capitalism, especially with respect to the different types of intangible capital and the growing financialization of economies. In this article, I do not intend to analyze in detail the main theoretical debates that characterize the development of economic science. My aim, which is much more modest, is to show to what extent what has been considered to be the specificities of Cultural Economics allows us to contribute to these theoretical debates. In a first part, I will explain the mechanisms that characterize the Cultural Economics, and show how, and to what extent, this economy allows refuting the substantial hypothesis used by the main theoretical matrices. In a second part, I will show to what extent the Cultural Economics implies the introduction of Historicity in economic analysis, and thus contributes to the main epistemological debates that have arisen in Economic Science.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Having Too Much: Philosophical Essays on Limitarianism, edited by Ingrid Robeyns, Cambridge, UK, Open Book Publishers, 2023</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Although the limitarian reflection may revise its applied ethical objectives, we believe it will remain fertile ground for the study of ideas on democratic participation from the point of view of material possession. The merit of this volume is that it illustrates this conclusion with in-depth and comprehensive studies that also shed light on the steps to be taken.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2025 11:40:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15163</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15163</guid>
      <author>Cojanu, Valentin</author>
      <dc:creator>Cojanu, Valentin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Although the limitarian reflection may revise its applied ethical objectives, we believe it will remain fertile ground for the study of ideas on democratic participation from the point of view of material possession. The merit of this volume is that it illustrates this conclusion with in-depth and comprehensive studies that also shed light on the steps to be taken.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Valentin Lazea, O Istorie Morală a Politicilor Monetare şi Fiscale [A Moral History of Monetary and Fiscal Policies], Bucureşti, Publica, 2023, 176 pp., 978-606-722-595-2</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The author leads us on a historical journey of moral economics over the last century and a half through an examination of monetary and fiscal policies during the period under review. Methods and conceptual approaches for investigating economic morality are critically analyzed and potential augmentations are proposed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 14 Feb 2025 10:57:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15061</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.15061</guid>
      <author>Teclean, Cezar</author>
      <dc:creator>Teclean, Cezar</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The author leads us on a historical journey of moral economics over the last century and a half through an examination of monetary and fiscal policies during the period under review. Methods and conceptual approaches for investigating economic morality are critically analyzed and potential augmentations are proposed.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Human-Centred Economics The Living Standards of Nations, 2024 Palgrave Macmillan, 356pp. Richard Samans</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Human-Centred Economics: The Living Standards of Nations, by Richard Samans, is a bold and optimistic book. Its main message stems from recognizing the crisis facing the global economy. The book argues that the dominant economic theory of the neoliberal era needs urgent revision and proposes a path that draws on a tradition of liberal thinkers who went far beyond a perspective solely focused on GDP growth.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 24 Nov 2024 09:12:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.14427</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.14427</guid>
      <author>Lopes, Tiago Camarinha</author>
      <dc:creator>Lopes, Tiago Camarinha</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Human-Centred Economics: The Living Standards of Nations, by Richard Samans, is a bold and optimistic book. Its main message stems from recognizing the crisis facing the global economy. The book argues that the dominant economic theory of the neoliberal era needs urgent revision and proposes a path that draws on a tradition of liberal thinkers who went far beyond a perspective solely focused on GDP growth.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Rodney Edvinsson, An economic philosophy of production, work and consumption: a transhistorical framework, New York, NY, Routledge, 2023, vii + 199 pp., hb, ISBN 978-0-367-52225-4</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The author takes us through his journey to find a new and better framework for redefining basic economic concepts such as production, work and consumption. The standard instruments for assessing wealth are criticized and alternatives are proposed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Nov 2024 14:14:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.14271</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.14271</guid>
      <author>Patruti, Alexandru</author>
      <dc:creator>Patruti, Alexandru</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The author takes us through his journey to find a new and better framework for redefining basic economic concepts such as production, work and consumption. The standard instruments for assessing wealth are criticized and alternatives are proposed.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Interdisciplinary Research Programme of Methodological Individualism: Back to Its Foundations</title>
      <description><![CDATA[According to methodological individualism any scientific explanation in the social sciences should have recourse to individual beliefs, wishes, intentions and actions. This article sets forth two practical reasons to endorse a clear-cut, classical version of methodological individualism as a research programme in the social sciences. The first one is that methodological individualism should lead to fundamental heuristic hypotheses. The second reason is that methodological individualism has the epistemological strength of producing statements open to logical refutation.The present article questions highly sophisticated accounts of methodological individualism. It suggests instead four tenets to be a valid research programme in the social sciences underscoring an intuitive language to analyze social phenomena. By doing so, it reviews some distinctive features of methodological individualism: Max Weber’s ideal types, Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of given behaviour, Friedrich Hayek’s concept of individual action and Jon Elster’s account of explanatory mechanisms.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Nov 2024 14:09:57 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.13056</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.13056</guid>
      <author>Bellido, Francisco J.</author>
      <dc:creator>Bellido, Francisco J.</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[According to methodological individualism any scientific explanation in the social sciences should have recourse to individual beliefs, wishes, intentions and actions. This article sets forth two practical reasons to endorse a clear-cut, classical version of methodological individualism as a research programme in the social sciences. The first one is that methodological individualism should lead to fundamental heuristic hypotheses. The second reason is that methodological individualism has the epistemological strength of producing statements open to logical refutation.The present article questions highly sophisticated accounts of methodological individualism. It suggests instead four tenets to be a valid research programme in the social sciences underscoring an intuitive language to analyze social phenomena. By doing so, it reviews some distinctive features of methodological individualism: Max Weber’s ideal types, Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of given behaviour, Friedrich Hayek’s concept of individual action and Jon Elster’s account of explanatory mechanisms.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Towards a Contemporary Philosophical Re-interpretation of Thorstein Veblenʼs Theory of Instincts and Institutions: An Axiomatic Approach</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The break of the twentieth century has seen two fundamental theories challenging the fields of mathematics and (heterodox) economics-(ZFC) Set theory and Veblenʼs Institutionalist economics. Although no direct relationship between these diverse projects has ever been documented, this paper argues that Veblenʼs appropriation of psychological traits and instincts, resulting in a comprehensive social theory of institutional frameworks, utilizes a mode of axiomatic thinking analogous to constructing sets in mathematics. Contemporary philosophy and psychology have only recently shown how their theoretical cores can relate to set theory, potentially retroactively uncovering how Veblenʼs mode of thinking the relation instincts-habits of thought-institutions could be philosophically interpreted anew. This mode of inquiry thus also exposes the overarching, albeit implicit, aim of this paperto outline the preliminary steps towards a (continental) philosophically inspired critical theory of institutions relating to the critique of political economy.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 10 Aug 2024 11:59:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.13067</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.13067</guid>
      <author>Kranjc, Uroš</author>
      <dc:creator>Kranjc, Uroš</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The break of the twentieth century has seen two fundamental theories challenging the fields of mathematics and (heterodox) economics-(ZFC) Set theory and Veblenʼs Institutionalist economics. Although no direct relationship between these diverse projects has ever been documented, this paper argues that Veblenʼs appropriation of psychological traits and instincts, resulting in a comprehensive social theory of institutional frameworks, utilizes a mode of axiomatic thinking analogous to constructing sets in mathematics. Contemporary philosophy and psychology have only recently shown how their theoretical cores can relate to set theory, potentially retroactively uncovering how Veblenʼs mode of thinking the relation instincts-habits of thought-institutions could be philosophically interpreted anew. This mode of inquiry thus also exposes the overarching, albeit implicit, aim of this paperto outline the preliminary steps towards a (continental) philosophically inspired critical theory of institutions relating to the critique of political economy.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The concept of relation in methodological individualism and holism: a reply to a functionalist critique</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In an article entitled "Agency, functionalism and all that. A Sraffian view", published in the Journal of Philosophical Economics, Professor Cesaratto (2024) has proposed a functionalist methodology to study the relation between agency and structure. In doing so, he made some criticisms of an article of ours that had previously appeared in the same journal in issue XV, entitled "Towards a unity of sense: a critical analysis of the concept of relation in methodological individualism and holism in economics" (Ianulardo and Stella, 2022). We take Cesaratto's critique as an invitation to a dialogue on the methodology of the social sciences, and we would like to clarify some aspects in response to his critique. In essence, we clarify that our article consisted of two parts, which we can call pars destruens and pars construens, respectively. In the first, we show that while the determinate identity of the individual postulated by methodological individualism cannot stand without reference to difference, the relational methodology postulated by methodological holism requires its terms (i.e. individuals) to stand as a relation. In the second part, we make it clear that the sense of unity to which we have referred is not represented by an actual community, but by the drive towards unity that is common to all individuals when they intend to form a social entity (group, class, nation, party, institution etc.). Every unification makes it possible to shed new light on the moments that led to it. In this sense, we have spoken of a teleological perspective, since the end point allows us to re-signify the intermediate moments that led to it.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Jul 2024 07:39:57 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.13329</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.13329</guid>
      <author>Ianulardo, Giancarlo</author>
      <author>Stella, Aldo</author>
      <dc:creator>Ianulardo, Giancarlo</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Stella, Aldo</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In an article entitled "Agency, functionalism and all that. A Sraffian view", published in the Journal of Philosophical Economics, Professor Cesaratto (2024) has proposed a functionalist methodology to study the relation between agency and structure. In doing so, he made some criticisms of an article of ours that had previously appeared in the same journal in issue XV, entitled "Towards a unity of sense: a critical analysis of the concept of relation in methodological individualism and holism in economics" (Ianulardo and Stella, 2022). We take Cesaratto's critique as an invitation to a dialogue on the methodology of the social sciences, and we would like to clarify some aspects in response to his critique. In essence, we clarify that our article consisted of two parts, which we can call pars destruens and pars construens, respectively. In the first, we show that while the determinate identity of the individual postulated by methodological individualism cannot stand without reference to difference, the relational methodology postulated by methodological holism requires its terms (i.e. individuals) to stand as a relation. In the second part, we make it clear that the sense of unity to which we have referred is not represented by an actual community, but by the drive towards unity that is common to all individuals when they intend to form a social entity (group, class, nation, party, institution etc.). Every unification makes it possible to shed new light on the moments that led to it. In this sense, we have spoken of a teleological perspective, since the end point allows us to re-signify the intermediate moments that led to it.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Phenomenology and intersubjectivity in political economy: an anti-perfectionist perspective</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Anti-perfectionism is a philosophical perspective combining the view of man as an imperfect and non-self-sufficient being with a scientific epistemology based on imperfect knowledge. From an epistemological perspective, it has roots in Socrates and, more recently, in the post-empiricism of Giambattista Vico, up to phenomenology. From an anthropological perspective, it is a philosophical tradition based on an awareness of the constitutive dependency of individual performance and fulfilment of man on his interaction with others. It is conceived in opposition to the individualism and perfect rationality of most social theories. The paper analyses both the philosophical and the epistemological premises of anti-perfectionism as well as its consequences in terms of economic methodology. It will specifically develop the momentary intersection of phenomenology and Austrian economics. The theory of knowledge and of sense-making of phenomenology will be discussed with particular attention to intersubjectivity, which expresses anti-perfectionism well. The interpretations of human knowledge and action of Scheler and Schütz are analysed and connected to some contemporary streams of Austrian economics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 15:01:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.12201</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.12201</guid>
      <author>Solari, Stefano</author>
      <dc:creator>Solari, Stefano</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Anti-perfectionism is a philosophical perspective combining the view of man as an imperfect and non-self-sufficient being with a scientific epistemology based on imperfect knowledge. From an epistemological perspective, it has roots in Socrates and, more recently, in the post-empiricism of Giambattista Vico, up to phenomenology. From an anthropological perspective, it is a philosophical tradition based on an awareness of the constitutive dependency of individual performance and fulfilment of man on his interaction with others. It is conceived in opposition to the individualism and perfect rationality of most social theories. The paper analyses both the philosophical and the epistemological premises of anti-perfectionism as well as its consequences in terms of economic methodology. It will specifically develop the momentary intersection of phenomenology and Austrian economics. The theory of knowledge and of sense-making of phenomenology will be discussed with particular attention to intersubjectivity, which expresses anti-perfectionism well. The interpretations of human knowledge and action of Scheler and Schütz are analysed and connected to some contemporary streams of Austrian economics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Economic Cultures of Fear and Love</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In earlier work, the author has studied the economic role of planning horizons in making a case for complementarity as the predominant feature of social interdependence. This paper compares the different choice strategies implied by substitution, opposition and conflicts of interest in an economics of fear with those arising from horizon effects, economic complementarity and concerts of interest in an economics based on love. The contrasting implications of a psychological literature on negative vs. positive emotions and their health effects, along with the findings in neurophysiological research about how humans are hard-wired for empathy and compassion leads to some fundamental changes in how we might address and revise social problems through economic analysis. The aim of this paper is to extend a horizonal case for complementarity in the author's previous work into its psychological links to research findings on healthy cognitive function and its emotional basis. An economics of substitution yields quite different conclusions about optimal institutional forms and how we address and frame social relations than are implied by an explicitly horizonal economics of complementary social relations. Recent psychological and neurophysiological studies support a horizonal case for complementarity in social relations, showing that our orthodox substitution assumptions and models of competitive equilibrium should be rejected for a renewed economic analysis based on horizonal models of complementarity and cooperation as a means to achieve greater social well-being in a healthier and more integrative form of social organization. The issues to be explored are not entertained within the currently existing frame of orthodox economics, so we must step beyond our standard habitual assumptions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 04 May 2024 15:54:04 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11570</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11570</guid>
      <author>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In earlier work, the author has studied the economic role of planning horizons in making a case for complementarity as the predominant feature of social interdependence. This paper compares the different choice strategies implied by substitution, opposition and conflicts of interest in an economics of fear with those arising from horizon effects, economic complementarity and concerts of interest in an economics based on love. The contrasting implications of a psychological literature on negative vs. positive emotions and their health effects, along with the findings in neurophysiological research about how humans are hard-wired for empathy and compassion leads to some fundamental changes in how we might address and revise social problems through economic analysis. The aim of this paper is to extend a horizonal case for complementarity in the author's previous work into its psychological links to research findings on healthy cognitive function and its emotional basis. An economics of substitution yields quite different conclusions about optimal institutional forms and how we address and frame social relations than are implied by an explicitly horizonal economics of complementary social relations. Recent psychological and neurophysiological studies support a horizonal case for complementarity in social relations, showing that our orthodox substitution assumptions and models of competitive equilibrium should be rejected for a renewed economic analysis based on horizonal models of complementarity and cooperation as a means to achieve greater social well-being in a healthier and more integrative form of social organization. The issues to be explored are not entertained within the currently existing frame of orthodox economics, so we must step beyond our standard habitual assumptions.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Historicity of Economic Sciences: The Main Epistemological Ruptures</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The object of this work is threefold: it consists (a) in explaining and justifying, based on Foucault's concept of episteme, the epistemological foundations from which Classical Economics, Keynesian Economics and Neoclassical Economics were built; (b) in studying the nature of the epistemological ruptures that allow differentiating these schools; and (c) in defining the degree of incommensurability of these different paradigms. In the first part, I will define the main epistemological tools that allow studying the birth and evolution of science. In the second part, I will study the nature of the epistemological ruptures that characterize these evolutions and these different schools.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2024 16:48:58 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.12219</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.12219</guid>
      <author>Herscovici, Alain</author>
      <dc:creator>Herscovici, Alain</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The object of this work is threefold: it consists (a) in explaining and justifying, based on Foucault's concept of episteme, the epistemological foundations from which Classical Economics, Keynesian Economics and Neoclassical Economics were built; (b) in studying the nature of the epistemological ruptures that allow differentiating these schools; and (c) in defining the degree of incommensurability of these different paradigms. In the first part, I will define the main epistemological tools that allow studying the birth and evolution of science. In the second part, I will study the nature of the epistemological ruptures that characterize these evolutions and these different schools.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 14:35:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.12256</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.12256</guid>
      <author>Pohoață, Ion</author>
      <author>Diaconașu, Delia-Elena</author>
      <author>Negru, Ioana</author>
      <dc:creator>Pohoață, Ion</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Diaconașu, Delia-Elena</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Negru, Ioana</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Agency, functionalism, and all that. A Sraffian view</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Former contributions examined the approach to institutions and economic history that can be derived from the classical and Marxian 'surplus approach' as particularly recovered by Piero Sraffa (1951) and Pierangelo Garegnani (1960). The present paper deals with the allegation levelled against historical materialism-and consequently against the surplus approach to institutions-of organicism or functionalism. Organicism is said to look at individuals as passive vectors functionally serving in various capabilities the reproduction and destiny of society as a whole. In this way human agency in the operation and change of society is excluded or at least restrained. Methodological individualism is the traditional alternative supported both by neoclassical and by (some) Marxist schools. The literature over the 'agency versus structure' determination of human behaviour in social and human sciences is immense. I will therefore limit myself to some episodes that may however provide enough food for thought on this field. I shall defend a functionalist view of society while giving space to individual intentional action and aspirations, albeit informed by historical conditioning circumstances. Historical reconstruction of the objective and subjective features of the economic formations under examination, rather than the empty and a-historical study of individual choices, unrelated to the social context, looks like the way to go. Agency must be historically contextualised.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Feb 2024 12:05:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11637</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11637</guid>
      <author>Cesaratto, Sergio</author>
      <dc:creator>Cesaratto, Sergio</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Former contributions examined the approach to institutions and economic history that can be derived from the classical and Marxian 'surplus approach' as particularly recovered by Piero Sraffa (1951) and Pierangelo Garegnani (1960). The present paper deals with the allegation levelled against historical materialism-and consequently against the surplus approach to institutions-of organicism or functionalism. Organicism is said to look at individuals as passive vectors functionally serving in various capabilities the reproduction and destiny of society as a whole. In this way human agency in the operation and change of society is excluded or at least restrained. Methodological individualism is the traditional alternative supported both by neoclassical and by (some) Marxist schools. The literature over the 'agency versus structure' determination of human behaviour in social and human sciences is immense. I will therefore limit myself to some episodes that may however provide enough food for thought on this field. I shall defend a functionalist view of society while giving space to individual intentional action and aspirations, albeit informed by historical conditioning circumstances. Historical reconstruction of the objective and subjective features of the economic formations under examination, rather than the empty and a-historical study of individual choices, unrelated to the social context, looks like the way to go. Agency must be historically contextualised.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Plato, Aristotle, and Locke on the accumulation of wealth and natural law</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The possibility of a growing accumulation of wealth, what we now refer to as economic growth, was something already considered by Plato, Aristotle and Locke, under the concept of chrematistics. In this paper we show how the economic thinking of these authors cannot be fully understood without considering the intimate relationship they establish between politics and property accumulation. In addition to continuities and ruptures in the arguments, there can be seen a growing understanding of the phenomenon of economic growth in such a way that, when we arrive at Locke, an evident paradigm shift can be appreciated. This change is rooted in the contributions of scholastic thinking for which the acquisition of property through human labour or industry enjoys legitimacy according to natural law.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jan 2024 16:11:10 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11552</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11552</guid>
      <author>Cendejas Bueno, José Luis</author>
      <dc:creator>Cendejas Bueno, José Luis</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The possibility of a growing accumulation of wealth, what we now refer to as economic growth, was something already considered by Plato, Aristotle and Locke, under the concept of chrematistics. In this paper we show how the economic thinking of these authors cannot be fully understood without considering the intimate relationship they establish between politics and property accumulation. In addition to continuities and ruptures in the arguments, there can be seen a growing understanding of the phenomenon of economic growth in such a way that, when we arrive at Locke, an evident paradigm shift can be appreciated. This change is rooted in the contributions of scholastic thinking for which the acquisition of property through human labour or industry enjoys legitimacy according to natural law.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Perspectives on interpersonal utility comparisons: an analysis of selected models</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Recently, new models for comparing the strength of individual preferences have been proposed. This perspective article discusses these models within the context of different accounts of how people attribute mental states to others. The paper highlights that the new models share a common shortcoming with Harsanyi’s Equiprobability Model of Moral Value Judgments, which is the inability to facilitate interpersonal comparisons of preference strengths.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jan 2024 16:20:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11271</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11271</guid>
      <author>Gandjour, Afschin</author>
      <dc:creator>Gandjour, Afschin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Recently, new models for comparing the strength of individual preferences have been proposed. This perspective article discusses these models within the context of different accounts of how people attribute mental states to others. The paper highlights that the new models share a common shortcoming with Harsanyi’s Equiprobability Model of Moral Value Judgments, which is the inability to facilitate interpersonal comparisons of preference strengths.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Jon D. Erickson, The Progress Illusion: Reclaiming Our Future from the Fairytale of Economics, Washington, DC, Island Press, 2022, xx + 252 pp., hb, ISBN 978-1-64-283252-5</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Review of Jon D. Erickson, The Progress Illusion: Reclaiming Our Future from the Fairytale of Economics]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Oct 2023 10:57:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11241</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11241</guid>
      <author>Pătruți, Alexandru</author>
      <dc:creator>Pătruți, Alexandru</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Review of Jon D. Erickson, The Progress Illusion: Reclaiming Our Future from the Fairytale of Economics]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reading and interpreting Ibn Khaldun's economic philosophy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This work aims to present key concepts, ideas, and events that can be derived mainly from Ibn Khaldun’s chapter on economic life, which he captures with the heading, Chapter on Making a Living (ma`āsh). Justifying this undertaking is the significance of Ibn Khaldun’s contributions, the scarcity of translations of his work, and the dependency of secondary interpretive works on a single English translation. While a reading of Ibn Khaldun’s economic philosophy through a textual analysis of the primary sources remains the focus of this work, a sampling of the interpretive and translation works is also presented here in order to understand the level of engagement of non-Arabic scholars with Ibn Khaldun’s work and as a frame of mind with which economic philosophers and social historians might engage.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Oct 2023 11:50:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10915</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10915</guid>
      <author>Souaiaia, Ahmed, E</author>
      <dc:creator>Souaiaia, Ahmed, E</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This work aims to present key concepts, ideas, and events that can be derived mainly from Ibn Khaldun’s chapter on economic life, which he captures with the heading, Chapter on Making a Living (ma`āsh). Justifying this undertaking is the significance of Ibn Khaldun’s contributions, the scarcity of translations of his work, and the dependency of secondary interpretive works on a single English translation. While a reading of Ibn Khaldun’s economic philosophy through a textual analysis of the primary sources remains the focus of this work, a sampling of the interpretive and translation works is also presented here in order to understand the level of engagement of non-Arabic scholars with Ibn Khaldun’s work and as a frame of mind with which economic philosophers and social historians might engage.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Scarcity Concept in the contemporary mainstream economic science: an analysis of its ontological and epistemological ambiguity</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Different economic schools have studied the scarcity concept, reaching otherexplanations. Accordingly, the discussion underlines that for the Classical School ofPolitical Economy (CSPE), scarcity is considered an empirical fact in contrast to theMarginalist School, which instead finds it as a theoretical consequence derived from itsaxioms. Following both schools, the Marshallian theorists introduce an ontological andepistemological ambiguity about scarcity. With this background, the article will try toclarify the concept and characteristics of scarcity. It examines the concept from differentschools of economic thought, considering a new ontological and epistemological path.The article concludes by highlighting that the scarcity characteristics of mainstreameconomics neglect the sociocultural, historical, and political dimensions, making theconsideration to abolish them through social, political, and economic changes aproblematic and, at times, vain option.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Oct 2023 14:58:28 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11061</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11061</guid>
      <author>Durán-Sandoval, Daniel</author>
      <author>Durán-Romero, Gemma</author>
      <author>Uleri, Francesca</author>
      <dc:creator>Durán-Sandoval, Daniel</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Durán-Romero, Gemma</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Uleri, Francesca</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Different economic schools have studied the scarcity concept, reaching otherexplanations. Accordingly, the discussion underlines that for the Classical School ofPolitical Economy (CSPE), scarcity is considered an empirical fact in contrast to theMarginalist School, which instead finds it as a theoretical consequence derived from itsaxioms. Following both schools, the Marshallian theorists introduce an ontological andepistemological ambiguity about scarcity. With this background, the article will try toclarify the concept and characteristics of scarcity. It examines the concept from differentschools of economic thought, considering a new ontological and epistemological path.The article concludes by highlighting that the scarcity characteristics of mainstreameconomics neglect the sociocultural, historical, and political dimensions, making theconsideration to abolish them through social, political, and economic changes aproblematic and, at times, vain option.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Șerban Oana, Cultural Capital and Creative Communication: (Anti-)Modern and (Non-)Eurocentric Perspectives</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Oct 2023 07:56:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11521</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11521</guid>
      <author>Vlad, Andreea Ioana</author>
      <dc:creator>Vlad, Andreea Ioana</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>'We need to offer something better to the scholars of the future.' Which way forward for heterodox economics?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[After the global financial crisis, hopes were high that there would be a pluralisation of the economics discipline and a boost for heterodox economics that challenged dominant economic models. However, mainstream economics once again proved its enormous resilience and the future of alternatives to this mainstream is anything but certain. Geoffrey Hodgson's new book on this issue has sparked fresh discussions about the stunted development of heterodox economics and proposals for possible ways forward. This article will argue that the crucial factor for the future of heterodox economics is not converging on a single unified paradigm or raising the quality of research, but rather gaining access to different kinds of capital, first and foremost professorial positions at universities. Such access is severely restricted under present conditions as a result of epistemological and ontological discrimination. Heterodox economics can only flourish if the epistemic community of economists embraces paradigmatic pluralism as part of their academic culture, or if regulations are put in place to secure access to such capital and so to academic freedom.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:04:37 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10548</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10548</guid>
      <author>Heise, Arne</author>
      <dc:creator>Heise, Arne</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[After the global financial crisis, hopes were high that there would be a pluralisation of the economics discipline and a boost for heterodox economics that challenged dominant economic models. However, mainstream economics once again proved its enormous resilience and the future of alternatives to this mainstream is anything but certain. Geoffrey Hodgson's new book on this issue has sparked fresh discussions about the stunted development of heterodox economics and proposals for possible ways forward. This article will argue that the crucial factor for the future of heterodox economics is not converging on a single unified paradigm or raising the quality of research, but rather gaining access to different kinds of capital, first and foremost professorial positions at universities. Such access is severely restricted under present conditions as a result of epistemological and ontological discrimination. Heterodox economics can only flourish if the epistemic community of economists embraces paradigmatic pluralism as part of their academic culture, or if regulations are put in place to secure access to such capital and so to academic freedom.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An essay on the need to redefine economics for the sake of a human economy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[More than 90 years after Lionel Robbins more or less defined the subject ofeconomics in his famous essay, it is time to redress the issue in light of recent developments and new insights. Robbins used the figure of Robinson Crusoe to define homo economicus as an agent that makes choices in conditions of scarcity. By re-reading and re-interpreting the story of Crusoe, we make more sense of the narrative when we envisage people engaged in practices by which they realize what is important to them, that is, their values. Homo economicus becomes a special case pertinent to theinstrumental economies of markets and organizations. In the so-called human economies of the home, the social, cultural, and natural world, people use the inputs that they acquire in the instrumental economies to realize what is important to them, such as families, friendships, science, art, religion, meanings. This shift in perspective will have far reaching consequence for the way economists think and theorize and enables them to connect with the value-based approach that is increasingly dominatingthe worlds of business and politics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:04:11 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10887</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10887</guid>
      <author>Klamer, Arjo</author>
      <dc:creator>Klamer, Arjo</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[More than 90 years after Lionel Robbins more or less defined the subject ofeconomics in his famous essay, it is time to redress the issue in light of recent developments and new insights. Robbins used the figure of Robinson Crusoe to define homo economicus as an agent that makes choices in conditions of scarcity. By re-reading and re-interpreting the story of Crusoe, we make more sense of the narrative when we envisage people engaged in practices by which they realize what is important to them, that is, their values. Homo economicus becomes a special case pertinent to theinstrumental economies of markets and organizations. In the so-called human economies of the home, the social, cultural, and natural world, people use the inputs that they acquire in the instrumental economies to realize what is important to them, such as families, friendships, science, art, religion, meanings. This shift in perspective will have far reaching consequence for the way economists think and theorize and enables them to connect with the value-based approach that is increasingly dominatingthe worlds of business and politics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Plea for Pluralism</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Mainstream economics is one way of understanding how the economy works, but mainstream economists argue much more: that mainstream economics is the onlyway of understanding the economy. Mainstream economists should embrace pluralism for reasons suggested by John Stuart Mill: as a guard against the tyranny of the majority, a tyranny that fortifies itself against doubt not by reason but by power; even if the majority is right and the doubters wrong, engaging with doubt is a way to strengthen correct arguments; and, most likely, according to Mill, there is partial truth on the side of heterodoxy as well as on the orthodox side. The two elements of the power of mainstream economists are related: the police power over what is and what is not published in the major journals, and the role of publication in these journals in the tenure process. Pluralism is not an issue of concern to academics only. Economists of all stripes may try to construct the economy in the image of their theories, but for some time the mainstream has had the upper hand, just as it does in the academy. The push to deregulate the economy, which began in the United States during the Carter presidency, had its full flowering in the financial crisis of 2008.What will it take to allow heterodoxy into the academy? If history is any guide, innovations in economics take root when they are allied to successful political movements. One case in point is the symbiosis between Keynes’s General Theory and the New Deal and social democracy. Another is the resurgence of pre-Keynesian theory dressed up in the high-tech mathematics of New Classical theory and the coming to power of the apostles of neoliberalism in the 1980s. It’s a good bet that for a new economics to take hold in this century, it will do so in partnership, however tacit, with a new politics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10886</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10886</guid>
      <author>Marglin, Stephen, A</author>
      <dc:creator>Marglin, Stephen, A</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Mainstream economics is one way of understanding how the economy works, but mainstream economists argue much more: that mainstream economics is the onlyway of understanding the economy. Mainstream economists should embrace pluralism for reasons suggested by John Stuart Mill: as a guard against the tyranny of the majority, a tyranny that fortifies itself against doubt not by reason but by power; even if the majority is right and the doubters wrong, engaging with doubt is a way to strengthen correct arguments; and, most likely, according to Mill, there is partial truth on the side of heterodoxy as well as on the orthodox side. The two elements of the power of mainstream economists are related: the police power over what is and what is not published in the major journals, and the role of publication in these journals in the tenure process. Pluralism is not an issue of concern to academics only. Economists of all stripes may try to construct the economy in the image of their theories, but for some time the mainstream has had the upper hand, just as it does in the academy. The push to deregulate the economy, which began in the United States during the Carter presidency, had its full flowering in the financial crisis of 2008.What will it take to allow heterodoxy into the academy? If history is any guide, innovations in economics take root when they are allied to successful political movements. One case in point is the symbiosis between Keynes’s General Theory and the New Deal and social democracy. Another is the resurgence of pre-Keynesian theory dressed up in the high-tech mathematics of New Classical theory and the coming to power of the apostles of neoliberalism in the 1980s. It’s a good bet that for a new economics to take hold in this century, it will do so in partnership, however tacit, with a new politics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Future of Heterodox Economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[We assess economics research and teaching frameworks in the United States by examining how knowledge is produced and ranked, the flaws and strengths of heterodox economic theory; and how students are trained, especially for careers in economic policy. We challenge the meaning of established terminology such as 'heterodoxy' and 'mainstream' by investigating their utility as a marker and to illuminate major barriers to the successful adoption of alternative economic theories in academia and the public discourse. Based on interviews with experienced economists working with heterodox paradigms in both mainstream and heterodox institutions, we identify three barriers 1) Neoclassical hegemony, 2) Weakness of heterodox theory, and 3) Pedagogy and training in economics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:03:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11114</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11114</guid>
      <author>Ghilarducci, Teresa</author>
      <author>Knauss, Zachary</author>
      <author>McGahey, Richard</author>
      <author>Milberg, William</author>
      <author>Landes, Drew</author>
      <dc:creator>Ghilarducci, Teresa</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Knauss, Zachary</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>McGahey, Richard</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Milberg, William</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Landes, Drew</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[We assess economics research and teaching frameworks in the United States by examining how knowledge is produced and ranked, the flaws and strengths of heterodox economic theory; and how students are trained, especially for careers in economic policy. We challenge the meaning of established terminology such as 'heterodoxy' and 'mainstream' by investigating their utility as a marker and to illuminate major barriers to the successful adoption of alternative economic theories in academia and the public discourse. Based on interviews with experienced economists working with heterodox paradigms in both mainstream and heterodox institutions, we identify three barriers 1) Neoclassical hegemony, 2) Weakness of heterodox theory, and 3) Pedagogy and training in economics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Hybrid Vigor of Heterodox Economics: A Feminist Perspective</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This case study in the evolution of heterodox economics describes the emergence of feminist perspectives on care provision and their implications for a larger theory of bargaining over the distribution of gains from cooperation. It testifies to the hybrid vigor of diverse and ongoing efforts to challenge the narrow focus of the neoclassical paradigm.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:02:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10885</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10885</guid>
      <author>Folbre, Nancy</author>
      <dc:creator>Folbre, Nancy</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This case study in the evolution of heterodox economics describes the emergence of feminist perspectives on care provision and their implications for a larger theory of bargaining over the distribution of gains from cooperation. It testifies to the hybrid vigor of diverse and ongoing efforts to challenge the narrow focus of the neoclassical paradigm.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Heterodoxy Needs Institutional Backing</title>
      <description><![CDATA[A general aversion to new ideas, psychological factors, and foremost, institutional conditions shape the challenging position of heterodox economics. This institutional framework is coined by a strong orientation towards publication metrics and influences young scholars to conformity. We propose two ideas to improve the conditions for heterodox research. First, to introduce competition between journals for the scientific papers they want to have the most. Second, to establish a qualified random selection of papers to equalize the chances of publishing.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:02:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10889</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10889</guid>
      <author>Frey, Bruno, S</author>
      <author>Briviba, Andre</author>
      <dc:creator>Frey, Bruno, S</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Briviba, Andre</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A general aversion to new ideas, psychological factors, and foremost, institutional conditions shape the challenging position of heterodox economics. This institutional framework is coined by a strong orientation towards publication metrics and influences young scholars to conformity. We propose two ideas to improve the conditions for heterodox research. First, to introduce competition between journals for the scientific papers they want to have the most. Second, to establish a qualified random selection of papers to equalize the chances of publishing.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE FUTURE OF POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS: Post-Keynesian Economics at 50</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This article discusses the future of post-Keynesian economics by considering three angles: i) the future of post-Keynesian economics as an institution or as a school of thougth; ii) the future of post-Keynesian theory; and finally, iii) the future of post-Keynesian within the profession. My conclusion is fairly positive overall, although the place of post-Keynesian economics within the profession is certainly not enviable.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:01:58 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10890</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10890</guid>
      <author>Rochon, Louis-Philippe</author>
      <dc:creator>Rochon, Louis-Philippe</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This article discusses the future of post-Keynesian economics by considering three angles: i) the future of post-Keynesian economics as an institution or as a school of thougth; ii) the future of post-Keynesian theory; and finally, iii) the future of post-Keynesian within the profession. My conclusion is fairly positive overall, although the place of post-Keynesian economics within the profession is certainly not enviable.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Power structures in economics and society: Some remarks on the future of non-mainstream economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Economic approaches that emphasize power dynamics in the political economy or rely on a non-mathematical, non-positivistic, pluralistic methodology are either almost marginalized in (heterodoxy) or excluded from (transdisciplinary non-mainstream) the field of economics. Relying on a combination of the Discursive Political Economy of Economics and a critical sociology of economic knowledge, this article gives a sociological explanation of these paradigmatic conditions and the related future prospects of non-mainstream research within economics in Germany, by incorporating social theory, discourse, and power analysis, and philosophy of science. In doing so, the article argues for a special role of economics in the political economy, which is associated with a legitimatizing and economic-knowledgeproducing function for non-epistemic issues. In a dialectic understanding of society and science, the implementation of classification rankings such as rankings and of a pyramidal hierarchy of publications is viewed as the disciplinary response to its social role. This results in an unequal distribution of power in the field of economics in Germany. The article concludes that a pluralistic change in modern economics cannot be expected, as long there is no social change in terms of the interconnection between the two demands for academic reputation and economic knowledge.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:01:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11130</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11130</guid>
      <author>Reinke, Rouven</author>
      <dc:creator>Reinke, Rouven</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Economic approaches that emphasize power dynamics in the political economy or rely on a non-mathematical, non-positivistic, pluralistic methodology are either almost marginalized in (heterodoxy) or excluded from (transdisciplinary non-mainstream) the field of economics. Relying on a combination of the Discursive Political Economy of Economics and a critical sociology of economic knowledge, this article gives a sociological explanation of these paradigmatic conditions and the related future prospects of non-mainstream research within economics in Germany, by incorporating social theory, discourse, and power analysis, and philosophy of science. In doing so, the article argues for a special role of economics in the political economy, which is associated with a legitimatizing and economic-knowledgeproducing function for non-epistemic issues. In a dialectic understanding of society and science, the implementation of classification rankings such as rankings and of a pyramidal hierarchy of publications is viewed as the disciplinary response to its social role. This results in an unequal distribution of power in the field of economics in Germany. The article concludes that a pluralistic change in modern economics cannot be expected, as long there is no social change in terms of the interconnection between the two demands for academic reputation and economic knowledge.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ways of Knowing Agency and Development: notes on the philosophy of science and the conduct and use of inquiry</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Development is a value-laden concept and, as such, an essentially contested issue. To different extents, different ideas of development entail different assumptions about human agency. Although economics has been the most influential discipline, increasingly different accounts highlight distinct features of human beings and the contexts they inhabit, which lead to different implications. This article seeks to delineate the boundaries of the discussion and map out what are arguably the main alternatives within the field. Since such discussion deals with the question of what human action is, the argument is elaborated from the philosophy of science. Contra convention, the discussion uses a philosophical ontology, which is concerned with out connection to the world. Jackson’s heuristic is adopted to generate four philosophies of science and four notions of agency, regarded as ideal typical. Neopositivism advances a rational agent, reflexivity suggests a patient, critical realism furthers an interagent, and analyticism proposes a transagent. This article invites scholars and practitioners interested in this increasingly interdisciplinary area to raise their awareness regarding the foundations on which their ideas about human agency build and note the implications they have for the production and consumption of knowledge.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Apr 2023 05:40:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8873</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8873</guid>
      <author>Garcés-Velástegui, Pablo</author>
      <dc:creator>Garcés-Velástegui, Pablo</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Development is a value-laden concept and, as such, an essentially contested issue. To different extents, different ideas of development entail different assumptions about human agency. Although economics has been the most influential discipline, increasingly different accounts highlight distinct features of human beings and the contexts they inhabit, which lead to different implications. This article seeks to delineate the boundaries of the discussion and map out what are arguably the main alternatives within the field. Since such discussion deals with the question of what human action is, the argument is elaborated from the philosophy of science. Contra convention, the discussion uses a philosophical ontology, which is concerned with out connection to the world. Jackson’s heuristic is adopted to generate four philosophies of science and four notions of agency, regarded as ideal typical. Neopositivism advances a rational agent, reflexivity suggests a patient, critical realism furthers an interagent, and analyticism proposes a transagent. This article invites scholars and practitioners interested in this increasingly interdisciplinary area to raise their awareness regarding the foundations on which their ideas about human agency build and note the implications they have for the production and consumption of knowledge.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Lehmann’s Analytical Inconsistencies on Liberalism and Capitalism</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Review of Lehmann, P.-J., Liberalism and Capitalism Today, London, Hoboken: ISTE-Wiley, 2021, 214 pp, ISBN 978-1-78630-689-0]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Feb 2023 09:22:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10220</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10220</guid>
      <author>Văduva, Ionuț</author>
      <dc:creator>Văduva, Ionuț</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Review of Lehmann, P.-J., Liberalism and Capitalism Today, London, Hoboken: ISTE-Wiley, 2021, 214 pp, ISBN 978-1-78630-689-0]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can a Catholic be Liberal? Roman Catholicism and Liberalism in a Political Economy Perspective (1800–1970)</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The philosophy of the Enlightenment and political thought of modernity found tough opposition in the Roman Catholic Church. Liberalism was associated with Free Masons and revolutionary intent. Nonetheless, liberalism and political economy stimulated some theoretical analysis and specific theoretical positions in terms of social philosophy and social economics by the Church. This paper presents an analysis of encyclical letters and other papal documents, as well as the writings of other Catholic scholars, to elaborate on the theoretical points used to contrast liberalism. Compromises, as well as turning points in the evolution of the Catholic position, are investigated. Lastly, the epistemological and historical reasons for the affinity of Roman Catholicism with ethical liberalism and the limits of this similarity are discussed. 1. Liberal and Catholic, an Italian drama]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Feb 2023 09:17:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9252</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9252</guid>
      <author>Solari, Stefano</author>
      <dc:creator>Solari, Stefano</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The philosophy of the Enlightenment and political thought of modernity found tough opposition in the Roman Catholic Church. Liberalism was associated with Free Masons and revolutionary intent. Nonetheless, liberalism and political economy stimulated some theoretical analysis and specific theoretical positions in terms of social philosophy and social economics by the Church. This paper presents an analysis of encyclical letters and other papal documents, as well as the writings of other Catholic scholars, to elaborate on the theoretical points used to contrast liberalism. Compromises, as well as turning points in the evolution of the Catholic position, are investigated. Lastly, the epistemological and historical reasons for the affinity of Roman Catholicism with ethical liberalism and the limits of this similarity are discussed. 1. Liberal and Catholic, an Italian drama]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Are Cultural Insights Worthy in Political Economy?: Review of Cultural Values in Political Economy, edited by J.P. Singh</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Cultural Values in Political Economy, edited by J.P. Singh, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2020, 248 p., e-book]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2023 14:23:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10107</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10107</guid>
      <author>Morosan, Raul</author>
      <dc:creator>Morosan, Raul</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Cultural Values in Political Economy, edited by J.P. Singh, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2020, 248 p., e-book]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Ralf Lüfter, The Ethics of Economic Responsibility</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Ralf Lüfter, The Ethics of Economic Responsibility, Routledge, 2020]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2023 14:22:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10039</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10039</guid>
      <author>Gibea, Toni</author>
      <dc:creator>Gibea, Toni</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Ralf Lüfter, The Ethics of Economic Responsibility, Routledge, 2020]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Margherita Zanasi, Economic Thought in Modern China: Market and Consumption, c.1500–1937, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020, 252 pages, ISBN: 978-1-108-49993-4.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2023 14:20:10 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9867</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9867</guid>
      <author>Wu, Jiarui</author>
      <dc:creator>Wu, Jiarui</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Opportunity Costs of Neoclassical Economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The notion of "opportunity cost" has been neglected in economics. The reason is that any such measure of cost is invisible, unobservable, and untestable. Yet the so-called 'competitive ideal' in neoclassical theory is based on claims of decreasing returns and substitutional tradeoffs in production, consumption and social relations, and therewith an exclusive focus on scarcity in economics. Within this view, collusion is suspect: it raises prices, reduces sales, and so harms social welfare. This is the baseline emphasis of neoclassical microeconomic theory. The opportunity costs of this framework involve a significant loss of perspective on actual economic phenomena, the potential value of which may far exceed that of orthodoxy. Here are several reasons why. First, the real world is interdependent and not decomposable into parts: all we do initiates effects spreading outward forever on everything. Second, our interconnected environment calls for a network or systems conception of economics in which substitution and complementarities coexist in nondecomposable tangles, obviating any institutional claim for the efficiency of competition over cooperation. Third, if all long-term production occurs with increasing returns, then the nature of economic relations solely reflects substitution for physical goods in short-term contexts; all long-term material outputsas well as all intangible tradesexhibit a complementary connection to make cooperation efficient. Fourth, the unbounded character of economic effects suggests an analytical bound derived from our rational limits, since we cannot see the full range of outcomes stemming from our decisions: planning horizons so enter this scene. Such 'horizon effects' suggest another important distinction in economics of 'atoms, bits and wits,' where atoms (the realm of physical things) are only subject to substitution assumptions in the short run, but shift to complementary interaction for all longer horizons. For bits (the realm of transactions involving information and all intangible outputs) and wits (that of horizon effects), both are realms characterized by complementary relations, so also yielding an economics in which cooperative systems are efficient and where competition cannot but fail by restricting output, knowledge and truth, while promoting a myopic culture in a dangerous self-destruct mode. This is the 'opportunity cost' of neoclassical economics: a world hurtling into a self-destructive failure due to its myopic culture spawned by rivalry, blind to its own pathologies and encouraged by an economics dogmatically closed to realistic conceptions due to competitive frames wrongly imposed in complementary realms, such as in academics, ecology, ethics and organizational learning. These costs far exceed the value realized by this approach. The paper explores these failures in more detail and describes the horizonal theory that would have emerged from the 1930s debates on cost had Hicks not walked away from increasing returns and had Hirshleifer not promoted a false 'rescue' endorsed by Alchian in 1968, when he declared decreasing returns "a general and universally valid law." Because of 'The Hicksian Getaway' in 1939-and 'The Hirshleifer Rescue' in 1962a rigid orthodoxy in economics emerged that was resistant to any alternative views, seeing them as a threat to its unearned dominance instead of as an opportunity to engage in new learning. A (supposedly) 'scientific' community was thus transformed to a closed domain of adherents strongly opposed to open debate and discussion. The curious character of this unheralded situation deserves closer attention than it has gotten thus far. That is the primary aim of this paper.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2023 14:08:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10082</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10082</guid>
      <author>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The notion of "opportunity cost" has been neglected in economics. The reason is that any such measure of cost is invisible, unobservable, and untestable. Yet the so-called 'competitive ideal' in neoclassical theory is based on claims of decreasing returns and substitutional tradeoffs in production, consumption and social relations, and therewith an exclusive focus on scarcity in economics. Within this view, collusion is suspect: it raises prices, reduces sales, and so harms social welfare. This is the baseline emphasis of neoclassical microeconomic theory. The opportunity costs of this framework involve a significant loss of perspective on actual economic phenomena, the potential value of which may far exceed that of orthodoxy. Here are several reasons why. First, the real world is interdependent and not decomposable into parts: all we do initiates effects spreading outward forever on everything. Second, our interconnected environment calls for a network or systems conception of economics in which substitution and complementarities coexist in nondecomposable tangles, obviating any institutional claim for the efficiency of competition over cooperation. Third, if all long-term production occurs with increasing returns, then the nature of economic relations solely reflects substitution for physical goods in short-term contexts; all long-term material outputsas well as all intangible tradesexhibit a complementary connection to make cooperation efficient. Fourth, the unbounded character of economic effects suggests an analytical bound derived from our rational limits, since we cannot see the full range of outcomes stemming from our decisions: planning horizons so enter this scene. Such 'horizon effects' suggest another important distinction in economics of 'atoms, bits and wits,' where atoms (the realm of physical things) are only subject to substitution assumptions in the short run, but shift to complementary interaction for all longer horizons. For bits (the realm of transactions involving information and all intangible outputs) and wits (that of horizon effects), both are realms characterized by complementary relations, so also yielding an economics in which cooperative systems are efficient and where competition cannot but fail by restricting output, knowledge and truth, while promoting a myopic culture in a dangerous self-destruct mode. This is the 'opportunity cost' of neoclassical economics: a world hurtling into a self-destructive failure due to its myopic culture spawned by rivalry, blind to its own pathologies and encouraged by an economics dogmatically closed to realistic conceptions due to competitive frames wrongly imposed in complementary realms, such as in academics, ecology, ethics and organizational learning. These costs far exceed the value realized by this approach. The paper explores these failures in more detail and describes the horizonal theory that would have emerged from the 1930s debates on cost had Hicks not walked away from increasing returns and had Hirshleifer not promoted a false 'rescue' endorsed by Alchian in 1968, when he declared decreasing returns "a general and universally valid law." Because of 'The Hicksian Getaway' in 1939-and 'The Hirshleifer Rescue' in 1962a rigid orthodoxy in economics emerged that was resistant to any alternative views, seeing them as a threat to its unearned dominance instead of as an opportunity to engage in new learning. A (supposedly) 'scientific' community was thus transformed to a closed domain of adherents strongly opposed to open debate and discussion. The curious character of this unheralded situation deserves closer attention than it has gotten thus far. That is the primary aim of this paper.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Towards a Theory of Conversation in Political Economy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The paper analyzes the nature of Political Economy as a modern conversational style, by defining its logical and rhetoric features. Successively, a wider historical and political context linked to the birth of the discipline is taken into account and thoroughly introduced in its implications for the interpretation of the role of such a discipline in modern life. Finally Political Economy is examined under the light of the educational effort it requires, as an anti- rhetoric method of inquiry and dialogue.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2023 07:28:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9964</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9964</guid>
      <author>Faella, Gian Paolo</author>
      <dc:creator>Faella, Gian Paolo</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The paper analyzes the nature of Political Economy as a modern conversational style, by defining its logical and rhetoric features. Successively, a wider historical and political context linked to the birth of the discipline is taken into account and thoroughly introduced in its implications for the interpretation of the role of such a discipline in modern life. Finally Political Economy is examined under the light of the educational effort it requires, as an anti- rhetoric method of inquiry and dialogue.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nietzsche and Fractal Geometry: a philosophical continuity</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The purpose of this work is to highlight the epistemological proximity between Nietzsche’s philosophy of science and the underlying philosophical principles of fractal geometry, as illustrated in the main work of its creator, French mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot.This work also aims to find the end of this philosophical continuity, finding an important divergence between Nietzsche’s philosophy of risk taking and Mandelbrot’s legacy in risk management.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jan 2023 07:07:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9913</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9913</guid>
      <author>Gualario, Leandro</author>
      <dc:creator>Gualario, Leandro</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The purpose of this work is to highlight the epistemological proximity between Nietzsche’s philosophy of science and the underlying philosophical principles of fractal geometry, as illustrated in the main work of its creator, French mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot.This work also aims to find the end of this philosophical continuity, finding an important divergence between Nietzsche’s philosophy of risk taking and Mandelbrot’s legacy in risk management.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Buddhist economics as a return to rational model of economic management</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The concept of Buddhist economics is gaining increased appeal in a world where external factors are once again becoming more of a threat than a salvation. Buddhist economy is a return to the values of agricultural production, but taking into account the experience and achievements of the industrial and post-industrial economy. Care for the environment, personal development, community development, especially spiritual development – these are the priorities of the Buddhist economy. In particular, agricultural production appears as only the most convenient means for achieving these goals. However, Buddhist economics is not a rejection of the achievements of modern and postmodern society – it is an attempt to use these experiences and achievements for a more intelligent and effective implementation of the goals of the economy, which were defined by Aristotle. The rational model of economic management according to these views consists in thrifty but full consumption and restrained production with environmentally friendly aims.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 2023 14:09:33 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10032</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10032</guid>
      <author>Zinchenko, Viktor</author>
      <author>Boichenko, Mykhailo</author>
      <dc:creator>Zinchenko, Viktor</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Boichenko, Mykhailo</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The concept of Buddhist economics is gaining increased appeal in a world where external factors are once again becoming more of a threat than a salvation. Buddhist economy is a return to the values of agricultural production, but taking into account the experience and achievements of the industrial and post-industrial economy. Care for the environment, personal development, community development, especially spiritual development – these are the priorities of the Buddhist economy. In particular, agricultural production appears as only the most convenient means for achieving these goals. However, Buddhist economics is not a rejection of the achievements of modern and postmodern society – it is an attempt to use these experiences and achievements for a more intelligent and effective implementation of the goals of the economy, which were defined by Aristotle. The rational model of economic management according to these views consists in thrifty but full consumption and restrained production with environmentally friendly aims.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Towards a unity of sense: A critical analysis of the concept of relation in methodological individualism and holism in Economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In social sciences and, in particular, in economics the debate on the most adequate model of explanation of social phenomena has been centred around two models: Methodological Individualism and Holism. While Methodological Individualism claims to be the most rigorous attempt to explain social phenomena by reducing them to their ultimate components, Holism stresses the primacy of the social relation, outside of which individuals cannot be understood as analytical units. In the analysis, we will refer to the way the debate has influenced economics education too through the debate on microfoundations and the role of individual preferences. In synthesis, we aim to show that the two explanatory models, rather than being opposed, need to be integrated, because they need each other. But for this to be done, we need to reflect on the role that the concept of “relation” plays in our understanding of the social structure and of the dynamics that characterises it. Indeed, the holistic-systemic model, though privileging the relation, must acknowledge that the relation needs some ultimate elements (the individuals), which in turn are prioritised by methodological individualism. But these entities, the individuals, in order to be what they are, i.e., each a determinate identity, need each to be referred to other individuals, which are essential to determine the single determinate identity. This means that each individual needs the relation. To prevent a circular explanation, we claim that a correct methodology should understand both the individual and society in the light of the unity of sense that emerges at the end of the process, rather than focusing on its starting point.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Dec 2022 14:52:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10013</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10013</guid>
      <author>Ianulardo, Giancarlo</author>
      <author>Stella, Aldo</author>
      <dc:creator>Ianulardo, Giancarlo</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Stella, Aldo</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In social sciences and, in particular, in economics the debate on the most adequate model of explanation of social phenomena has been centred around two models: Methodological Individualism and Holism. While Methodological Individualism claims to be the most rigorous attempt to explain social phenomena by reducing them to their ultimate components, Holism stresses the primacy of the social relation, outside of which individuals cannot be understood as analytical units. In the analysis, we will refer to the way the debate has influenced economics education too through the debate on microfoundations and the role of individual preferences. In synthesis, we aim to show that the two explanatory models, rather than being opposed, need to be integrated, because they need each other. But for this to be done, we need to reflect on the role that the concept of “relation” plays in our understanding of the social structure and of the dynamics that characterises it. Indeed, the holistic-systemic model, though privileging the relation, must acknowledge that the relation needs some ultimate elements (the individuals), which in turn are prioritised by methodological individualism. But these entities, the individuals, in order to be what they are, i.e., each a determinate identity, need each to be referred to other individuals, which are essential to determine the single determinate identity. This means that each individual needs the relation. To prevent a circular explanation, we claim that a correct methodology should understand both the individual and society in the light of the unity of sense that emerges at the end of the process, rather than focusing on its starting point.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Relation of Carl Menger's philosophy of economics to Auguste Comte's positivism</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The conception of the founder of the Austrian School, in his book on the philosophy of social sciences, has been described, by the supporters of this school, as a total methodological individualism, upholding the absolute specificity of these sciences to those of nature, and as rejecting the use of mathematics in economics. In fact, the human individual was, for Carl Menger, only the fundamental element of socioeconomic structures. Economic theory was to be inspired by the "atomism" of the natural sciences and to determine the causes, effects and laws of the studied phenomena, with the aim of predicting and controlling them. Empirical study had to unite with conceptual abstraction and mathematics, in proportions determined by the simplicity or complexity of the field of research. These characteristics of the conception of C. Manger, like similar others, make us assume an important (but unconfessed) influence of A. Comte's positivism. However, to prove it, we will try to restore his true philosophy of science, warped by the neo-positivism of the energetist physicists and of the Vienna Circle.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Dec 2022 09:22:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10033</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10033</guid>
      <author>Popovici, Alexandru, A.</author>
      <dc:creator>Popovici, Alexandru, A.</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The conception of the founder of the Austrian School, in his book on the philosophy of social sciences, has been described, by the supporters of this school, as a total methodological individualism, upholding the absolute specificity of these sciences to those of nature, and as rejecting the use of mathematics in economics. In fact, the human individual was, for Carl Menger, only the fundamental element of socioeconomic structures. Economic theory was to be inspired by the "atomism" of the natural sciences and to determine the causes, effects and laws of the studied phenomena, with the aim of predicting and controlling them. Empirical study had to unite with conceptual abstraction and mathematics, in proportions determined by the simplicity or complexity of the field of research. These characteristics of the conception of C. Manger, like similar others, make us assume an important (but unconfessed) influence of A. Comte's positivism. However, to prove it, we will try to restore his true philosophy of science, warped by the neo-positivism of the energetist physicists and of the Vienna Circle.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>‘Freedom’ on the Road to Ruin: An Australian Apology to America’s Freedom-Loving Hard Right.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Contemporary America faces deep-seated problems - not least because so many Americans have lost respect for their own electoral system and democratic institutions. America suffers too from unrelenting right wing hyperbole in respect of significant social issues, including their conviction that only they understand, and value, freedom. Because of Australia’s restrictive responses to the covid-19 pandemic, Florida’s Governor Ron DeSantis – a potential Presidential candidate - denigrates Australia as ‘not a free country; not a free country at all’. Australians may dismiss Governor DeSantis’s comments as laughable, but a chorus of hard right comments in support of his view invites a comparison of the different ways in which ‘freedom’ is understood in Republican America and in Australia. One consequence of DeSantis’s conception of ‘freedom’ is the extraordinary American death rate from the Covid-19 pandemic, which in the case of Florida – which DeSantis celebrates as the ‘free-est State’ – stood at about 48 times the Australian rate when he scorned Australia as indistinguishable from communist China. Despite massive American spending on defence budgets, a domestic battle has been waged, and lost, in respect of the more prosaic defence of America’s traditional economic philosophy, and its defining institutions; and American conservatives are now divided even within their own ranks as to what it is that they wish to conserve, other than partisan advantage. The roots of America’s present malaise are to be found in the evolving (mis)understandings of a set of keywords including ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘tyranny’, ‘individualism’, and ‘society’. The radical right has impoverished the understanding of these keywords, and Australia’s pandemic response was in fact designed to give itself freedom from the ‘freedom’ that the Republican right now eulogises. In the name of an implicit and contentious teleological vision, the Republican understanding of ‘freedom’ has now descended to the point where America’s hard right perversely sees itself as actually now needing to save Australia from democracy, while simultaneously undermining its own democratic institutions. The need for a reinvigorated teaching of economic philosophy is plain to see.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Nov 2022 07:18:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9763</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9763</guid>
      <author>Duhs, L, A</author>
      <dc:creator>Duhs, L, A</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Contemporary America faces deep-seated problems - not least because so many Americans have lost respect for their own electoral system and democratic institutions. America suffers too from unrelenting right wing hyperbole in respect of significant social issues, including their conviction that only they understand, and value, freedom. Because of Australia’s restrictive responses to the covid-19 pandemic, Florida’s Governor Ron DeSantis – a potential Presidential candidate - denigrates Australia as ‘not a free country; not a free country at all’. Australians may dismiss Governor DeSantis’s comments as laughable, but a chorus of hard right comments in support of his view invites a comparison of the different ways in which ‘freedom’ is understood in Republican America and in Australia. One consequence of DeSantis’s conception of ‘freedom’ is the extraordinary American death rate from the Covid-19 pandemic, which in the case of Florida – which DeSantis celebrates as the ‘free-est State’ – stood at about 48 times the Australian rate when he scorned Australia as indistinguishable from communist China. Despite massive American spending on defence budgets, a domestic battle has been waged, and lost, in respect of the more prosaic defence of America’s traditional economic philosophy, and its defining institutions; and American conservatives are now divided even within their own ranks as to what it is that they wish to conserve, other than partisan advantage. The roots of America’s present malaise are to be found in the evolving (mis)understandings of a set of keywords including ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘tyranny’, ‘individualism’, and ‘society’. The radical right has impoverished the understanding of these keywords, and Australia’s pandemic response was in fact designed to give itself freedom from the ‘freedom’ that the Republican right now eulogises. In the name of an implicit and contentious teleological vision, the Republican understanding of ‘freedom’ has now descended to the point where America’s hard right perversely sees itself as actually now needing to save Australia from democracy, while simultaneously undermining its own democratic institutions. The need for a reinvigorated teaching of economic philosophy is plain to see.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The apodictic method and the dialogue between theology and science (II)</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Many present day scientists think that religion can never come to terms with science. In sharp contrast with this widespread opinion, the authors of this paper consider that, historically, scientific reasoning and religious belief joined hands in their effort to investigate and understand reality. In fact, the present-day divorce between science and religion is nothing else than the final outcome of a gradual, long-term, and deliberately assumed process of the secularization of science. However, especially during the last decades, we have all been equally confronted with the advance of a new concern that some contemporary scientists have, namely reviewing the sphere of problems specific to the domains of investigation in which they are involved while now facing themes that are usually addressed by theological thought. It can be said that this recent development is being captured by an emerging new field of investigation within the modern scientific epistemology, Science and Religion. Against this background, the purpose of this paper is threefold: firstly, to briefly emphasize that one of the defining dimensions of the science and religion dialogue is given by the discontinuity relationship in which the knowledge acquired through scientific reason is placed in relation to the divinely revealed one; secondly, to argue that another defining dimension of the dialogue consists in the hierarchical harmony relationship that mediates the encounter between the two, thus transgressing the discontinuity and making the theology-science dialogue possible and viable; and thirdly to advocate the idea that the apodictic method (based on antinomic logic) can successfully structure such a dialogue. The paper is divided into two parts: the first one addresses the problem of truth in theology and science with particular focus on the antinomic logic, while the second part aims to illustrate how the apodictic method (based on antinomic logic) effectively implements together-workingness between scientific analysis and theological teaching by applying it to the field of economic science, namely the theory of rational behavior, with reference to the issue of wealth and poverty.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Nov 2022 12:54:37 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8740</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8740</guid>
      <author>Petre Comșa, Fr</author>
      <author>Munteanu, Costea</author>
      <dc:creator>Petre Comșa, Fr</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Munteanu, Costea</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Many present day scientists think that religion can never come to terms with science. In sharp contrast with this widespread opinion, the authors of this paper consider that, historically, scientific reasoning and religious belief joined hands in their effort to investigate and understand reality. In fact, the present-day divorce between science and religion is nothing else than the final outcome of a gradual, long-term, and deliberately assumed process of the secularization of science. However, especially during the last decades, we have all been equally confronted with the advance of a new concern that some contemporary scientists have, namely reviewing the sphere of problems specific to the domains of investigation in which they are involved while now facing themes that are usually addressed by theological thought. It can be said that this recent development is being captured by an emerging new field of investigation within the modern scientific epistemology, Science and Religion. Against this background, the purpose of this paper is threefold: firstly, to briefly emphasize that one of the defining dimensions of the science and religion dialogue is given by the discontinuity relationship in which the knowledge acquired through scientific reason is placed in relation to the divinely revealed one; secondly, to argue that another defining dimension of the dialogue consists in the hierarchical harmony relationship that mediates the encounter between the two, thus transgressing the discontinuity and making the theology-science dialogue possible and viable; and thirdly to advocate the idea that the apodictic method (based on antinomic logic) can successfully structure such a dialogue. The paper is divided into two parts: the first one addresses the problem of truth in theology and science with particular focus on the antinomic logic, while the second part aims to illustrate how the apodictic method (based on antinomic logic) effectively implements together-workingness between scientific analysis and theological teaching by applying it to the field of economic science, namely the theory of rational behavior, with reference to the issue of wealth and poverty.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Understanding how systemic change happens -marketisation and de-marketisation</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper discusses possible conceptual foundations of formal models of endogenous change processes, understood here as movements between market and non-market transactions at the level of the national economy. It links but does not merge movements of resources with shifts in the pattern of transaction types. In focussing on transaction types, it deploys insights from Commons, Coase, and Godelier, to discuss how framing transaction types as the fundamental 'thing to be explained' points to the value of choices about how activity may best be organised, which requires a general concept, which can be found in Commons' 'going concern', applicable to transactions focussing on markets or not. It entails the possibility of institutional change and shifts in the location of economic resources without formal policy change. It suggests that the main requirement for such change processes are dualistic incentive patterns that operate upon institutional choice and/or development, which derive at root from experienced contrasts between the realities of existing and normatively privileged systems, and others, normatively initially deemed inferior, that offer key actors greater economic efficiency. Moves of institutional activity from one to the other are thus conceptually processes of endogenous systemic change. System in this sense is thus viewed as a coexistence of alternatives. The motivation comes directly from consideration of two very different historical moments: endogenously driven shifts 'from plan to market' in countries attempting central planning, and contemporary pressures in market economies from areas of the economy, such as services, where joint production and/or own consumption imply irremediable market failure and so non-market based economic institutions offer greater economic efficiency and may therefore attract both resources (factors of production) and investment in development of suitable transactions and their organisation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Oct 2022 11:59:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9667</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9667</guid>
      <author>Fforde, Adam</author>
      <dc:creator>Fforde, Adam</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper discusses possible conceptual foundations of formal models of endogenous change processes, understood here as movements between market and non-market transactions at the level of the national economy. It links but does not merge movements of resources with shifts in the pattern of transaction types. In focussing on transaction types, it deploys insights from Commons, Coase, and Godelier, to discuss how framing transaction types as the fundamental 'thing to be explained' points to the value of choices about how activity may best be organised, which requires a general concept, which can be found in Commons' 'going concern', applicable to transactions focussing on markets or not. It entails the possibility of institutional change and shifts in the location of economic resources without formal policy change. It suggests that the main requirement for such change processes are dualistic incentive patterns that operate upon institutional choice and/or development, which derive at root from experienced contrasts between the realities of existing and normatively privileged systems, and others, normatively initially deemed inferior, that offer key actors greater economic efficiency. Moves of institutional activity from one to the other are thus conceptually processes of endogenous systemic change. System in this sense is thus viewed as a coexistence of alternatives. The motivation comes directly from consideration of two very different historical moments: endogenously driven shifts 'from plan to market' in countries attempting central planning, and contemporary pressures in market economies from areas of the economy, such as services, where joint production and/or own consumption imply irremediable market failure and so non-market based economic institutions offer greater economic efficiency and may therefore attract both resources (factors of production) and investment in development of suitable transactions and their organisation.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Kenneth Boulding: A Friends' Economist</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper examines Kenneth Boulding's (1910-1993) religious beliefs and argues he was one of the most prolific religious economists in the 20 th century. He was an enigmatic economist whose career spanned over six decades. He helped to establish the field of general systems and furthered peace studies and conflict and defense. His early work earned him the John Bates Clark medal in 1949. But behind Boulding's theoretical economics was a deep religious ideology. Strongly affected by World War I while growing up in Liverpool, England, Boulding became a lifelong pacifist. Raised Methodist, Boulding discovered Quakerism in high school. While Boulding published widely in the field of economics, he also published almost 100 articles in Quaker journals. Boulding's body of work in economics and Quakerism led to interesting crosspollination. His work on peace and conflict and defense were a direct result of his pacifism. Boulding's work shows deep concern for human betterment and prosperity that is seeped in his religious principles.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 May 2022 06:20:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9030</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.9030</guid>
      <author>Scott, Robert H.</author>
      <dc:creator>Scott, Robert H.</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper examines Kenneth Boulding's (1910-1993) religious beliefs and argues he was one of the most prolific religious economists in the 20 th century. He was an enigmatic economist whose career spanned over six decades. He helped to establish the field of general systems and furthered peace studies and conflict and defense. His early work earned him the John Bates Clark medal in 1949. But behind Boulding's theoretical economics was a deep religious ideology. Strongly affected by World War I while growing up in Liverpool, England, Boulding became a lifelong pacifist. Raised Methodist, Boulding discovered Quakerism in high school. While Boulding published widely in the field of economics, he also published almost 100 articles in Quaker journals. Boulding's body of work in economics and Quakerism led to interesting crosspollination. His work on peace and conflict and defense were a direct result of his pacifism. Boulding's work shows deep concern for human betterment and prosperity that is seeped in his religious principles.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pragmatic behaviour: pragmatism as a philosophy for behavioural economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Behavioral economics offers an account of actual human behavior. Contrasting with the conventional normative approach to rationality, rational choice theory, describes the deviations from optimal decision making. These are attributed to failures in two systems, one in charge of automatic behavior (System 1) and the other responsible for reflective one (System 2). As important as this is, an elaboration of the interaction between them seems to be lacking. Philosophical pragmatism can contribute to address this want. It provides an evolutionary explanation of how people act accounting for the continuity of behavior including habitual and reflective action. The former is captured by habits and the latter directed towards objects. Additionally, it proposes a dialogical self, consisting of an interaction between the 'I', denoting impulse, and the 'me', referring to reflective action. As such, pragmatism can provide fertile ground on which to cultivate behavioral insights.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2022 06:42:36 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8741</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8741</guid>
      <author>Garcés, Pablo</author>
      <dc:creator>Garcés, Pablo</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Behavioral economics offers an account of actual human behavior. Contrasting with the conventional normative approach to rationality, rational choice theory, describes the deviations from optimal decision making. These are attributed to failures in two systems, one in charge of automatic behavior (System 1) and the other responsible for reflective one (System 2). As important as this is, an elaboration of the interaction between them seems to be lacking. Philosophical pragmatism can contribute to address this want. It provides an evolutionary explanation of how people act accounting for the continuity of behavior including habitual and reflective action. The former is captured by habits and the latter directed towards objects. Additionally, it proposes a dialogical self, consisting of an interaction between the 'I', denoting impulse, and the 'me', referring to reflective action. As such, pragmatism can provide fertile ground on which to cultivate behavioral insights.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Neoliberal governmentality, knowledge work, and thumos</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Research has shown that the knowledge worker, the decisive driver of the knowledge economy, works increasingly longer hours. In fact, it would appear that instead of working to live, they live to work. There appears to be three reasons for this living-to-work development. First, the knowledge worker ‘has to’ on account of the pressure to become ever more efficient. Such pressure translates into internalized coercion in the case of the self-responsible knowledge worker. Secondly, working is constant, because the Internet and smart technologies and mobile devices have made it ‘possible’. It gives the worker the capacity and management omnipotent control. In the final instance, the neoliberal knowledge worker works all the time because s/he paradoxically ‘wants to’. It is a curious phenomenon, because this compulsive working is concomitant with a rise of a host of physical, emotional, and psychological disorders as well as the erosion of social bonds. The paradox is exacerbated by the fact that the knowledge worker does not derive any of the usual utilities or satisfactions associated with hard work. Elsewhere I have ascribed this apparent contradiction at the heart of the living-to-work phenomenon to the invisible thumotic satisfaction generated by knowledge work. In the present article, I argue that neoliberal governmentality has found a way to tether thumos directly to the profit incentive. I draw on Foucault’s 1978-1979 Collége de France lecture course in which he analysed neoliberal governmentality with specific emphasis on the work of the neoliberal theorist of human capital, Gary Becker.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8662</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8662</guid>
      <author>Hofmeyr, Benda</author>
      <dc:creator>Hofmeyr, Benda</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Research has shown that the knowledge worker, the decisive driver of the knowledge economy, works increasingly longer hours. In fact, it would appear that instead of working to live, they live to work. There appears to be three reasons for this living-to-work development. First, the knowledge worker ‘has to’ on account of the pressure to become ever more efficient. Such pressure translates into internalized coercion in the case of the self-responsible knowledge worker. Secondly, working is constant, because the Internet and smart technologies and mobile devices have made it ‘possible’. It gives the worker the capacity and management omnipotent control. In the final instance, the neoliberal knowledge worker works all the time because s/he paradoxically ‘wants to’. It is a curious phenomenon, because this compulsive working is concomitant with a rise of a host of physical, emotional, and psychological disorders as well as the erosion of social bonds. The paradox is exacerbated by the fact that the knowledge worker does not derive any of the usual utilities or satisfactions associated with hard work. Elsewhere I have ascribed this apparent contradiction at the heart of the living-to-work phenomenon to the invisible thumotic satisfaction generated by knowledge work. In the present article, I argue that neoliberal governmentality has found a way to tether thumos directly to the profit incentive. I draw on Foucault’s 1978-1979 Collége de France lecture course in which he analysed neoliberal governmentality with specific emphasis on the work of the neoliberal theorist of human capital, Gary Becker.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind, A Philosopher's Economist: Hume and the Rise of Capitalism</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind, A Philosopher's Economist: Hume and the Rise of Capitalism, Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 316 p., e-book]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8675</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8675</guid>
      <author>Cernea, Mihail-Valentin</author>
      <dc:creator>Cernea, Mihail-Valentin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind, A Philosopher's Economist: Hume and the Rise of Capitalism, Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 316 p., e-book]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Stephen J. Macekura, The Mismeasure of Progress: Economic Growth and Its Critics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Stephen J. Macekura, The Mismeasure of Progress: Economic Growth and Its Critics, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2020]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8674</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8674</guid>
      <author>Bîgu, Dragoș</author>
      <dc:creator>Bîgu, Dragoș</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Stephen J. Macekura, The Mismeasure of Progress: Economic Growth and Its Critics, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2020]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Edward Nelson, Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the United States, 1932-1972 (volumes 1 and 2)</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Edward Nelson, Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the United States, 1932-1972 (volumes 1 and 2), Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2020]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8673</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8673</guid>
      <author>Galbács, Peter</author>
      <dc:creator>Galbács, Peter</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Edward Nelson, Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the United States, 1932-1972 (volumes 1 and 2), Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2020]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of François Levrau, Noel Clycq (eds.), Equality. Interdisciplinary Perspectives</title>
      <description><![CDATA[François Levrau, Noel Clycq (eds.), Equality. Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature, 1st Edition, 2021, 356 pp]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8672</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8672</guid>
      <author>Şerban, Henrieta</author>
      <dc:creator>Şerban, Henrieta</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[François Levrau, Noel Clycq (eds.), Equality. Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature, 1st Edition, 2021, 356 pp]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economics as the scientization of politics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper uses Beck's concept of reflexive modernity, and a Foucauldian approach, to critique the positivist philosophy associated with contemporary conventional economics, and to show its inadequacy for the environmental emergency. The paper suggests economics is not neutral but performs an ideological function in justifying the political and social order. Economics can be deconstructed by tracing its history, thereby laying bare its philosophical and political roots. The environmental debate repeats past debates of the 1920s and 30s. By employing the 'subjugated' institutional economics approaches economics can be redefined, and the path to a truly Green New Deal can be unearthed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8671</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8671</guid>
      <author>Mulberg, Jon</author>
      <dc:creator>Mulberg, Jon</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper uses Beck's concept of reflexive modernity, and a Foucauldian approach, to critique the positivist philosophy associated with contemporary conventional economics, and to show its inadequacy for the environmental emergency. The paper suggests economics is not neutral but performs an ideological function in justifying the political and social order. Economics can be deconstructed by tracing its history, thereby laying bare its philosophical and political roots. The environmental debate repeats past debates of the 1920s and 30s. By employing the 'subjugated' institutional economics approaches economics can be redefined, and the path to a truly Green New Deal can be unearthed.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Teaching the philosophical grounding of economics to economists: a 10 years' experience</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8670</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8670</guid>
      <author>Crespo, Ricardo, F</author>
      <dc:creator>Crespo, Ricardo, F</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>'Everything You Know is Wrong'. A series of challenges and responses</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8669</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8669</guid>
      <author>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Academic discipline of economics as hedonist philosophy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Contemporary mainstream economics cannot be seen as disconnected from philosophical concerns. On the contrary, it should be understood as a defence for a specific philosophy, namely, crude quantitative hedonism where money would measure pleasure and pain. Disguised among a great mathematical apparatus involving utility functions, supply, and demand, lies a specific hedonist philosophy that every year is lectured to thousands of economic and business students around the world. This hedonist philosophy is much less sophisticated than that in ancient hedonist philosophers as Epicurus or Lucretius. Furthermore, it does not solve any of the systematic difficulties regularly faced by hedonist philosophy. However, the argument that economics is detached from philosophy works as a rhetorical artifice to protect its dominant underlying philosophy: Philosophical disputes would have to be addressed within the biased mathematical apparatus of quantitative hedonism. Economists and business students must learn to identify the underlying philosophy in mainstream economics and alternative philosophical systems.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8668</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8668</guid>
      <author>Cardão-Pito, Tiago</author>
      <dc:creator>Cardão-Pito, Tiago</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Contemporary mainstream economics cannot be seen as disconnected from philosophical concerns. On the contrary, it should be understood as a defence for a specific philosophy, namely, crude quantitative hedonism where money would measure pleasure and pain. Disguised among a great mathematical apparatus involving utility functions, supply, and demand, lies a specific hedonist philosophy that every year is lectured to thousands of economic and business students around the world. This hedonist philosophy is much less sophisticated than that in ancient hedonist philosophers as Epicurus or Lucretius. Furthermore, it does not solve any of the systematic difficulties regularly faced by hedonist philosophy. However, the argument that economics is detached from philosophy works as a rhetorical artifice to protect its dominant underlying philosophy: Philosophical disputes would have to be addressed within the biased mathematical apparatus of quantitative hedonism. Economists and business students must learn to identify the underlying philosophy in mainstream economics and alternative philosophical systems.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What can economists learn from Foucault?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8667</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8667</guid>
      <author>Gürkan, Ceyhun</author>
      <dc:creator>Gürkan, Ceyhun</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How the attitude of Chicago economics towards philosophy changed over time: an essay on what role some historical methods should play in practicing the philosophy of economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8666</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8666</guid>
      <author>Galbács, Peter</author>
      <dc:creator>Galbács, Peter</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>The apodictic method and the dialogue between theology and science (I)</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Many today’s scientists think that religion can never come to terms with science. In sharp contrast to the widespread opinion, the authors of this paper consider that historically scientific reasoning and religious belief joined hands in their effort to investigate and understand reality. In fact, the current divorce between science and religion is nothing else than the final outcome of a gradual long-term, and deliberately assumed process of science secularization of science. However, especially during the last decades, we have all been equally confronted with the advance of a new concern over the fact that contemporary scientists have been approaching an area of investigation that had been usually addressed by the theological thought. This recent development has generated an emerging new field of investigation of Science and Religion within modern scientific epistemology.Against this background, the purpose of this paper is three-fold: firstly, to briefly emphasize that one of the defining dimensions of the dialogue between science and religion is given by the discontinuity, in which, the knowledge acquired through scientific reasoning is placed in relation to the divinely revealed knowledge; secondly, to argue that another defining dimension of the dialogue consists in the hierarchical harmony mediating the encounter between the two, thus transgressing the discontinuity and making the dialogue between theology and science possible and viable; and thirdly, to advocate the idea that the apodictic method (based on antinomic logic) can successfully structure such a dialogue.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8665</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8665</guid>
      <author>Petre Comşa, Fr</author>
      <author>Munteanu, Costea</author>
      <dc:creator>Petre Comşa, Fr</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Munteanu, Costea</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Many today’s scientists think that religion can never come to terms with science. In sharp contrast to the widespread opinion, the authors of this paper consider that historically scientific reasoning and religious belief joined hands in their effort to investigate and understand reality. In fact, the current divorce between science and religion is nothing else than the final outcome of a gradual long-term, and deliberately assumed process of science secularization of science. However, especially during the last decades, we have all been equally confronted with the advance of a new concern over the fact that contemporary scientists have been approaching an area of investigation that had been usually addressed by the theological thought. This recent development has generated an emerging new field of investigation of Science and Religion within modern scientific epistemology.Against this background, the purpose of this paper is three-fold: firstly, to briefly emphasize that one of the defining dimensions of the dialogue between science and religion is given by the discontinuity, in which, the knowledge acquired through scientific reasoning is placed in relation to the divinely revealed knowledge; secondly, to argue that another defining dimension of the dialogue consists in the hierarchical harmony mediating the encounter between the two, thus transgressing the discontinuity and making the dialogue between theology and science possible and viable; and thirdly, to advocate the idea that the apodictic method (based on antinomic logic) can successfully structure such a dialogue.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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      <title>A critical note on the scientific conception of economics: claiming for a methodological pluralism</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Opponents of mainstream economics have not yet called attention to the lack of in-depth examination of the general scientific conception of modern economics. However, economic science cannot consistently fulfil the epistemological and ontological requirements of the scientific standards underlying this conception. What can be scientifically recognized as true cannot be answered, neither through the actual ontological structure of the object of observation nor through a methodological demarcation. These limitations necessarily lead to the claim for both a pragmatic and a radical methodological pluralism.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8664</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8664</guid>
      <author>Reinke, Rouven</author>
      <dc:creator>Reinke, Rouven</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Opponents of mainstream economics have not yet called attention to the lack of in-depth examination of the general scientific conception of modern economics. However, economic science cannot consistently fulfil the epistemological and ontological requirements of the scientific standards underlying this conception. What can be scientifically recognized as true cannot be answered, neither through the actual ontological structure of the object of observation nor through a methodological demarcation. These limitations necessarily lead to the claim for both a pragmatic and a radical methodological pluralism.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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      <title>Method and scope in Joseph A. Schumpeter's economics: a pluralist perspective</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This study aims to evaluate the ideas on the scope and method of economics of Joseph Schumpeter who is one of the important economists of the 20th century. The study consists of four sections: In the first section we underline the interesting points of his life to understand the roots, background, or 'vision' of his thought system. In the second section, we will examine his methodological views that he asserted in his first (but translated into English only in 2010) book. Third section will be concerned with his 'analysis of economics' which refers to his critics of Leon Walras's general equilibrium analysis (as static) and his own alternative (dynamics analysis of capitalist economies) about the central subject matter of economics. In the fourth section we will treat his approach about the development/evolution process of economic thought in time. The study concludes with a brief assessment: Schumpeter is one of the rare economists who can build his own thought system in the history of economics, and he embraced a pluralist perspective in the field of the methodology of economics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8663</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8663</guid>
      <author>Yay, Turan</author>
      <dc:creator>Yay, Turan</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This study aims to evaluate the ideas on the scope and method of economics of Joseph Schumpeter who is one of the important economists of the 20th century. The study consists of four sections: In the first section we underline the interesting points of his life to understand the roots, background, or 'vision' of his thought system. In the second section, we will examine his methodological views that he asserted in his first (but translated into English only in 2010) book. Third section will be concerned with his 'analysis of economics' which refers to his critics of Leon Walras's general equilibrium analysis (as static) and his own alternative (dynamics analysis of capitalist economies) about the central subject matter of economics. In the fourth section we will treat his approach about the development/evolution process of economic thought in time. The study concludes with a brief assessment: Schumpeter is one of the rare economists who can build his own thought system in the history of economics, and he embraced a pluralist perspective in the field of the methodology of economics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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      <title>Justice and just price in Francisco de Vitoria's Commentary on Summa Theologica II-II q77</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Following Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria's analysis of justice in exchanges takes place by commenting on the corresponding questions of the Summa Theologica. The identification of the just price with that of common estimation occurs under a sufficient concurrence of sellers and buyers. A high level of concurrence limits the ability to take advantage of the need on the other side of the market. This fact guaranties a full consent of the parties involved in trading. Under conditions of market power or when some authority fixes a legal price, just price should also be taken as a normative ideal.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 12:14:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8661</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8661</guid>
      <author>Cendejas Bueno, José Luis</author>
      <dc:creator>Cendejas Bueno, José Luis</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Following Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria's analysis of justice in exchanges takes place by commenting on the corresponding questions of the Summa Theologica. The identification of the just price with that of common estimation occurs under a sufficient concurrence of sellers and buyers. A high level of concurrence limits the ability to take advantage of the need on the other side of the market. This fact guaranties a full consent of the parties involved in trading. Under conditions of market power or when some authority fixes a legal price, just price should also be taken as a normative ideal.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Towards a theory of ignorance</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The paper develops an argument for the criteria that a theory of ignorance should meet. It starts from the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental action. Usually, the latter is considered irrational and the former rational as being based upon known cause-effect relations whilst the latter is not. I argue that the former requires a reasoned basis in predictive knowledge of cause and effect, without which good council is either for inaction or noninstrumental action. The argument proceeds by exploiting mainstream statistical methods to explore an example of a 'metric of advised ignorance' to guide explicit reasoned choice allowing rejection of instrumental action in favour of inaction or non-instrumental action. The argument then explores a case study of how such rejection is disallowed by official requirements in International Development Assistance (aid) that contexts must always be believed predictive and so action organised as instrumental. This shows the basic irrationality of mainstream policy rationality. The paper then discusses wider social epistemological issues of this irrationality and concludes with a list of criteria a theory of ignorance should meet.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10739</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10739</guid>
      <author>Fforde, Adam</author>
      <dc:creator>Fforde, Adam</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The paper develops an argument for the criteria that a theory of ignorance should meet. It starts from the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental action. Usually, the latter is considered irrational and the former rational as being based upon known cause-effect relations whilst the latter is not. I argue that the former requires a reasoned basis in predictive knowledge of cause and effect, without which good council is either for inaction or noninstrumental action. The argument proceeds by exploiting mainstream statistical methods to explore an example of a 'metric of advised ignorance' to guide explicit reasoned choice allowing rejection of instrumental action in favour of inaction or non-instrumental action. The argument then explores a case study of how such rejection is disallowed by official requirements in International Development Assistance (aid) that contexts must always be believed predictive and so action organised as instrumental. This shows the basic irrationality of mainstream policy rationality. The paper then discusses wider social epistemological issues of this irrationality and concludes with a list of criteria a theory of ignorance should meet.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Review of Andrea Komlosy, Work. The Last 1000 Years, translated by Jakob K. Watson with Loren Balhorn, London, Verso, 2018, 265 pp., hb, ISBN 978-1-78663-410-8</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10746</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10746</guid>
      <author>Cojanu, Valentin</author>
      <dc:creator>Cojanu, Valentin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Review of Mark Thornton, The Skyscraper Curse: And How Austrian Economists Predicted Every Major Economic Crisis of the Last Century, Auburn, Alabama, Mises Institute, 2018, 275 pp., pb, ISBN 978-1-61016-684-3</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10745</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10745</guid>
      <author>Pătruţi, Alexandru</author>
      <dc:creator>Pătruţi, Alexandru</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Review of Dumas, Lloyd J., Building the Good Society. The Power and Limits of Markets, Democracy and Freedom in an Increasingly Polarized World, Emerald Publishing, 2020, xiv+228 pp., hb, ISBN 978-1-83867-632-2</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10744</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10744</guid>
      <author>Şerban-Oprescu, George</author>
      <dc:creator>Şerban-Oprescu, George</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Craig Smith, Adam Smith, Cambridge / Medford MA, Polity Press, 1st Edition, 2020, 210 pp., pb, ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-1823-4</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10743</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10743</guid>
      <author>Bălan, Sergiu</author>
      <dc:creator>Bălan, Sergiu</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why is economics not part of a system of scientific ethics? A review essay on Wilfred Dolfsma and Ioana Negru’s The Ethical Formation of Economists</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Until the 1990s, the most used research and teaching materials for economists were print journal articles and print books. Since the Internet was commercialized in the 1990s, economists have used digital technologies in research and teaching. Journal articles and books are now more easily accessed. Online subscription systems allow economists to acquire electronic study and research materials in real time. Researchers can access a wealth of teaching and research materials freely and openly. In this essay [1], I focus on Wilfred Dolfsma and Ioana Negru’s The Ethical Formation of Economists (Dolfsma and Negru 2019) and claim that digital economics research requires a global understanding of ethics consistent with the values of scholarly practices. In the absence of scientific ethics, digital tools and software can harm the members of scholarly communities internationally and become a source of scientific misconduct. Economics should be taught as part of a system of scientific ethics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10742</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10742</guid>
      <author>Yalcintas, Altug</author>
      <dc:creator>Yalcintas, Altug</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Until the 1990s, the most used research and teaching materials for economists were print journal articles and print books. Since the Internet was commercialized in the 1990s, economists have used digital technologies in research and teaching. Journal articles and books are now more easily accessed. Online subscription systems allow economists to acquire electronic study and research materials in real time. Researchers can access a wealth of teaching and research materials freely and openly. In this essay [1], I focus on Wilfred Dolfsma and Ioana Negru’s The Ethical Formation of Economists (Dolfsma and Negru 2019) and claim that digital economics research requires a global understanding of ethics consistent with the values of scholarly practices. In the absence of scientific ethics, digital tools and software can harm the members of scholarly communities internationally and become a source of scientific misconduct. Economics should be taught as part of a system of scientific ethics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Rejoinder on animal spirits in Descartes and Keynes: a response to Kurt Smith</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This essay serves as a response to Kurt Smith, who wrote a philosophical and historical commentary on my 2018 essay entitled ‘Crises, confidence and animal spirits: exploring subjectivity in the dualism of Descartes and Keynes’ in The Journal of Philosophical Economics. It also provides a rejoinder to my original commentary on the role of animal spirits in relation to dualism in the work of Descartes and Keynes. I address Smith’s historical-philosophical response to my work in three ways. First, I revisit Gilbert Ryle’s concept of the intellectualist legend with respect to understanding the Cartesian tradition of thought and expand upon my own exegetical approach in order to clear up the thorny issue of determining and asserting authorial intention. Second, I address the problem of establishing analogies between texts and disciplines. In order to do so I will revisit my earlier critique of the concept of ‘the Economy’ and show that, contra to Smith’s reading, it is not in fact analogous to Descartes’ ‘human being.’ Finally, I open up a fresh exploration of the nature of the relationship between economic rationality and economic system, looking at the broader economic vision of Keynes and some of his notorious opponents – Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10741</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10741</guid>
      <author>Scott, Sonya, Marie</author>
      <dc:creator>Scott, Sonya, Marie</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This essay serves as a response to Kurt Smith, who wrote a philosophical and historical commentary on my 2018 essay entitled ‘Crises, confidence and animal spirits: exploring subjectivity in the dualism of Descartes and Keynes’ in The Journal of Philosophical Economics. It also provides a rejoinder to my original commentary on the role of animal spirits in relation to dualism in the work of Descartes and Keynes. I address Smith’s historical-philosophical response to my work in three ways. First, I revisit Gilbert Ryle’s concept of the intellectualist legend with respect to understanding the Cartesian tradition of thought and expand upon my own exegetical approach in order to clear up the thorny issue of determining and asserting authorial intention. Second, I address the problem of establishing analogies between texts and disciplines. In order to do so I will revisit my earlier critique of the concept of ‘the Economy’ and show that, contra to Smith’s reading, it is not in fact analogous to Descartes’ ‘human being.’ Finally, I open up a fresh exploration of the nature of the relationship between economic rationality and economic system, looking at the broader economic vision of Keynes and some of his notorious opponents – Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Comparing economic theories or: pluralism in economics and the need for a comparative approach to scientific research programmes</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Pluralism in economics appears to be a double-edged sword: we need more than one theory to grasp and explain the entire economic world, yet a plurality of possible explanations undermines the aspiration of the economic discipline to provide ‘objective knowledge’ in the singular of the ‘one world one truth’ conception. Therefore, pluralism is often equated with relativism and obscurantism. In this article, I will explore both the demand for pluralism and the fear of relativism and obscurantism, scrutinising each position in order to evaluate their respective justification and devising a methodological proposal that may appease both the defender and the sceptic of economic pluralism.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10740</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10740</guid>
      <author>Heise, Arne</author>
      <dc:creator>Heise, Arne</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Pluralism in economics appears to be a double-edged sword: we need more than one theory to grasp and explain the entire economic world, yet a plurality of possible explanations undermines the aspiration of the economic discipline to provide ‘objective knowledge’ in the singular of the ‘one world one truth’ conception. Therefore, pluralism is often equated with relativism and obscurantism. In this article, I will explore both the demand for pluralism and the fear of relativism and obscurantism, scrutinising each position in order to evaluate their respective justification and devising a methodological proposal that may appease both the defender and the sceptic of economic pluralism.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Marx’s Law of value and the ontology of labour: a Castoriadian critical point of view</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In Marx’s thought, is ‘law of value’ a particular law of capitalism (historicism) or a general law of the economy (naturalism)? To clarify this ambiguity, this article proposes to employ the social ontology of Cornélius Castoriadis. For it, ‘labour’ is not a substance, but a recent historical creation through which, finally, the capitalist mode of production expresses a fundamental truth about all society’s way of being. From this perspective, we explore some consequences of this deconstruction for the theory of value as current neo-Marxist approaches may employ it today in their economic analyses.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10738</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10738</guid>
      <author>Sobel, Richard</author>
      <dc:creator>Sobel, Richard</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In Marx’s thought, is ‘law of value’ a particular law of capitalism (historicism) or a general law of the economy (naturalism)? To clarify this ambiguity, this article proposes to employ the social ontology of Cornélius Castoriadis. For it, ‘labour’ is not a substance, but a recent historical creation through which, finally, the capitalist mode of production expresses a fundamental truth about all society’s way of being. From this perspective, we explore some consequences of this deconstruction for the theory of value as current neo-Marxist approaches may employ it today in their economic analyses.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari: performative Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari: performative constitution of unpayable debt in finance constitution of unpayable debt in finance capitalism capitalism</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Drawing upon the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari this essay puts forth the argument that in finance capitalism debt resolution performs as an elusive promise and an appearance that reconstitutes unpayable debt. A close elaboration on Nietzsche's conceptual cartographies of the relation between the flows of Apollo and Dionysus and on the contextualization of this relation within capitalist frames that, as this essay demonstrates, Deleuze and Guattari explore in both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus contributes to the argument that in finance capitalism unpayable debt is performatively constituted through illusions of debt resolution. To date little work offers a performative approach of Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualization of the differential relation between the two flows of capital that constitute unpayable debt, including the ties between these flows and Nietzsche's grasp of the differential relation between Apollo and Dionysus. As a result the performative strategies that constitute, justify, and reproduce unpayable debt in finance capitalism remain relatively unexplored. This essay draws upon the works of Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari and adds a performative methodology on the ongoing discussions on debt in order to address the practices that infinitize debt under the gaze of financial capital.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10737</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10737</guid>
      <author>Banalopoulou, Christina</author>
      <dc:creator>Banalopoulou, Christina</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Drawing upon the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari this essay puts forth the argument that in finance capitalism debt resolution performs as an elusive promise and an appearance that reconstitutes unpayable debt. A close elaboration on Nietzsche's conceptual cartographies of the relation between the flows of Apollo and Dionysus and on the contextualization of this relation within capitalist frames that, as this essay demonstrates, Deleuze and Guattari explore in both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus contributes to the argument that in finance capitalism unpayable debt is performatively constituted through illusions of debt resolution. To date little work offers a performative approach of Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualization of the differential relation between the two flows of capital that constitute unpayable debt, including the ties between these flows and Nietzsche's grasp of the differential relation between Apollo and Dionysus. As a result the performative strategies that constitute, justify, and reproduce unpayable debt in finance capitalism remain relatively unexplored. This essay draws upon the works of Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari and adds a performative methodology on the ongoing discussions on debt in order to address the practices that infinitize debt under the gaze of financial capital.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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      <title>Nordhaus on philosophy in climate change economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Nordhaus' contribution to climate change economics is well-known and, for many, praiseworthy. But his refusal to acknowledge his normative stances is philosophically problematic. This article explores his arguments about philosophy in the economics of climate change found in his review of the Stern's Review (2007). It concludes that Nordhaus nonetheless relies on normative, ethical assumptions, whose oversight hinders the finding of a solution to the problems he tries himself to solve.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10736</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10736</guid>
      <author>Jodoin, Laurent</author>
      <dc:creator>Jodoin, Laurent</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Nordhaus' contribution to climate change economics is well-known and, for many, praiseworthy. But his refusal to acknowledge his normative stances is philosophically problematic. This article explores his arguments about philosophy in the economics of climate change found in his review of the Stern's Review (2007). It concludes that Nordhaus nonetheless relies on normative, ethical assumptions, whose oversight hinders the finding of a solution to the problems he tries himself to solve.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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      <title>The rationality principle as a universal grammar of economic explanations</title>
      <description><![CDATA[A universal grammar of economic explanations is characterized by the meansend rationality principle, which can be understood by drawing a conceptual distinction between its two facets: theoretical abstraction and empirical content. The former serves as a pure form of economic way of thinking and thus delimits the capacities of economists to perceive and understand the manifold human behaviour. The latter provides economists with objects of thought and renders the discipline empirically relevant. Given the implications of the two facets of rationality, the main task of economics as a descriptive science is to incorporate appropriate empirical content into the pure rational framework with the aim of better explaining and predicting human behaviour. As a prescriptive science, economic inquiry should draw on the persuasion and communication skills of its practitioners, thereby influencing the state of the economy through changing the means and ends of the decision makers in question.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10735</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10735</guid>
      <author>Li, Cheng</author>
      <dc:creator>Li, Cheng</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A universal grammar of economic explanations is characterized by the meansend rationality principle, which can be understood by drawing a conceptual distinction between its two facets: theoretical abstraction and empirical content. The former serves as a pure form of economic way of thinking and thus delimits the capacities of economists to perceive and understand the manifold human behaviour. The latter provides economists with objects of thought and renders the discipline empirically relevant. Given the implications of the two facets of rationality, the main task of economics as a descriptive science is to incorporate appropriate empirical content into the pure rational framework with the aim of better explaining and predicting human behaviour. As a prescriptive science, economic inquiry should draw on the persuasion and communication skills of its practitioners, thereby influencing the state of the economy through changing the means and ends of the decision makers in question.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economic essays (part two): toward a realistic concept of choice</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The previous three essays (Jennings 2019) and the first in this second series were originally drafted 30 years ago in 1988-1990. They aimed to present a more realistic concept of choice in economics. These four essays serve as a precursor to my subsequent work. The first three essays (Jennings 2019) addressed these issues. Essay One started with the notion of ‘opportunity cost’ and the ‘problem of invisibility’ as a case for open discourse. The second essay introduced two metaphors for economic behavior: the ‘neighborhood store’ and the ‘chessboard’, to raise issues of incomplete knowledge, time and social process. The third essay focused on interdependence: a ‘transport’ metaphor shows a balance of substitution and complementarity, opening institutional questions of competition and cooperation. These three essays set up an ethical theory of planning horizons. The fourth essay outlines a theory of ethics based on rational bounds. The endless interdependence of choice makes rational limits essential; surprises show the border of prior awareness of radiant outcomes. Our ethics align private with social incentives; wherever relations show affinity, competition is self-defeating: cooperation is more efficient, especially in education. Learning extends horizons, suggesting the failure of rivalrous systems. How incentives shape planning horizons is central to social well-being. The fifth essay develops this view with regard to institutions. Where substitution is not the basic character of our relations, competition fails. We see rivalry as productive and think ‘collusion’ is suspect, on an assumption of opposition with no room for consilient aims. But am I discomfited by your success or enriched thereby? Substitution may not be so general, if cooperation expands our horizons in a complementary way. The sixth essay poses a horizonal research agenda. How incentives shape behavior is central to well-being. Substitution and competition lead to fragmentation, when nothing complete can be understood through isolated design. Everything connects, so we must approach understanding thus. Economics – severed from honor, ethics, civilization, climate and ecological loss – cannot grasp these horizonal issues. Our short attention spans bring harm; competitive frames support a myopic culture in self-destruct mode. This is where substitution has failed; a cultural evolution is needed, starting with realistic concepts of choice.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10734</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10734</guid>
      <author>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The previous three essays (Jennings 2019) and the first in this second series were originally drafted 30 years ago in 1988-1990. They aimed to present a more realistic concept of choice in economics. These four essays serve as a precursor to my subsequent work. The first three essays (Jennings 2019) addressed these issues. Essay One started with the notion of ‘opportunity cost’ and the ‘problem of invisibility’ as a case for open discourse. The second essay introduced two metaphors for economic behavior: the ‘neighborhood store’ and the ‘chessboard’, to raise issues of incomplete knowledge, time and social process. The third essay focused on interdependence: a ‘transport’ metaphor shows a balance of substitution and complementarity, opening institutional questions of competition and cooperation. These three essays set up an ethical theory of planning horizons. The fourth essay outlines a theory of ethics based on rational bounds. The endless interdependence of choice makes rational limits essential; surprises show the border of prior awareness of radiant outcomes. Our ethics align private with social incentives; wherever relations show affinity, competition is self-defeating: cooperation is more efficient, especially in education. Learning extends horizons, suggesting the failure of rivalrous systems. How incentives shape planning horizons is central to social well-being. The fifth essay develops this view with regard to institutions. Where substitution is not the basic character of our relations, competition fails. We see rivalry as productive and think ‘collusion’ is suspect, on an assumption of opposition with no room for consilient aims. But am I discomfited by your success or enriched thereby? Substitution may not be so general, if cooperation expands our horizons in a complementary way. The sixth essay poses a horizonal research agenda. How incentives shape behavior is central to well-being. Substitution and competition lead to fragmentation, when nothing complete can be understood through isolated design. Everything connects, so we must approach understanding thus. Economics – severed from honor, ethics, civilization, climate and ecological loss – cannot grasp these horizonal issues. Our short attention spans bring harm; competitive frames support a myopic culture in self-destruct mode. This is where substitution has failed; a cultural evolution is needed, starting with realistic concepts of choice.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Review of Piero Ferri, Minsky’s Moment. An Insider’s View on the Economics of Hyman Minsky, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, 252 pp., ISBN 978-1-78897-372-4</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Nov 2019 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10733</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10733</guid>
      <author>Stamate-Stefan, Andreas</author>
      <dc:creator>Stamate-Stefan, Andreas</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economic essays (part one): toward a realistic concept of choice</title>
      <description><![CDATA[These essays were originally drafted 30 years ago between 1988 and 1990, and then they were filed away and rediscovered just this year. They represented an attempt to offer a simple and unadorned version of fundamental issues in economics pertaining to our urgent need for a realistic concept of choice on which to found our constructions. The first essay introduces the notion of ‘opportunity cost’ and our use of caeteris paribus in the process of partial analysis. The second essay offers two metaphors for economic behavior: the ‘neighborhood store’ where virtually all neoclassical choice occurs; and the ‘chessboard’ that opens three issues simply ignored in orthodox settings. The third essay addresses the problem of interdependence, since choice in this setting confronts our range of awareness as bounded where outcomes spread forever with externalities everywhere, ruling out additivity.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Nov 2019 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10732</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10732</guid>
      <author>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[These essays were originally drafted 30 years ago between 1988 and 1990, and then they were filed away and rediscovered just this year. They represented an attempt to offer a simple and unadorned version of fundamental issues in economics pertaining to our urgent need for a realistic concept of choice on which to found our constructions. The first essay introduces the notion of ‘opportunity cost’ and our use of caeteris paribus in the process of partial analysis. The second essay offers two metaphors for economic behavior: the ‘neighborhood store’ where virtually all neoclassical choice occurs; and the ‘chessboard’ that opens three issues simply ignored in orthodox settings. The third essay addresses the problem of interdependence, since choice in this setting confronts our range of awareness as bounded where outcomes spread forever with externalities everywhere, ruling out additivity.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The unrealistic realist philosophy. The ontology of econometrics revisited</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The argument put forth in this article shows that the hitherto scientific-realist approaches to econometrics are incongruent with the realistically reconstructed empirical macroeconomics. The SR approaches share in common being realist about the relations depicted by (successful) models. The economic models of data are sensitive to minor changes in sample and estimating methods what creates the 'emerging contrary result' phenomenon: the community of econometricians accept models that are inconsistent. Being SR about econometrics equals committing oneself to the following trilemma: (1) it is feasible to indicate the successful models that rightly isolate/idealize the regularities of the economy (the knowledge thesis); (2) econometric models are about the economic world (the independence thesis); and, at least in some areas of application, (3) successful econometric models contradict each other.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Nov 2019 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10731</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10731</guid>
      <author>Maziarz, Mariusz</author>
      <dc:creator>Maziarz, Mariusz</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The argument put forth in this article shows that the hitherto scientific-realist approaches to econometrics are incongruent with the realistically reconstructed empirical macroeconomics. The SR approaches share in common being realist about the relations depicted by (successful) models. The economic models of data are sensitive to minor changes in sample and estimating methods what creates the 'emerging contrary result' phenomenon: the community of econometricians accept models that are inconsistent. Being SR about econometrics equals committing oneself to the following trilemma: (1) it is feasible to indicate the successful models that rightly isolate/idealize the regularities of the economy (the knowledge thesis); (2) econometric models are about the economic world (the independence thesis); and, at least in some areas of application, (3) successful econometric models contradict each other.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reconsidering economics in relation to sustainable development and democracy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The challenge of sustainable development can be approached from different angles. In this essay it is argued that one also needs to examine the present close to monopoly position of neoclassical economic theory at university departments of economics in many parts of the world. An open debate is needed about paradigms in economics as well as ideological orientations.An alternative to neoclassical theory is outlined where individuals and organizations are regarded as political actors, each guided by an ideological orientation or mission. Reference is made to the 17 UN sustainable development goals suggesting that impacts need to be seen in multidimensional terms and an alternative definition of economics as “multidimensional management of limited resources in a democratic society” is proposed. It is argued that economics need to move away from its technocracy-oriented tendencies to democracy-oriented approaches. This is exemplified by a move away from neoclassical Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) to Positional Analysis as approach to decision-making and sustainability assessment.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Nov 2019 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10730</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10730</guid>
      <author>Söderbaum, Peter</author>
      <dc:creator>Söderbaum, Peter</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The challenge of sustainable development can be approached from different angles. In this essay it is argued that one also needs to examine the present close to monopoly position of neoclassical economic theory at university departments of economics in many parts of the world. An open debate is needed about paradigms in economics as well as ideological orientations.An alternative to neoclassical theory is outlined where individuals and organizations are regarded as political actors, each guided by an ideological orientation or mission. Reference is made to the 17 UN sustainable development goals suggesting that impacts need to be seen in multidimensional terms and an alternative definition of economics as “multidimensional management of limited resources in a democratic society” is proposed. It is argued that economics need to move away from its technocracy-oriented tendencies to democracy-oriented approaches. This is exemplified by a move away from neoclassical Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) to Positional Analysis as approach to decision-making and sustainability assessment.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The resilience of modern neoclassical economics -a case study in the light of Ludwik Fleck's 'harmony of deception'</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In this paper, Ludwick Fleck’s philosophy and sociology of science will be briefly outlined in order to establish a ‘theory of the resilience of scientific misapprehension’. This theory will be use in order to gain insights into the modes of operation of defence and resilience of modern neoclassical economics in the face of recent harsh critique by singling out a case of extreme deviation of theoretical prediction from empirical evidence: minimum wages’ impact on employment.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Nov 2019 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10729</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10729</guid>
      <author>Heise, Arne</author>
      <dc:creator>Heise, Arne</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In this paper, Ludwick Fleck’s philosophy and sociology of science will be briefly outlined in order to establish a ‘theory of the resilience of scientific misapprehension’. This theory will be use in order to gain insights into the modes of operation of defence and resilience of modern neoclassical economics in the face of recent harsh critique by singling out a case of extreme deviation of theoretical prediction from empirical evidence: minimum wages’ impact on employment.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Morality and value neutrality in economics: a dualist view</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper proposes a dualist view that economics exhibits the properties of both moral science and value-neutral approach, regardless of the normative-positive distinction. Our argumentation is derived from the understanding that, analytically, economics is a broadly-defined rational choice theory. As implied by this claim, on the one hand, economics behaves as a moral science for two main reasons: all economic theories and policy discussions are necessarily based on moral premises about means-end considerations; economics as an analytical approach can be and has been applied to explanations of a wide range of moral phenomena. On the other hand, since economists — without being informed of some ethical presuppositions of higher order — cannot deal with the comparisons among different value criteria, their approach remains neutral regarding judgmental positions, which should be given a priori to make economic enquiries possible. Ultimately, by this view we reconcile morality with value neutrality in economics, without slicing the discipline into two distinctive branches.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10725</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10725</guid>
      <author>Li, Cheng</author>
      <dc:creator>Li, Cheng</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper proposes a dualist view that economics exhibits the properties of both moral science and value-neutral approach, regardless of the normative-positive distinction. Our argumentation is derived from the understanding that, analytically, economics is a broadly-defined rational choice theory. As implied by this claim, on the one hand, economics behaves as a moral science for two main reasons: all economic theories and policy discussions are necessarily based on moral premises about means-end considerations; economics as an analytical approach can be and has been applied to explanations of a wide range of moral phenomena. On the other hand, since economists — without being informed of some ethical presuppositions of higher order — cannot deal with the comparisons among different value criteria, their approach remains neutral regarding judgmental positions, which should be given a priori to make economic enquiries possible. Ultimately, by this view we reconcile morality with value neutrality in economics, without slicing the discipline into two distinctive branches.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Venkat Venkatasubramanian, How Much Inequality is Fair? Mathematical Principles of a Moral, Optimal, and Stable Capitalist Society, New York, Columbia University Press, 2017, xxi+279 pp., hb, ISBN 978-0-231-18072-6</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10728</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10728</guid>
      <author>Cojanu, Valentin</author>
      <dc:creator>Cojanu, Valentin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Colin White, A History of the Global Economy. The Inevitable Accident, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018, hb, ix+495 pages, ISBN 978-1-78897-197-3</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10727</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10727</guid>
      <author>Şerban-Oprescu, George</author>
      <dc:creator>Şerban-Oprescu, George</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis, edited by Gilbert Faccarello and Heinz D. Kurz, Edward Elgar Publishing, Northhampton, MA, 2018, 3 volumes, 1919 pp, Paperback, ISBN 978-1-78536-131-9</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10726</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10726</guid>
      <author>Mursa, Gabriel</author>
      <author>Iacobuţă, Andreea</author>
      <dc:creator>Mursa, Gabriel</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Iacobuţă, Andreea</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. Ethics, jurisprudence and political economy throughout the intellectual history of Adam Smith</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper aims to address two research questions that have not been sufficiently examined by specialized studies of the intellectual history of Adam Smith. The first question asks why Smith, after developing his theory of sympathy in the first editions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, started working on a theory of jurisprudence and ended up writing The Wealth of Nations. The second question asks why Smith, after writing and republishing The Wealth of Nations, asserted that he could not complete his theory of jurisprudence and incorporated a new part dedicated to virtue ethics in the last edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1790. The paper shows that: 1) after developing his theory of sympathy in the first edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith stated that a theory of jurisprudence was necessary to form rules of justice that guarantee social order, and in the search for that theory he ended up writing The Wealth of Nations; 2) in The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith was devoted to studying the development of commerce in modern society and the conduct of the mercantile individual who pursued his own interest, and was incapable of elaborating on those general principles of justice that would ensure social harmony. Smith then delved into virtue ethics in order to recommend virtuous conduct that encourages mercantile individuals to become good citizens. The paper concludes by contending that economics would benefit from a better understanding of the relationship between political economy, jurisprudence and ethics in the work of Adam Smith. Specifically, economics would broaden in scope of study and contribute to larger debates about the past, present and future of modern civilization.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10724</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10724</guid>
      <author>Piqué, Pilar</author>
      <dc:creator>Piqué, Pilar</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper aims to address two research questions that have not been sufficiently examined by specialized studies of the intellectual history of Adam Smith. The first question asks why Smith, after developing his theory of sympathy in the first editions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, started working on a theory of jurisprudence and ended up writing The Wealth of Nations. The second question asks why Smith, after writing and republishing The Wealth of Nations, asserted that he could not complete his theory of jurisprudence and incorporated a new part dedicated to virtue ethics in the last edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1790. The paper shows that: 1) after developing his theory of sympathy in the first edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith stated that a theory of jurisprudence was necessary to form rules of justice that guarantee social order, and in the search for that theory he ended up writing The Wealth of Nations; 2) in The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith was devoted to studying the development of commerce in modern society and the conduct of the mercantile individual who pursued his own interest, and was incapable of elaborating on those general principles of justice that would ensure social harmony. Smith then delved into virtue ethics in order to recommend virtuous conduct that encourages mercantile individuals to become good citizens. The paper concludes by contending that economics would benefit from a better understanding of the relationship between political economy, jurisprudence and ethics in the work of Adam Smith. Specifically, economics would broaden in scope of study and contribute to larger debates about the past, present and future of modern civilization.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>On Amartya Sen's concept of sympathy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper examines Amartya Sen's concept of sympathy and the oversimplified, ambiguous and sometimes erroneous interpretations of this concept by Sen's interpreters. In the first section, two types of sympathy can be found in Sen's 'Rational fools' essay-a contemplative and an active type of which the former has conceptual primacy. Following this, active sympathy is examined to ascertain what Sen means by 'actions based on sympathy' and why he deems these to be 'egoistic'. Sen's understanding of egoism means that sympathy is not straightforwardly assimilable to the orthodox theory of rational choice. The section after that analyses the place of altruism in Sen's work and ascertains that altruism can be aligned both with sympathy and commitment, depending on the definition one uses. The final section compares sympathy and commitment and establishes that they are to be distinguished, not according to the welfare a person expects to obtain from making choices, but according to the reason which motivates that person to make a choice.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10723</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10723</guid>
      <author>Peacock, Mark, S</author>
      <dc:creator>Peacock, Mark, S</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper examines Amartya Sen's concept of sympathy and the oversimplified, ambiguous and sometimes erroneous interpretations of this concept by Sen's interpreters. In the first section, two types of sympathy can be found in Sen's 'Rational fools' essay-a contemplative and an active type of which the former has conceptual primacy. Following this, active sympathy is examined to ascertain what Sen means by 'actions based on sympathy' and why he deems these to be 'egoistic'. Sen's understanding of egoism means that sympathy is not straightforwardly assimilable to the orthodox theory of rational choice. The section after that analyses the place of altruism in Sen's work and ascertains that altruism can be aligned both with sympathy and commitment, depending on the definition one uses. The final section compares sympathy and commitment and establishes that they are to be distinguished, not according to the welfare a person expects to obtain from making choices, but according to the reason which motivates that person to make a choice.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Friedman's instrumentalism in F53. A Weberian reading</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In this paper, Weber’s methodology of ideal types is applied as a framework to argue for the instrumentalist interpretation of Friedman’s methodology of positive economics. Weber’s ideal-typical methodology is characterized as a mix of descriptive inaccuracy and causal adequacy. Based on some recent structuralist results in the philosophy of science it is highlighted how intimately causal understanding and the properties of entities are related. The main contrast between Weber and Friedman consists in the emphases they placed on the causal properties of agents. It is argued that Friedman’s instrumentalism results from his neglect of entity properties for no causal understanding can be placed upon neglected characteristics. By identifying some channels through which methodological Weberianism could spread, the possibility of a real albeit indirect connection between Weber and Friedman is suggested, with Frank H. Knight as the most probable diffuser.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10722</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10722</guid>
      <author>Galbács, Peter</author>
      <dc:creator>Galbács, Peter</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In this paper, Weber’s methodology of ideal types is applied as a framework to argue for the instrumentalist interpretation of Friedman’s methodology of positive economics. Weber’s ideal-typical methodology is characterized as a mix of descriptive inaccuracy and causal adequacy. Based on some recent structuralist results in the philosophy of science it is highlighted how intimately causal understanding and the properties of entities are related. The main contrast between Weber and Friedman consists in the emphases they placed on the causal properties of agents. It is argued that Friedman’s instrumentalism results from his neglect of entity properties for no causal understanding can be placed upon neglected characteristics. By identifying some channels through which methodological Weberianism could spread, the possibility of a real albeit indirect connection between Weber and Friedman is suggested, with Frank H. Knight as the most probable diffuser.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economic experiments versus physical science experiments: an ontology-based approach</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This article applies an ontology-based approach to economic experiments, emphasizing their differences with respect to physical science experiments. To contextualize our discussion, a conciliatory Weberian view of the similarities and differences between natural and social sciences is provided. After that, some ontological features of the social sciences' domain are highlighted, together with their problematic effect on experimental economics. Specifically, we focus on human beings' representational capacities and intentionality, their cultural and conventionally mediated forms of social interaction, and the holistic openness, instability and uncertainty of the social world. Finally, we emphasize the severe under-determination of theory by evidence affecting social science, as well as the related problems of empirical ambiguity, confirmatory biases and propensity to pseudoscientific practices in experimental economics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10721</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10721</guid>
      <author>Caamaño-Alegre, María</author>
      <author>Caamaño-Alegre, José</author>
      <dc:creator>Caamaño-Alegre, María</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Caamaño-Alegre, José</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This article applies an ontology-based approach to economic experiments, emphasizing their differences with respect to physical science experiments. To contextualize our discussion, a conciliatory Weberian view of the similarities and differences between natural and social sciences is provided. After that, some ontological features of the social sciences' domain are highlighted, together with their problematic effect on experimental economics. Specifically, we focus on human beings' representational capacities and intentionality, their cultural and conventionally mediated forms of social interaction, and the holistic openness, instability and uncertainty of the social world. Finally, we emphasize the severe under-determination of theory by evidence affecting social science, as well as the related problems of empirical ambiguity, confirmatory biases and propensity to pseudoscientific practices in experimental economics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Max Haiven, Art after Money, Money after Art; Creative Strategies Against Financialization, London: Pluto Press, 2018, 279 pp., pb. £19,99, ISBN 978-074533824</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2018 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10720</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10720</guid>
      <author>Papadopoulos, Georgios</author>
      <dc:creator>Papadopoulos, Georgios</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Tavasci, Daniela and Luigi Ventimiglia (eds.), Teaching the History of Economic Thought. Integrating Historical Perspectives into Modern Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018, hb, vi+150 pages, ISBN 978-1-78811-347-2</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2018 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10719</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10719</guid>
      <author>Serban-Oprescu, George</author>
      <dc:creator>Serban-Oprescu, George</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Critical comments on the philosophical context of Ludwig von Mises's 'Human action'</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Mises’s work of ‘Human action’ is analyzed in relation to the methodological conceptions of his predecessor C. Menger and of his successor F. von Hayek. Also, it is placed in the continuation of one of his previous works and in contrast to one that followed it. Some of his ideas can be better understood in such a way, while others show themselves as contradictory. It results that his attempt to combine apriorism with scientific realism explains some of major difficulties of Mises’s argumentation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2018 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10718</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10718</guid>
      <author>Popovici, Alexandru, A</author>
      <dc:creator>Popovici, Alexandru, A</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Mises’s work of ‘Human action’ is analyzed in relation to the methodological conceptions of his predecessor C. Menger and of his successor F. von Hayek. Also, it is placed in the continuation of one of his previous works and in contrast to one that followed it. Some of his ideas can be better understood in such a way, while others show themselves as contradictory. It results that his attempt to combine apriorism with scientific realism explains some of major difficulties of Mises’s argumentation.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ecce Homo-Economicus? The Dr. Jekyll &amp; Mr. Hide syndrome of the economic man in the context of natural resources scarcity and environmental externalities</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Indeed, the artificial entity ‘Homo-Economicus’ plays a central role in modern neoclassical economic theory. Maybe an illegitimate child of markets’ self-regulation doctrine and the emerging rationalism - professed by the post-modern realms of neoliberalism and the ongoing globalization process - this theoretical abstraction is promoted as a potential prototype of human behavior. It is firmly believed, that this individualistic, self-motivated, and above all, perfectly informed ‘entity’ could, theoretically, lead the economic system into profound balance between supply and demand, consumption and production, utility maximization, and so on. The present paper consists of a criticism to the mainstream prototype of Homo-Economicus, with further extensions to the neoclassical paradigm. Placing this criticism in the context of ecological economics, the paper argues that the notorious rationality of Homo-Economicus seems to be vanished in the deadlock of a futile race towards non-renewable natural resources depletion and increasing environmental externalities. Finally, a brief review of alternative theoretical frameworks and evidence from institutional and behavioral economics, delineates an emerging pressing request for a paradigm change.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2018 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10717</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10717</guid>
      <author>Kalimeris, Panos</author>
      <dc:creator>Kalimeris, Panos</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Indeed, the artificial entity ‘Homo-Economicus’ plays a central role in modern neoclassical economic theory. Maybe an illegitimate child of markets’ self-regulation doctrine and the emerging rationalism - professed by the post-modern realms of neoliberalism and the ongoing globalization process - this theoretical abstraction is promoted as a potential prototype of human behavior. It is firmly believed, that this individualistic, self-motivated, and above all, perfectly informed ‘entity’ could, theoretically, lead the economic system into profound balance between supply and demand, consumption and production, utility maximization, and so on. The present paper consists of a criticism to the mainstream prototype of Homo-Economicus, with further extensions to the neoclassical paradigm. Placing this criticism in the context of ecological economics, the paper argues that the notorious rationality of Homo-Economicus seems to be vanished in the deadlock of a futile race towards non-renewable natural resources depletion and increasing environmental externalities. Finally, a brief review of alternative theoretical frameworks and evidence from institutional and behavioral economics, delineates an emerging pressing request for a paradigm change.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Classical economics must not become history</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper is meant as a clear statement that things can no longer continue the way they have gone so far. If analyzed critically, the classical heritage, enshrined in fundamental rules and theories, the result of a massive abstraction effort, has not always been consolidated and developed properly in modern times. Therefore, compared to other sciences, economics has been losing ground, exactly where it should have been reinforced by those who serve it-, the economists. Its main core, the classical heritage, has been enriched, but the additions, knowingly or not, have in fact weakened and transformed it into a loose collection of feeble causalities and verbosity. It is imperative that such deviations be stopped. We suggest a two-step solution: a) an inventory of the elements that define the hard core of Economics; b) a review of the circumstances that show what happened with said hard core. The conclusions point to a necessary return to classical ideas.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2018 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10716</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10716</guid>
      <author>Pohoată, Ion</author>
      <author>Diaconasu, Delia-Elena</author>
      <author>Crupenschi, Vladimir-Mihai</author>
      <dc:creator>Pohoată, Ion</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Diaconasu, Delia-Elena</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Crupenschi, Vladimir-Mihai</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper is meant as a clear statement that things can no longer continue the way they have gone so far. If analyzed critically, the classical heritage, enshrined in fundamental rules and theories, the result of a massive abstraction effort, has not always been consolidated and developed properly in modern times. Therefore, compared to other sciences, economics has been losing ground, exactly where it should have been reinforced by those who serve it-, the economists. Its main core, the classical heritage, has been enriched, but the additions, knowingly or not, have in fact weakened and transformed it into a loose collection of feeble causalities and verbosity. It is imperative that such deviations be stopped. We suggest a two-step solution: a) an inventory of the elements that define the hard core of Economics; b) a review of the circumstances that show what happened with said hard core. The conclusions point to a necessary return to classical ideas.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Negative and positive liberty and the freedom to choose in Isaiah Berlin and Jean-Jacques Rousseau</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Berlin has made the famous distinction between negative and positive liberty. For many liberals, negative liberty is modern individual liberty manifested in markets, while interference by the State is a form of positive liberty. Berlin was also repelled by Rousseau's concept of the general will, which he considered as a form of collectivist holism. The paper argues that this philosophy is a mistaken interpretation of Berlin's two concepts of liberty and of Rousseau's general will. In a simple model of individual and collective choice under conditions of bounded rationality, it is shown that positive and negative liberty are interdependent. The collective choices made under positive liberty can be modeled as the stochastic version of Rousseau's general will, provided that liberal democracy enables the conditions of free public deliberation. In that case, the individual freedom cherished by Berlin is compatible with positive liberty.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2018 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10715</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10715</guid>
      <author>Collignon, Stefan</author>
      <dc:creator>Collignon, Stefan</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Berlin has made the famous distinction between negative and positive liberty. For many liberals, negative liberty is modern individual liberty manifested in markets, while interference by the State is a form of positive liberty. Berlin was also repelled by Rousseau's concept of the general will, which he considered as a form of collectivist holism. The paper argues that this philosophy is a mistaken interpretation of Berlin's two concepts of liberty and of Rousseau's general will. In a simple model of individual and collective choice under conditions of bounded rationality, it is shown that positive and negative liberty are interdependent. The collective choices made under positive liberty can be modeled as the stochastic version of Rousseau's general will, provided that liberal democracy enables the conditions of free public deliberation. In that case, the individual freedom cherished by Berlin is compatible with positive liberty.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Financial bubbles and their magic: asset price as a heroic journey in the financial markets</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Why do financial crises appear unprecedented in spite of being a rather regular occurrence across countries and time? There are many answers from various schools of finance and economics, including Minsky's financial instability hypothesis in which systemic stability endogenously results in instability. We explore the inclusion of observed human behavior in an endogenous framework by engaging with anthropological concepts such as myth, ritual and magic that structure and explain our behaviour, and by extending the concept of agency from human to non-human. We also point to the possibility of better understanding our position in the mythological cycle using the new social media data. The aim of the article is to offer a holistic framework of interpretation of causes and circumstances of economic crises, using the tools of economy, semiotics, and economic anthropology that would account for both the universality of these crises and for their particular occurrences that always seem unique.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2018 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10714</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10714</guid>
      <author>Balasescu, Alexandru</author>
      <author>Jain, Apurv</author>
      <dc:creator>Balasescu, Alexandru</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Jain, Apurv</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Why do financial crises appear unprecedented in spite of being a rather regular occurrence across countries and time? There are many answers from various schools of finance and economics, including Minsky's financial instability hypothesis in which systemic stability endogenously results in instability. We explore the inclusion of observed human behavior in an endogenous framework by engaging with anthropological concepts such as myth, ritual and magic that structure and explain our behaviour, and by extending the concept of agency from human to non-human. We also point to the possibility of better understanding our position in the mythological cycle using the new social media data. The aim of the article is to offer a holistic framework of interpretation of causes and circumstances of economic crises, using the tools of economy, semiotics, and economic anthropology that would account for both the universality of these crises and for their particular occurrences that always seem unique.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reclaiming the University: transforming economics as a discipline</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Economics as a discipline is currently in disarray. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, academic experts, students, commentators, practitioners and politicians all questioned the status of academic economics and many called for a 'new economic thinking'. Nearly a decade later, however, there is little evidence of a transformation in research and teaching. The present study first clarifies what is meant by a transformation of economics as a discipline, since this remains an ill-defined term and may be interpreted in very different ways. It then establishes the conditions of a successful transformation of the discipline in terms of intra-disciplinary and extra-disciplinary factors. The paper argues that economics as a discipline cannot be expected to trigger this transformation by itself (i.e. via self-regulation), since the 'market for economic ideas' is prone to market failure. In addition, the influence of external factors and actors on the market may serve to distort the congruence between the individual researcher's utility and societal welfare. External incentives are therefore required to establish constitutional guardrails that ensure fair competition between ideas.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 20 May 2018 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10711</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10711</guid>
      <author>Heise, Arne</author>
      <dc:creator>Heise, Arne</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Economics as a discipline is currently in disarray. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, academic experts, students, commentators, practitioners and politicians all questioned the status of academic economics and many called for a 'new economic thinking'. Nearly a decade later, however, there is little evidence of a transformation in research and teaching. The present study first clarifies what is meant by a transformation of economics as a discipline, since this remains an ill-defined term and may be interpreted in very different ways. It then establishes the conditions of a successful transformation of the discipline in terms of intra-disciplinary and extra-disciplinary factors. The paper argues that economics as a discipline cannot be expected to trigger this transformation by itself (i.e. via self-regulation), since the 'market for economic ideas' is prone to market failure. In addition, the influence of external factors and actors on the market may serve to distort the congruence between the individual researcher's utility and societal welfare. External incentives are therefore required to establish constitutional guardrails that ensure fair competition between ideas.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A comment on 'Comment on the law of supply and demand'</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The paper briefly discusses some issues approached in the study ‘A comment on the law of supply and demand’ by M. Northrup Buechner, published in this issue of J Phil Econ. The way of discussing is logical-theoretical, without bringing into attention empirical data. Even less than that, only a few of the issues debated in the original study are examined, namely those issues which appeared to this author as both the most problematic and susceptible to drive the future discussion in the matter.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 20 May 2018 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10713</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10713</guid>
      <author>Dinga, Emil</author>
      <dc:creator>Dinga, Emil</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The paper briefly discusses some issues approached in the study ‘A comment on the law of supply and demand’ by M. Northrup Buechner, published in this issue of J Phil Econ. The way of discussing is logical-theoretical, without bringing into attention empirical data. Even less than that, only a few of the issues debated in the original study are examined, namely those issues which appeared to this author as both the most problematic and susceptible to drive the future discussion in the matter.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A comment on the law of supply and demand</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Graduate economics departments have largely abandoned the law of supply and demand (henceforth, The Law). Nevertheless, The Law continues to be taught in all undergraduate economics programs, and it is accepted as the fundamental law of price throughout the world. This paper explains how the modern conceptions of demand and supply as schedules have driven The Law from graduate economics. A reinterpretation of the meaning of supply and demand is suggested as the basis for bringing The Law back into the corpus of economic theory, that is, supply and demand should be conceived of the same way Adam Smith and the whole classical school conceived of them—as simple quantities.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 20 May 2018 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10712</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10712</guid>
      <author>Buechner, M, Northrup</author>
      <dc:creator>Buechner, M, Northrup</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Graduate economics departments have largely abandoned the law of supply and demand (henceforth, The Law). Nevertheless, The Law continues to be taught in all undergraduate economics programs, and it is accepted as the fundamental law of price throughout the world. This paper explains how the modern conceptions of demand and supply as schedules have driven The Law from graduate economics. A reinterpretation of the meaning of supply and demand is suggested as the basis for bringing The Law back into the corpus of economic theory, that is, supply and demand should be conceived of the same way Adam Smith and the whole classical school conceived of them—as simple quantities.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Descartes and the notion of animal spirits: a brief historico-philosophical remark on Sonya Marie Scott's 'Crises, confidence, and animal spirits: exploring subjectivity in the dualism of Descartes and Keynes'</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In ‘Crises, confidence, and animals spirits: exploring subjectivity in the dualism of Descartes and Keynes,’ Sonya Marie Scott sets out to deepen our understanding of Keynes’ use of animal spirits in his influential work in economics, by exploring one of the sources from which he appears to have acquired the notion—in the work of Seventeenth-Century philosopher René Descartes. The examination to follow will focus almost exclusively on Descartes’s view, where I hope to bring to light, for future discussion, both historical and philosophical troubles lurking in the account of Descartes as found in Scott’s article. I shall focus on two issues: first, I shall say a few critical words about the analogy offered by Scott, the analogy between Descartes’s and Keynes’ respective ‘dualisms;’ secondly, I shall look briefly at Scott’s reading of Descartes on animal spirits. As a quick bit of preliminary stage-setting, let me preface my remarks with a brief account of Descartes’s dualism and his account of the human being.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 20 May 2018 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10710</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10710</guid>
      <author>Smith, Kurt</author>
      <dc:creator>Smith, Kurt</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In ‘Crises, confidence, and animals spirits: exploring subjectivity in the dualism of Descartes and Keynes,’ Sonya Marie Scott sets out to deepen our understanding of Keynes’ use of animal spirits in his influential work in economics, by exploring one of the sources from which he appears to have acquired the notion—in the work of Seventeenth-Century philosopher René Descartes. The examination to follow will focus almost exclusively on Descartes’s view, where I hope to bring to light, for future discussion, both historical and philosophical troubles lurking in the account of Descartes as found in Scott’s article. I shall focus on two issues: first, I shall say a few critical words about the analogy offered by Scott, the analogy between Descartes’s and Keynes’ respective ‘dualisms;’ secondly, I shall look briefly at Scott’s reading of Descartes on animal spirits. As a quick bit of preliminary stage-setting, let me preface my remarks with a brief account of Descartes’s dualism and his account of the human being.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Crises, confidence, and animal spirits: exploring subjectivity in the dualism of Descartes and Keynes</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper will explore the nuanced epistemological status of the economic subject in Keynes' work, alongside the physiology of the human subject in Descartes' Passions of the Soul and Treatise on Man. In both instances 'animal spirits' serve as an indicator of dualism within the subject. In Descartes, the spirits mediate between the soul and the body, between the rational and non-rational, by their effect on the pineal gland. In Keynes, animal spirits push up against a certain form of economic rationality and represent a non-rational impulse inherent to human nature that is often opposed to economic reason. While Keynes' conception of economic subjectivity extends well beyond the rationalism of many of his predecessors, the dualism presented in his work by means of the animal spirits is worth considering in philosophical terms. Ultimately this paper will conclude that Keynes' work contains an element of what Gilbert Ryle (1949) has termed the 'intellectualist legend,' that is, the philosophical assumption that we must think first, and then act, relegating spontaneous action to the realm of the 'animal' or the 'non-rational.']]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 20 May 2018 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10709</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10709</guid>
      <author>Scott, Sonya, Marie</author>
      <dc:creator>Scott, Sonya, Marie</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper will explore the nuanced epistemological status of the economic subject in Keynes' work, alongside the physiology of the human subject in Descartes' Passions of the Soul and Treatise on Man. In both instances 'animal spirits' serve as an indicator of dualism within the subject. In Descartes, the spirits mediate between the soul and the body, between the rational and non-rational, by their effect on the pineal gland. In Keynes, animal spirits push up against a certain form of economic rationality and represent a non-rational impulse inherent to human nature that is often opposed to economic reason. While Keynes' conception of economic subjectivity extends well beyond the rationalism of many of his predecessors, the dualism presented in his work by means of the animal spirits is worth considering in philosophical terms. Ultimately this paper will conclude that Keynes' work contains an element of what Gilbert Ryle (1949) has termed the 'intellectualist legend,' that is, the philosophical assumption that we must think first, and then act, relegating spontaneous action to the realm of the 'animal' or the 'non-rational.']]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A multidisciplinary-economic framework of analysis</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Human motivation offers energy, and circumstances offer possibilities. Only in combination, human motivation and circumstance yield action. Over time, desires and opportunities, to satisfy them closely, interact with one another. Orthodox economics analyzes economic motivation in interaction with scarce natural resources. It assumes that perfect rationality and non-sociality create a so-called economic world and analyzes the economic mechanism of allocation of scarce resources. Neoclassical economists use this world as a theoretical foundation for their empirical research. Heterodox economics rejects this strategy of isolating one motivation, a strategy that ignores the psychic and the social problem. However, the heterodox idea of human motivation, being variable and endogenous, is badly analyzed. This leads the author to construct a psychic and a social world that is completely comparable with the agent-structure model of the economic world. The three isolated worlds are integrated by analyzing the interactions between the three worlds. In the integrated world, the economic structure, the psychic structure and the social structure are one another's foundations. This human world gives familiar economic concepts such as utility, efficiency, rationality, price, value, cost and benefit, a different meaning. Similarly, psychic concepts such as Self, willpower and personality and social concepts such as status, power, culture and morality, are given different meanings. To make the model more realistic, it should be made dynamic and historical and be placed in the context of the world as an open system.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2017 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10708</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10708</guid>
      <author>Keizer, Piet</author>
      <dc:creator>Keizer, Piet</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Human motivation offers energy, and circumstances offer possibilities. Only in combination, human motivation and circumstance yield action. Over time, desires and opportunities, to satisfy them closely, interact with one another. Orthodox economics analyzes economic motivation in interaction with scarce natural resources. It assumes that perfect rationality and non-sociality create a so-called economic world and analyzes the economic mechanism of allocation of scarce resources. Neoclassical economists use this world as a theoretical foundation for their empirical research. Heterodox economics rejects this strategy of isolating one motivation, a strategy that ignores the psychic and the social problem. However, the heterodox idea of human motivation, being variable and endogenous, is badly analyzed. This leads the author to construct a psychic and a social world that is completely comparable with the agent-structure model of the economic world. The three isolated worlds are integrated by analyzing the interactions between the three worlds. In the integrated world, the economic structure, the psychic structure and the social structure are one another's foundations. This human world gives familiar economic concepts such as utility, efficiency, rationality, price, value, cost and benefit, a different meaning. Similarly, psychic concepts such as Self, willpower and personality and social concepts such as status, power, culture and morality, are given different meanings. To make the model more realistic, it should be made dynamic and historical and be placed in the context of the world as an open system.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Some thoughts on ancient civilizations' trinity of philosophy, religion and economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Here are some loud thoughts that reflect upon the relationship that had long existed amidst philosophy, religion and economics in the so-called ‘grand’ civilizations (that had existed during 3100 BC to the beginning of Christian era). Historically, the visions of intellectuals, rulers, men of faiths, and business people have helped drive these civilizations to their zenith. The philosophies, religions, and economics of the time were deeply involved in this process of development, and seem to have acted in unison. Here is an attempt to provoke some fresh thinking on the subject by re-examining this triad relationship of the fundamental spheres of human life. The logic of this paper attempts to raise doubts, if the relationship was ideal and was based on ethical and moral values, as it was proclaimed by the philosophers, pontiffs, politicians and the business leaders of the time.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2017 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10707</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10707</guid>
      <author>Sharma, Soumitra</author>
      <dc:creator>Sharma, Soumitra</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Here are some loud thoughts that reflect upon the relationship that had long existed amidst philosophy, religion and economics in the so-called ‘grand’ civilizations (that had existed during 3100 BC to the beginning of Christian era). Historically, the visions of intellectuals, rulers, men of faiths, and business people have helped drive these civilizations to their zenith. The philosophies, religions, and economics of the time were deeply involved in this process of development, and seem to have acted in unison. Here is an attempt to provoke some fresh thinking on the subject by re-examining this triad relationship of the fundamental spheres of human life. The logic of this paper attempts to raise doubts, if the relationship was ideal and was based on ethical and moral values, as it was proclaimed by the philosophers, pontiffs, politicians and the business leaders of the time.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Smith's invisible hand: controversy is needed</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Smith's metaphor of the invisible hand, commonly attributed to The Wealth of Nations, is described in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is a ‘deception’ fed to the lower classes. Private initiative depends upon the presence of privileged classes in a conservative rather than liberal state. Only thus can the ‘invisible hand’ improve the nation's ‘wealth.’ Hence, the economic mainstream cannot easily claim Adam Smith as their ancestor. Nor can the Marxists associate him to the misdeeds of the mainstream. A Smithian ancestry is more plausible for Neoliberals.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2017 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10706</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10706</guid>
      <author>Di Mario, Flavia</author>
      <author>Micocci, Andrea</author>
      <dc:creator>Di Mario, Flavia</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Micocci, Andrea</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Smith's metaphor of the invisible hand, commonly attributed to The Wealth of Nations, is described in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is a ‘deception’ fed to the lower classes. Private initiative depends upon the presence of privileged classes in a conservative rather than liberal state. Only thus can the ‘invisible hand’ improve the nation's ‘wealth.’ Hence, the economic mainstream cannot easily claim Adam Smith as their ancestor. Nor can the Marxists associate him to the misdeeds of the mainstream. A Smithian ancestry is more plausible for Neoliberals.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The order of social sciences: sociology in dialogue with neighbouring disciplines</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Comparing sociology with economics, psychology or history shows that borderlines between disciplines have become fluent and always newly oscillating. Economists, especially prominent positions awarded with Nobel prizes, are increasingly discussing items as motivation, rationality, norms or culture which belong to the domain of sociology. Sociology should acknowledge this kind of ‘imperialism’ and claim own competencies.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2017 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10705</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10705</guid>
      <author>Bögenhold, Dieter</author>
      <dc:creator>Bögenhold, Dieter</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Comparing sociology with economics, psychology or history shows that borderlines between disciplines have become fluent and always newly oscillating. Economists, especially prominent positions awarded with Nobel prizes, are increasingly discussing items as motivation, rationality, norms or culture which belong to the domain of sociology. Sociology should acknowledge this kind of ‘imperialism’ and claim own competencies.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to transform economics? A philosophical appraisal</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Ten years after the global financial crisis there is hardly any evidence that the theories, teaching and policies of mainstream economics have changed. This paper is an attempt to contribute to the greater understanding of this persistence, but also to the discussion on what the requirements are to materialise a transformation in economics, given the dismal outcomes in the world economy. The analytical approach of the paper is to utilise relevant philosophical accounts that point out attributes of dominant discourses, and methodological requirements to supersede an already dominant discourse. The objective is to contribute to an improved understanding of factors that obstruct or construct transformations in a knowledge field such as economics; and thereby contribute to transformation efforts, preferably for a more pluralist and emancipatory economics. Given the complexities and the tensions between different philosophical positions, the conclusions of this appraisal are summarised into five criteria that appear essential to realise a successful transformation in economics: critical juncture; dissimilarity; scholar validation; sensibility; and external power. It is suggested to revise efforts to fulfil these criteria as much, and as soon as possible, given the importance and urgency of changing the trajectory of our economies and societies.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2017 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10704</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10704</guid>
      <author>Kellecioglu, Deniz</author>
      <dc:creator>Kellecioglu, Deniz</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Ten years after the global financial crisis there is hardly any evidence that the theories, teaching and policies of mainstream economics have changed. This paper is an attempt to contribute to the greater understanding of this persistence, but also to the discussion on what the requirements are to materialise a transformation in economics, given the dismal outcomes in the world economy. The analytical approach of the paper is to utilise relevant philosophical accounts that point out attributes of dominant discourses, and methodological requirements to supersede an already dominant discourse. The objective is to contribute to an improved understanding of factors that obstruct or construct transformations in a knowledge field such as economics; and thereby contribute to transformation efforts, preferably for a more pluralist and emancipatory economics. Given the complexities and the tensions between different philosophical positions, the conclusions of this appraisal are summarised into five criteria that appear essential to realise a successful transformation in economics: critical juncture; dissimilarity; scholar validation; sensibility; and external power. It is suggested to revise efforts to fulfil these criteria as much, and as soon as possible, given the importance and urgency of changing the trajectory of our economies and societies.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Ajit Sinha, A Revolution in Economic Theory: The Economics of Piero Sraffa, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, x + 244 pages, ISBN 978-3319306155</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 May 2017 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10703</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10703</guid>
      <author>Correa, Romar</author>
      <dc:creator>Correa, Romar</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economic theory in historical perspective</title>
      <description><![CDATA[On the methodological plain this paper outlines the conditions that contribute to the development of economic theories and it continues with an examination of the concrete circumstances that gave rise to modern neoclassical macroeconomic theories. The paper further claims that the current impasse in macroeconomics is indicative of the need for new directions in economic theory which becomes imperative in the long economic downturn that started in 2007 and concludes by suggesting the need for a synthesis between the classical analysis and the theory of effective demand.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 May 2017 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10702</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10702</guid>
      <author>Tsoulfidis, Lefteris</author>
      <dc:creator>Tsoulfidis, Lefteris</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[On the methodological plain this paper outlines the conditions that contribute to the development of economic theories and it continues with an examination of the concrete circumstances that gave rise to modern neoclassical macroeconomic theories. The paper further claims that the current impasse in macroeconomics is indicative of the need for new directions in economic theory which becomes imperative in the long economic downturn that started in 2007 and concludes by suggesting the need for a synthesis between the classical analysis and the theory of effective demand.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The dominion of means over ends. Modern bank credit and Max Weber's irrational rationalization</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The institutions which grant credit today can be considered to be an example of what Max Weber describes as the typical rationalization of modern age. Such a rationalization would bring a lack of reflection on what should be the ultimate significance of certain technical means, which are confused with a value-in-itself of a social context. The paper highlight the fact that the function of credit consistent with individuals’ ‘ultimate ends’ seems to be that of a temporal coordination between the ‘bargaining wills’ of different individuals who aim at obtaining the highest benefit by means of the utility of their products and the products of their peers. But the current epoch has favored the elevation of historically determined features of credit-issuing to ultimate ends. Referring, among other sources, to a report by the Bank of England and to studies by Neo-Keynesian authors such as Stiglitz, this essay establishes that the consequence of the current private structure of credit-issuing is that the ultimate end of credit does not coincide with maximization and economic reciprocity but with the assessment of a risk which is distinctly private. Also, since in this structure Central Bank acts as the bank of all commercial banks, credit granting can be read as being in function of the availability – within a circumscribed economic web – of a specific credit ‘raw material’ which has a price: central bank’s liquidity. This situation puts a deep philosophical problem into the limelight, since any ‘existential’ preferability of the current model of credit issuing can only be explained as an alienation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 May 2017 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10701</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10701</guid>
      <author>Cortese, Domenico</author>
      <dc:creator>Cortese, Domenico</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The institutions which grant credit today can be considered to be an example of what Max Weber describes as the typical rationalization of modern age. Such a rationalization would bring a lack of reflection on what should be the ultimate significance of certain technical means, which are confused with a value-in-itself of a social context. The paper highlight the fact that the function of credit consistent with individuals’ ‘ultimate ends’ seems to be that of a temporal coordination between the ‘bargaining wills’ of different individuals who aim at obtaining the highest benefit by means of the utility of their products and the products of their peers. But the current epoch has favored the elevation of historically determined features of credit-issuing to ultimate ends. Referring, among other sources, to a report by the Bank of England and to studies by Neo-Keynesian authors such as Stiglitz, this essay establishes that the consequence of the current private structure of credit-issuing is that the ultimate end of credit does not coincide with maximization and economic reciprocity but with the assessment of a risk which is distinctly private. Also, since in this structure Central Bank acts as the bank of all commercial banks, credit granting can be read as being in function of the availability – within a circumscribed economic web – of a specific credit ‘raw material’ which has a price: central bank’s liquidity. This situation puts a deep philosophical problem into the limelight, since any ‘existential’ preferability of the current model of credit issuing can only be explained as an alienation.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>'Growth in a Time of Debt' as an example of the logical-positivist science</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The paper addresses the question whether the now- infamous piece of econometric research conducted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) that set the threshold hypothesis in the relation between public debt and economic growth was conducted in accordance with the neopositivist doctrine. The article consists of two parts. First, the epistemic advice given by logical positivism is reconstructed and operationalized. Second, the cliometric method employed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) is analyzed. The answer to the research question is affirmative. ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’ is a piece of logical-positivist science because (1) the research is data-based and aimed at confirming the results, (2) its authors are committed to the neopositivist theory-observation distinction, (3) its goal is describing an empirical generalization and the result’s interpretations suggest that (4) Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) understand causality in a reductionist way, as a constant conjunction.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 May 2017 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10700</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10700</guid>
      <author>Maziarz, Mariusz</author>
      <dc:creator>Maziarz, Mariusz</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The paper addresses the question whether the now- infamous piece of econometric research conducted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) that set the threshold hypothesis in the relation between public debt and economic growth was conducted in accordance with the neopositivist doctrine. The article consists of two parts. First, the epistemic advice given by logical positivism is reconstructed and operationalized. Second, the cliometric method employed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) is analyzed. The answer to the research question is affirmative. ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’ is a piece of logical-positivist science because (1) the research is data-based and aimed at confirming the results, (2) its authors are committed to the neopositivist theory-observation distinction, (3) its goal is describing an empirical generalization and the result’s interpretations suggest that (4) Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) understand causality in a reductionist way, as a constant conjunction.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economics, chrematistics, oikos and polis in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In Aristotle’s thought, economic activity refers to a kind of praxis consisting in allocating the human and material means that constitute the oikos –the domestic community- to fulfil its natural ends: ensure both life and the means of life. By means of natural chrematistics -acquisitive art- families acquire the necessary means for this, which come from production and exchange. Families group together in the political community (polis) whose end is living well, according to virtues, among which justice is highlighted as the ‘complete virtue’. For its part, the Christian êthos regards every human act, internal and external, of this complete system (polis, oikos and chrematistics) as tending towards its ultimate purpose (beatitudo). In St. Thomas’s view, eternal law harmonizes necessity of irrational beings, loving God’s action (divine law), natural law, and the contingency of ‘human things’ where the economy is included. Trading activity is lawful if it is at the service of the oikos or polis and according to how is exercised, by following commutative justice. The family, political and religious character of human nature establishes what the natural-necessary consists of, embracing, apart from bodily goods, others derived from considering social status and the life chosen (civil, religious, active or contemplative). Economic activity based on this anthropological root has a specific place as a part of an ordered natural-legal totality that provides the economy with meaning and sufficient moral guidance.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 May 2017 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10699</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10699</guid>
      <author>Cendejas Bueno, José Luis</author>
      <dc:creator>Cendejas Bueno, José Luis</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In Aristotle’s thought, economic activity refers to a kind of praxis consisting in allocating the human and material means that constitute the oikos –the domestic community- to fulfil its natural ends: ensure both life and the means of life. By means of natural chrematistics -acquisitive art- families acquire the necessary means for this, which come from production and exchange. Families group together in the political community (polis) whose end is living well, according to virtues, among which justice is highlighted as the ‘complete virtue’. For its part, the Christian êthos regards every human act, internal and external, of this complete system (polis, oikos and chrematistics) as tending towards its ultimate purpose (beatitudo). In St. Thomas’s view, eternal law harmonizes necessity of irrational beings, loving God’s action (divine law), natural law, and the contingency of ‘human things’ where the economy is included. Trading activity is lawful if it is at the service of the oikos or polis and according to how is exercised, by following commutative justice. The family, political and religious character of human nature establishes what the natural-necessary consists of, embracing, apart from bodily goods, others derived from considering social status and the life chosen (civil, religious, active or contemplative). Economic activity based on this anthropological root has a specific place as a part of an ordered natural-legal totality that provides the economy with meaning and sufficient moral guidance.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Altug Yalcintas, Intellectual Path Dependence in Economics: Why economists do not reject refuted theories, Routledge, 2016, hb, xiv + 173 pages, ISBN 978-1-138-01617-0</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Nov 2016 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10697</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10697</guid>
      <author>Cojanu, Valentin</author>
      <dc:creator>Cojanu, Valentin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Mary Godwin, Ethics and Diversity in Business Management Education. A Sociological Study with International Scope, Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 2015, eb, x + 94 pages, ISBN 978-3-662-46654-4</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Nov 2016 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10698</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10698</guid>
      <author>Buzar, Stipe</author>
      <dc:creator>Buzar, Stipe</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>'Why has economics turned out this way?' A socio-economic note on the explanation of monism in economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Economic science has – lamented by some, applauded by others – turned into a monistic discipline. In this short research note, a socio-economic answer to the question of why this has happened is provided by combining an economic approach to the market for economic ideas with a sociological approach to a scientific (power) field.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Nov 2016 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10696</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10696</guid>
      <author>Heise, Arne</author>
      <dc:creator>Heise, Arne</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Economic science has – lamented by some, applauded by others – turned into a monistic discipline. In this short research note, a socio-economic answer to the question of why this has happened is provided by combining an economic approach to the market for economic ideas with a sociological approach to a scientific (power) field.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Planning horizons as an ordinal entropic measure of organization</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971) educated economists on the notion of entropy laws in economics and ecological process. An earlier paper by Kenneth E. Boulding (1962) asked what we might do with a measure of organizational entropy, were one ever devised. The aim of this paper is to propose the notion of planning horizons as a candidate for this role. First, the concept of organizational entropy is discussed and defined within the interdependent domain of ecological economics. Next, the character and contributions of an entropic measure of organization are reviewed, as described in Boulding’s work. Third, the concept of planning horizons – and their relation to economic cohesion, efficiency and well-being – is introduced to show how ‘horizon effects’ (shifts in planning horizons) serve as an ordinal entropic measure of organization in dynamic complex settings of interdependent effects. Last, the promise of planning horizons as a new social research program in ecological economics shall be discussed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Nov 2016 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10695</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10695</guid>
      <author>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971) educated economists on the notion of entropy laws in economics and ecological process. An earlier paper by Kenneth E. Boulding (1962) asked what we might do with a measure of organizational entropy, were one ever devised. The aim of this paper is to propose the notion of planning horizons as a candidate for this role. First, the concept of organizational entropy is discussed and defined within the interdependent domain of ecological economics. Next, the character and contributions of an entropic measure of organization are reviewed, as described in Boulding’s work. Third, the concept of planning horizons – and their relation to economic cohesion, efficiency and well-being – is introduced to show how ‘horizon effects’ (shifts in planning horizons) serve as an ordinal entropic measure of organization in dynamic complex settings of interdependent effects. Last, the promise of planning horizons as a new social research program in ecological economics shall be discussed.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economic crisis, economic methodology and the scientific ideal of physics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The methodological foundations of mainstream economics have been cited as one of the main reasons for its failure to account for the economic crisis of 2008. In spite of this, the status of economic methodology has not been elevated. This is due to the persistent aversion towards methodological discourse by most mainstream economists. The anti-methodology stance has a long presence as exemplified in Frank Hahn’s (1992) work. After focusing on the debate originating after the publication of Hahn’s arguments, the paper offers a categorization of the main explanations for mainstream methodological aversion. Subsequently, it suggests an explanation based on the role of the physics scientific ideal, arguing that the endeavor to achieve the high scientific status of physics by following the methods of physics, contributed to the negative mainstream attitude towards economic methodology. The relevant writings of the extremely influential mainstream economists Irving Fisher and Milton Friedman, reinforce the assertion that the alleged hard science status of economics renders methodological discussions and especially methodological criticism, rather pointless. The paper also calls for a more systematic discussion of this issue, especially in the wake of the line of argument that links the recent failings of mainstream economics to its methodological basis.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Nov 2016 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10694</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10694</guid>
      <author>Drakopoulos, Stavros A.</author>
      <dc:creator>Drakopoulos, Stavros A.</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The methodological foundations of mainstream economics have been cited as one of the main reasons for its failure to account for the economic crisis of 2008. In spite of this, the status of economic methodology has not been elevated. This is due to the persistent aversion towards methodological discourse by most mainstream economists. The anti-methodology stance has a long presence as exemplified in Frank Hahn’s (1992) work. After focusing on the debate originating after the publication of Hahn’s arguments, the paper offers a categorization of the main explanations for mainstream methodological aversion. Subsequently, it suggests an explanation based on the role of the physics scientific ideal, arguing that the endeavor to achieve the high scientific status of physics by following the methods of physics, contributed to the negative mainstream attitude towards economic methodology. The relevant writings of the extremely influential mainstream economists Irving Fisher and Milton Friedman, reinforce the assertion that the alleged hard science status of economics renders methodological discussions and especially methodological criticism, rather pointless. The paper also calls for a more systematic discussion of this issue, especially in the wake of the line of argument that links the recent failings of mainstream economics to its methodological basis.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Aristotle on justice in exchange: commensurability by fiat</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This essay offers an interpretation of Aristotle's remarks on the commensurability of goods in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. It explores the term ‘by hypothesis’ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) which Aristotle uses to describe the institution of currency through which commensurability is established. The term implies that Aristotle conceives the origins of currency to lie in a conscious act of stipulation rather than through a spontaneous process in which currency is established via the unintended consequences of individual action. In conclusion, contemporary theories of money are considered and it is asked with which Aristotle’s conception of money aligns most closely.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Nov 2016 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10693</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10693</guid>
      <author>Peacock, Mark</author>
      <dc:creator>Peacock, Mark</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This essay offers an interpretation of Aristotle's remarks on the commensurability of goods in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. It explores the term ‘by hypothesis’ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) which Aristotle uses to describe the institution of currency through which commensurability is established. The term implies that Aristotle conceives the origins of currency to lie in a conscious act of stipulation rather than through a spontaneous process in which currency is established via the unintended consequences of individual action. In conclusion, contemporary theories of money are considered and it is asked with which Aristotle’s conception of money aligns most closely.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of J. E. King, Advanced Introduction to Post Keynesian Economics, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, pb, ISBN 978-1-78254-843-0, x + 139 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 May 2016 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10692</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10692</guid>
      <author>Cojanu, Valentin</author>
      <dc:creator>Cojanu, Valentin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Dani Rodrik, Economics Rules: Why Economics Works, When It Fails, and How to Tell the Difference, Oxford University Press, 2015, hb, ISBN 978-0-19-873689-9, xi+253 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 May 2016 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10691</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10691</guid>
      <author>Chiriţoiu, Dorin Iulian</author>
      <dc:creator>Chiriţoiu, Dorin Iulian</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Potrošačka kultura i konzumerizam [Consumer Culture and Consumerism], edited by Snježana Čolić, Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, 2013, pb, ISBN 978-953-7964-00-9, 206 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 May 2016 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10690</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10690</guid>
      <author>Maskalan, Ana</author>
      <dc:creator>Maskalan, Ana</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Slow living and the green economy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The current paper explores the relationship between some relatively new concepts in the field of economics-slow living, slow food, slow writing and the green economy. The goal of the paper is twofolddiscussing the possibilities opened by these exciting new concepts, in terms of an increase in the quality of life combined with an environmentally sustainable lifestyle, as well as ascertaining what the concepts may entail in the context in which the effects of the recent economic crisis may make green and slow living seem like a distant dream. It is this holistic view that we shall attempt to enlarge upon in the paper, with the avowed purpose of weighing out the possibilities presented in the complicated, crisis-fraught global context.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 May 2016 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10689</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10689</guid>
      <author>Ioncică, Diana-Eugenia</author>
      <author>Petrescu, Eva-Cristina</author>
      <dc:creator>Ioncică, Diana-Eugenia</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Petrescu, Eva-Cristina</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The current paper explores the relationship between some relatively new concepts in the field of economics-slow living, slow food, slow writing and the green economy. The goal of the paper is twofolddiscussing the possibilities opened by these exciting new concepts, in terms of an increase in the quality of life combined with an environmentally sustainable lifestyle, as well as ascertaining what the concepts may entail in the context in which the effects of the recent economic crisis may make green and slow living seem like a distant dream. It is this holistic view that we shall attempt to enlarge upon in the paper, with the avowed purpose of weighing out the possibilities presented in the complicated, crisis-fraught global context.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Rawls and Piketty: the philosophical aspects of economic inequality</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper discusses a key contemporary problem, that of inequality. Certainly, the most visible inequality today is economic inequality, which is not only a characteristic found today, but is also the result of a long historical development. The problem arises when inequality becomes artificial (produces itself) and thus becomes a matter of social sciences and humanities. At this point, the question of economic inequality becomes a non-economic issue and thus opens the possibility of formulating such principles that will be able to reduce the issue to a minimum. This paper discusses this possibility, while referring to Thomas Piketty's book on capital in relation to John Rawls's principles of justice to which Piketty refers to.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 May 2016 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10688</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10688</guid>
      <author>Sunajko, Goran</author>
      <dc:creator>Sunajko, Goran</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper discusses a key contemporary problem, that of inequality. Certainly, the most visible inequality today is economic inequality, which is not only a characteristic found today, but is also the result of a long historical development. The problem arises when inequality becomes artificial (produces itself) and thus becomes a matter of social sciences and humanities. At this point, the question of economic inequality becomes a non-economic issue and thus opens the possibility of formulating such principles that will be able to reduce the issue to a minimum. This paper discusses this possibility, while referring to Thomas Piketty's book on capital in relation to John Rawls's principles of justice to which Piketty refers to.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Poor countries and development: a critique of Nicole Hassoun and a defense of the argument for good institutional quality</title>
      <description><![CDATA[If we agree that ‘institutions are the kinds of structures that matter most in the social realm: they make up the stuff of social life’ (Hodgson, 2006, p.2), and we also agree that they largely influence, either positively or negatively, even many of the decisions relative to our personal lives, then we should conclude that emphasis on quality institutions to a people should not be wished away. Drawing on the earlier stated, the present work critically responds to the position of Hassoun (2014) that making aid conditional on good institutional quality is not good for the poor. It may be true that giving aid to the poor without consideration of the quality status of their social institutions may serve their immediate purposes, but if the poor are not to be consigned and confined to the margins of perpetual dependence, then due attention should rather be shown to ensure better reforms for their institutions, given that quality institutions largely and positively influence and sustain, in spite of other considerations, human development in the final analysis.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 May 2016 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10687</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10687</guid>
      <author>Olufemi Badru, Ronald</author>
      <dc:creator>Olufemi Badru, Ronald</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[If we agree that ‘institutions are the kinds of structures that matter most in the social realm: they make up the stuff of social life’ (Hodgson, 2006, p.2), and we also agree that they largely influence, either positively or negatively, even many of the decisions relative to our personal lives, then we should conclude that emphasis on quality institutions to a people should not be wished away. Drawing on the earlier stated, the present work critically responds to the position of Hassoun (2014) that making aid conditional on good institutional quality is not good for the poor. It may be true that giving aid to the poor without consideration of the quality status of their social institutions may serve their immediate purposes, but if the poor are not to be consigned and confined to the margins of perpetual dependence, then due attention should rather be shown to ensure better reforms for their institutions, given that quality institutions largely and positively influence and sustain, in spite of other considerations, human development in the final analysis.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The case for increasing returns (2): the methods of planning horizons</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In neoclassical economics, substitution assumptions support equilibrium models in closed systems shunning interdependence. On these grounds an array of frames show outcomes as stable, efficient, unique and determinate. Heterodox economists say equilibrium models sidestep practical knowledge and the rich reality of economic behavior. Rigor or realism, mainstream or radical, ecological, institutional, socio-cultural: economics invites a wide diversity of assumptions, once short-term models of substitution are opened to question. The answers are blurred by applications; there is clarity in a simplicity shielded from mundane detail. This paper addresses the methodological impact of planning horizons, increasing returns and complementarity, and their proper representation in economic constructions. Horizonal economics can be construed as extending orthodox standards into a realm of time, but for its subtler ramifications. Increasing returns make our relations complementary and not substitutional, loosening the tight deductions from mainstream models of choice. The horizonal extension of our received theory of price applies time to cost and demand curves, showing Marshallian scissors (supply and demand) cut outward and downward with expanded horizons. Static conceptions appear in horizonal groups, suggesting complete theories of price should specify agents’ horizons, with no further radical impact: the trouble emerges with increasing returns and complementarity. Horizons stem from unbounded causality; if all we do ripples outward forever in nature and society, the relevant field of inquiry for economics is interdependent: this is the case for bounded rationality as an analytical limit to economic conceptions. In turn, interdependence suggests a use of network constructs to frame complex systemic cascades, and networks open a door to complementarity and increasing returns in transport and information exchange. The gaping maw of increasing returns and complementarity opens, swallowing down neat traditions such as stability, equilibrium, marginalism, partial analysis, supply and demand depictions of price, etc. The methodological lesson of this shift to network contexts and dynamic complex systems supersedes some of our favored doctrines and the analyses on which they stand. Without decreasing returns and substitution, neoclassical arguments simply do not work. Heterodox approaches – and their intelligent application – are required in this setting. The paper offers a few guidelines to an unexplored domain of fundamental departures.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 May 2016 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10686</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10686</guid>
      <author>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In neoclassical economics, substitution assumptions support equilibrium models in closed systems shunning interdependence. On these grounds an array of frames show outcomes as stable, efficient, unique and determinate. Heterodox economists say equilibrium models sidestep practical knowledge and the rich reality of economic behavior. Rigor or realism, mainstream or radical, ecological, institutional, socio-cultural: economics invites a wide diversity of assumptions, once short-term models of substitution are opened to question. The answers are blurred by applications; there is clarity in a simplicity shielded from mundane detail. This paper addresses the methodological impact of planning horizons, increasing returns and complementarity, and their proper representation in economic constructions. Horizonal economics can be construed as extending orthodox standards into a realm of time, but for its subtler ramifications. Increasing returns make our relations complementary and not substitutional, loosening the tight deductions from mainstream models of choice. The horizonal extension of our received theory of price applies time to cost and demand curves, showing Marshallian scissors (supply and demand) cut outward and downward with expanded horizons. Static conceptions appear in horizonal groups, suggesting complete theories of price should specify agents’ horizons, with no further radical impact: the trouble emerges with increasing returns and complementarity. Horizons stem from unbounded causality; if all we do ripples outward forever in nature and society, the relevant field of inquiry for economics is interdependent: this is the case for bounded rationality as an analytical limit to economic conceptions. In turn, interdependence suggests a use of network constructs to frame complex systemic cascades, and networks open a door to complementarity and increasing returns in transport and information exchange. The gaping maw of increasing returns and complementarity opens, swallowing down neat traditions such as stability, equilibrium, marginalism, partial analysis, supply and demand depictions of price, etc. The methodological lesson of this shift to network contexts and dynamic complex systems supersedes some of our favored doctrines and the analyses on which they stand. Without decreasing returns and substitution, neoclassical arguments simply do not work. Heterodox approaches – and their intelligent application – are required in this setting. The paper offers a few guidelines to an unexplored domain of fundamental departures.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The paper proposes an economic assessment of paternalism by comparing different alternative responses to dynamically inconsistent behaviors consecutive to hyperbolic discounting. Two main types of action are possible, self-commanding strategies and paternalism The first category includes personal rules and pre-commitment The second can be subcategorized between coercive and non-coercive forms of paternalism, which are respectively associated (although it is debatable) with legal paternalism and with ‘nudges’. Despite being self-inflicted, self-commanding strategies are actually not cost free and can result in a dramatic cutback of people’s freedom of choice. Likewise, legal paternalism can, on occasion, be less harmful than personal rules or pre-commitment; similarly, nudges can be more invasive and less effective than their proponents want us to believe. The aim of this paper is not to propose any standardized form of response to irrational behavior (whatever that may mean) but to argue, on the contrary, that every case should be individually appraised. Individual situations can be remedied by self-commanding strategies or by paternalistic policies, either in isolation or in combination.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2015 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10683</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10683</guid>
      <author>Salvat, Christophe</author>
      <dc:creator>Salvat, Christophe</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The paper proposes an economic assessment of paternalism by comparing different alternative responses to dynamically inconsistent behaviors consecutive to hyperbolic discounting. Two main types of action are possible, self-commanding strategies and paternalism The first category includes personal rules and pre-commitment The second can be subcategorized between coercive and non-coercive forms of paternalism, which are respectively associated (although it is debatable) with legal paternalism and with ‘nudges’. Despite being self-inflicted, self-commanding strategies are actually not cost free and can result in a dramatic cutback of people’s freedom of choice. Likewise, legal paternalism can, on occasion, be less harmful than personal rules or pre-commitment; similarly, nudges can be more invasive and less effective than their proponents want us to believe. The aim of this paper is not to propose any standardized form of response to irrational behavior (whatever that may mean) but to argue, on the contrary, that every case should be individually appraised. Individual situations can be remedied by self-commanding strategies or by paternalistic policies, either in isolation or in combination.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of The Anthropocene and the Global Environmental Crisis: Rethinking modernity in a new epoch, edited by Clive Hamilton, Christophe Bonneuil and François Gemenne, Routledge, London, 2015, pbk, ISBN 978-1-138-821124-8, pp. 187+xi</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2015 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10685</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10685</guid>
      <author>Cojanu, Valentin</author>
      <dc:creator>Cojanu, Valentin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A criterion for realism, with an application to behavioral economic models</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Many economists working within the framework of behavioral economics (BE) label the conventional way of modeling as unrealistic, and consider their own approach as more realistic than the standard practice. However, a criterion for realism is lacking in behavioral economics literature. This paper offers a simple criterion for predicating realism to economic models, and provides an illustration of such criterion at work on a particular BE model.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2015 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10684</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10684</guid>
      <author>Marqués, Gustavo</author>
      <author>Weisman, Diego</author>
      <dc:creator>Marqués, Gustavo</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Weisman, Diego</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Many economists working within the framework of behavioral economics (BE) label the conventional way of modeling as unrealistic, and consider their own approach as more realistic than the standard practice. However, a criterion for realism is lacking in behavioral economics literature. This paper offers a simple criterion for predicating realism to economic models, and provides an illustration of such criterion at work on a particular BE model.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Gordon Tullock is acknowledged for being the first to recognize the true costs of rent-seeking as including not only the Harberger triangle but also the Tullock rectangle. This rectangle does not constitute merely a lossless transfer of wealth, but it causes a misallocation of resources as rent-seekers invest resources in lobbying. However, a close reading of Tullock’s writings shows that his arguments are formulated in a holistic fashion, speaking of what is efficient or inefficient for society. Rent-seeking is inefficient because it reduces societal welfare. But according to a methodologically individualist and subjectivist economics, such a claim is invalid. We must distinguish between positive economic fact and normative moral philosophy. We call for a reconstruction of utility and welfare economics based on methodological individualism and subjectivism with implications for the theories of monopoly and competition: practices which Neoclassical perfect-competition theory considers to be evidence of rent-seeking should instead be deemed as indications of genuine competition Political economy should be concerned with ascertaining which institutions will best enable individuals to pursue their individually subjective ends – or else economists should be explicit about their normative preferences and political philosophies.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2015 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10682</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10682</guid>
      <author>Makovi, Michael</author>
      <dc:creator>Makovi, Michael</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Gordon Tullock is acknowledged for being the first to recognize the true costs of rent-seeking as including not only the Harberger triangle but also the Tullock rectangle. This rectangle does not constitute merely a lossless transfer of wealth, but it causes a misallocation of resources as rent-seekers invest resources in lobbying. However, a close reading of Tullock’s writings shows that his arguments are formulated in a holistic fashion, speaking of what is efficient or inefficient for society. Rent-seeking is inefficient because it reduces societal welfare. But according to a methodologically individualist and subjectivist economics, such a claim is invalid. We must distinguish between positive economic fact and normative moral philosophy. We call for a reconstruction of utility and welfare economics based on methodological individualism and subjectivism with implications for the theories of monopoly and competition: practices which Neoclassical perfect-competition theory considers to be evidence of rent-seeking should instead be deemed as indications of genuine competition Political economy should be concerned with ascertaining which institutions will best enable individuals to pursue their individually subjective ends – or else economists should be explicit about their normative preferences and political philosophies.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economics in times of crisis. In search of a new paradigm in economic sciences</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The relationship between the development of economics and economic performance is not reducible to any set of simple rules. Among the historians of economic thought there is even a handful of those who perceive the progress in economics mostly as an outcome of the attempts to solve the problems, inconsistencies and paradoxes within economic theory itself. Seen from this perspective, economic reality has minor (or no) importance. On the other hand, the endeavours to modify a mainstream approach are significantly greater in times of economic downturns. Seeing that economics is in such a state of ‘intellectual ferment’ nowadays, it is worth reconsidering the connection between economics and the economy. Thus the main aim of the paper is to analyse the current state of economic science in relation to the last economic slump. Although it is of course not possible to predict the future trajectories of economic theorising, taking into consideration the nature of the crisis the most feasible and potentially most fruitful areas are indicated.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2015 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10681</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10681</guid>
      <author>Dzionek-Kozlowska, Joanna</author>
      <dc:creator>Dzionek-Kozlowska, Joanna</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The relationship between the development of economics and economic performance is not reducible to any set of simple rules. Among the historians of economic thought there is even a handful of those who perceive the progress in economics mostly as an outcome of the attempts to solve the problems, inconsistencies and paradoxes within economic theory itself. Seen from this perspective, economic reality has minor (or no) importance. On the other hand, the endeavours to modify a mainstream approach are significantly greater in times of economic downturns. Seeing that economics is in such a state of ‘intellectual ferment’ nowadays, it is worth reconsidering the connection between economics and the economy. Thus the main aim of the paper is to analyse the current state of economic science in relation to the last economic slump. Although it is of course not possible to predict the future trajectories of economic theorising, taking into consideration the nature of the crisis the most feasible and potentially most fruitful areas are indicated.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The case for increasing returns I: ‘The Hicksian Getaway’ and ‘The Hirshleifer Rescue’</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The case for increasing returns is accepted by most heterodox economists. Yet allegiance to decreasing returns in orthodox circles still endures directly and in the form of substitution assumptions. In forty short years from 1928 to 1968, beliefs shifted from Pigou calling rising cost ‘inadmissible’ to Alchian deeming decreasing returns ‘a universally valid law’ until Kaldor revived the case for increasing returns in the 1970s. How did these shifts of view occur? After dapham opened the door and Pigou defined the orthodox stand, the 1930s debates swept through imperfect competition and many other issues into Keynesian disequilibrium theory. In 1939, ‘The Hicksian Getaway’ opened an Age of Denial leading to equilibrium theories based on substitution; then during the 1960s a second challenge to rising cost based on learning and technical change was defeated by ‘The Hirshleifer Bescue’ of decreasing returns and thus substitution in neoclassical theory. Why economists' substitution assumptions still hold sway is the focus of this study. First, the paper reviews ‘The Hicksian Getaway’ in its context and with respect to equilibrium models. Second, the paper analyzes and disproves ‘The Hirshleifer Bescue’ as an invalid argument based on a non-sequitur and thus simply asserted. Third, the case for increasing returns is developed into a theory of planning horizons supporting a generalized complementarity in economics. Some methodological implications are explored at the end.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2015 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10680</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10680</guid>
      <author>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings Jr., Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The case for increasing returns is accepted by most heterodox economists. Yet allegiance to decreasing returns in orthodox circles still endures directly and in the form of substitution assumptions. In forty short years from 1928 to 1968, beliefs shifted from Pigou calling rising cost ‘inadmissible’ to Alchian deeming decreasing returns ‘a universally valid law’ until Kaldor revived the case for increasing returns in the 1970s. How did these shifts of view occur? After dapham opened the door and Pigou defined the orthodox stand, the 1930s debates swept through imperfect competition and many other issues into Keynesian disequilibrium theory. In 1939, ‘The Hicksian Getaway’ opened an Age of Denial leading to equilibrium theories based on substitution; then during the 1960s a second challenge to rising cost based on learning and technical change was defeated by ‘The Hirshleifer Bescue’ of decreasing returns and thus substitution in neoclassical theory. Why economists' substitution assumptions still hold sway is the focus of this study. First, the paper reviews ‘The Hicksian Getaway’ in its context and with respect to equilibrium models. Second, the paper analyzes and disproves ‘The Hirshleifer Bescue’ as an invalid argument based on a non-sequitur and thus simply asserted. Third, the case for increasing returns is developed into a theory of planning horizons supporting a generalized complementarity in economics. Some methodological implications are explored at the end.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Abdul Azim Islahi, History of Islamic Economic Thought: Contributions of Muslim Scholars to Economic Thought and Analysis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (UK), hb, 2014, ISBN 9781784711375, viii+125 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2015 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10679</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10679</guid>
      <author>Cojanu, Valentin</author>
      <dc:creator>Cojanu, Valentin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown, New York, Verso, 1st edition, 2013, ISBN: 978-1-781-68079-7, 384 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2015 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10678</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10678</guid>
      <author>Brebenel, Şerban</author>
      <dc:creator>Brebenel, Şerban</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A brief history of international trade thought: from pre-doctrinal contributions to the 21st century heterodox international economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The present paper outlines the development of international trade thought, from the pre-doctrinal contributions of Greek philosophers and scholastic theologians, through the theories of the first schools of economic thought, and up to modern and contemporary trade theories. I follow filiations of ideas in a chronological order, and show how theoretical investigation into the causes and effects of international trade—and the rationale for government intervention—has evolved over the last two centuries.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2015 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10677</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10677</guid>
      <author>Dorobăţ, Carmen, Elena</author>
      <dc:creator>Dorobăţ, Carmen, Elena</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The present paper outlines the development of international trade thought, from the pre-doctrinal contributions of Greek philosophers and scholastic theologians, through the theories of the first schools of economic thought, and up to modern and contemporary trade theories. I follow filiations of ideas in a chronological order, and show how theoretical investigation into the causes and effects of international trade—and the rationale for government intervention—has evolved over the last two centuries.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A review of the Granger-causality fallacy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Methods used to infer causal relations from data rather than knowledge of mechanisms are most helpful and exploited only if the theoretical background is insufficient or experimentation impossible. The review of literature shows that when an investigator has no prior knowledge of the researched phenomenon, no result of the Grangercausality test has any epistemic utility due to different possible interpretations. (1) Rejecting the null in one of the tests can be interpreted as either a true causal relation, opposite direction of the true causation, instant causality, time series cointegration, not frequent enough sampling, etc. (2) Bi-directional Granger causality can be read either as instant causality or common cause fallacy. (3) Non-rejection of both nulls possibly means either indirect or nonlinear causality, or no causal relation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2015 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10676</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10676</guid>
      <author>Maziarz, Mariusz</author>
      <dc:creator>Maziarz, Mariusz</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Methods used to infer causal relations from data rather than knowledge of mechanisms are most helpful and exploited only if the theoretical background is insufficient or experimentation impossible. The review of literature shows that when an investigator has no prior knowledge of the researched phenomenon, no result of the Grangercausality test has any epistemic utility due to different possible interpretations. (1) Rejecting the null in one of the tests can be interpreted as either a true causal relation, opposite direction of the true causation, instant causality, time series cointegration, not frequent enough sampling, etc. (2) Bi-directional Granger causality can be read either as instant causality or common cause fallacy. (3) Non-rejection of both nulls possibly means either indirect or nonlinear causality, or no causal relation.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>‘Ups’ and ‘downs’ in metaphor use: the case of increase / decrease metaphors in Spanish economic discourse</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The purpose of the present article is to analyze the use of evaluative metaphors in two economic discourse genres displaying different degrees of specialization: business media and the central bank report. The article points out the differences in terms of metaphor use between the two types of discourses ranging from lexical choices to the way evaluation is assumed. Metaphor use is also a result of specific textual goals. The research is intended to provide a detailed insight into matters related to hidden subjective content present in metaphors. The extended use of the lexical items in focus both in the media as well as in specialized discourse tends to generate readers’ over familiarization with them and consequently the possibility of value neutralization. That is why people are usually not aware of the opinion forming effects metaphors have in communication.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2015 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10675</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10675</guid>
      <author>Pecican, Anca</author>
      <dc:creator>Pecican, Anca</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The purpose of the present article is to analyze the use of evaluative metaphors in two economic discourse genres displaying different degrees of specialization: business media and the central bank report. The article points out the differences in terms of metaphor use between the two types of discourses ranging from lexical choices to the way evaluation is assumed. Metaphor use is also a result of specific textual goals. The research is intended to provide a detailed insight into matters related to hidden subjective content present in metaphors. The extended use of the lexical items in focus both in the media as well as in specialized discourse tends to generate readers’ over familiarization with them and consequently the possibility of value neutralization. That is why people are usually not aware of the opinion forming effects metaphors have in communication.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Expiration of private property rights: a note</title>
      <description><![CDATA[According to libertarian law, upon what occasions may a person's private property rights in goods, commodities, in himself, be alienated from him? The present paper is an attempt to wrestle with this question. We consider abandonment, punishment, salvage, misplacement, liberation of property.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2015 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10674</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10674</guid>
      <author>Block, Walter, E</author>
      <dc:creator>Block, Walter, E</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[According to libertarian law, upon what occasions may a person's private property rights in goods, commodities, in himself, be alienated from him? The present paper is an attempt to wrestle with this question. We consider abandonment, punishment, salvage, misplacement, liberation of property.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Work, recognition and subjectivization: some remarks about the modernity of Kojève's interpretation of Hegel</title>
      <description><![CDATA[From the analytical point of view of Hegel's philosophical anthropology, in Kojève's interpretation, work is an existential structure through which the dual process of subjectification and socialization unfolds. For Hegel, however, this process is not taken for granted: its possibility is understood in terms of the culmination of man's conquest of humanity, taking as a point of departure the relation of mastery to servitude and the undertaking to transform this relation precisely from within the perspective of servitude. The goal of this article is to reconstruct the conceptual framework of this philosophical moment, to our mind an indispensible precondition for the apperception of our modern societies' functioning at the most fundamental level, to the extent that they consider themselves to be ‘work based societies.’]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2015 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10673</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10673</guid>
      <author>Sobel, Richard</author>
      <dc:creator>Sobel, Richard</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[From the analytical point of view of Hegel's philosophical anthropology, in Kojève's interpretation, work is an existential structure through which the dual process of subjectification and socialization unfolds. For Hegel, however, this process is not taken for granted: its possibility is understood in terms of the culmination of man's conquest of humanity, taking as a point of departure the relation of mastery to servitude and the undertaking to transform this relation precisely from within the perspective of servitude. The goal of this article is to reconstruct the conceptual framework of this philosophical moment, to our mind an indispensible precondition for the apperception of our modern societies' functioning at the most fundamental level, to the extent that they consider themselves to be ‘work based societies.’]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Collective beliefs and horizontal interactions between groups: the case of political parties</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Groups matter in our ordinary folk psychology because a part of our social interactions is done with collective entities. In our everyday life, we indeed sometimes ascribe mental states to social groups as a whole or to individuals as members of groups in order to understand and predict their behavior. The aim of this paper is to explore this aspect of social interactions by focusing on the concept of ‘collective belief’ in a non-summative sense and, more precisely, on collective belief of a specific kind of group: the political party. How can the concept of ‘collective belief’ help to understand the interactions which involve these kinds of collective entities? After providing an epistemic description of political parties, this paper focuses on the collective belief in a non-summative sense. As Gilbert says, a group believes that p, if its members are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. It is argued, with the help of an example from the political history of France, that this view can enable us to understand the interaction between political parties. More precisely, it can help clarify the way in which a political party uses the rational constraints on the party as a whole and/or the social and epistemic constraints on the behavior of the group's members in order to destabilize or weaken other political parties.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2015 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10672</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10672</guid>
      <author>Ouzilou, Olivier</author>
      <dc:creator>Ouzilou, Olivier</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Groups matter in our ordinary folk psychology because a part of our social interactions is done with collective entities. In our everyday life, we indeed sometimes ascribe mental states to social groups as a whole or to individuals as members of groups in order to understand and predict their behavior. The aim of this paper is to explore this aspect of social interactions by focusing on the concept of ‘collective belief’ in a non-summative sense and, more precisely, on collective belief of a specific kind of group: the political party. How can the concept of ‘collective belief’ help to understand the interactions which involve these kinds of collective entities? After providing an epistemic description of political parties, this paper focuses on the collective belief in a non-summative sense. As Gilbert says, a group believes that p, if its members are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. It is argued, with the help of an example from the political history of France, that this view can enable us to understand the interaction between political parties. More precisely, it can help clarify the way in which a political party uses the rational constraints on the party as a whole and/or the social and epistemic constraints on the behavior of the group's members in order to destabilize or weaken other political parties.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Jérôme Ballet, Damien Bazin, Jean-Luc Dubois, and François-Régis Mahieu, Freedom, Responsibility and Economics of the Person, London, Routledge, ebk, 2014, 174 pp., ISBN 978-0-203-79633-7</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2014 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10670</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10670</guid>
      <author>Dorobăţ, Carmen, Elena</author>
      <dc:creator>Dorobăţ, Carmen, Elena</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Joseph E. Stiglitz and Bruce C. Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development and Social Progress, New York, Columbia University Press, 2014, hb, 34.95$, 680 pp., ISBN 978-0-231-15214-3</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2014 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10671</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10671</guid>
      <author>Toarna, Alina</author>
      <dc:creator>Toarna, Alina</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Commentary on secrets of economics editors: an unintended ethnography of economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2014 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10669</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10669</guid>
      <author>Balaban, Utku</author>
      <dc:creator>Balaban, Utku</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A comment on scarcity</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Modern economics is based on the idea that every good and service is scarce, but the standard defenses of this premise by reference to zero prices and infinite resources are invalid. The concept of scarcity is defined and used to show that ordinary scarcities are not economic scarcities. The errors regarding scarcity are traced to the methodology of modern economics, and an alternative method is suggested for a science whose subject matter is real human beings. The concept of relative scarcity is explained, and used to illuminate some important aspects of the functioning of a market economy. Some of the consequences are identified for economics if economists recognized that universal scarcity is not a fact.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2014 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10668</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10668</guid>
      <author>Buechner, M, Northrup</author>
      <dc:creator>Buechner, M, Northrup</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Modern economics is based on the idea that every good and service is scarce, but the standard defenses of this premise by reference to zero prices and infinite resources are invalid. The concept of scarcity is defined and used to show that ordinary scarcities are not economic scarcities. The errors regarding scarcity are traced to the methodology of modern economics, and an alternative method is suggested for a science whose subject matter is real human beings. The concept of relative scarcity is explained, and used to illuminate some important aspects of the functioning of a market economy. Some of the consequences are identified for economics if economists recognized that universal scarcity is not a fact.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Shifting economics: fundamental questions and Amartya K. Sen's pragmatic humanism</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Amartya K. Sen's body of work is an unrelenting project that consistently and coherently re-focuses the attention of economists and economics towards foundational questions. His capabilities framework has offered an expanded space of evaluation to directly judge the well-being of people and society. Through a detailed survey of Sen's intellectual development, his readdressing fundamental rigidities in economic methodology, and his new framework for evaluation, this paper argues that Sen has inculcated new habits of mind, and engendered a social momentum in economic thought that takes human complexity and the richness of societal diversity into account. Creating a social momentum in economic thought through refocused habits of mind can have a sustainable impact in economics only if its scope is not sub-discipline specific, if it provides an inclusive framework, and if it builds bridges within and outside the discipline chiefly between economics and moral philosophy. Sen's approach is pragmatic, courteous, and persuasive, but not divisive. It is expansive, yet contextual; it is humanistic. In Sen, economics is an inquiry into the nature and causes of human development.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2014 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10667</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10667</guid>
      <author>Natarajan, Tara</author>
      <dc:creator>Natarajan, Tara</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Amartya K. Sen's body of work is an unrelenting project that consistently and coherently re-focuses the attention of economists and economics towards foundational questions. His capabilities framework has offered an expanded space of evaluation to directly judge the well-being of people and society. Through a detailed survey of Sen's intellectual development, his readdressing fundamental rigidities in economic methodology, and his new framework for evaluation, this paper argues that Sen has inculcated new habits of mind, and engendered a social momentum in economic thought that takes human complexity and the richness of societal diversity into account. Creating a social momentum in economic thought through refocused habits of mind can have a sustainable impact in economics only if its scope is not sub-discipline specific, if it provides an inclusive framework, and if it builds bridges within and outside the discipline chiefly between economics and moral philosophy. Sen's approach is pragmatic, courteous, and persuasive, but not divisive. It is expansive, yet contextual; it is humanistic. In Sen, economics is an inquiry into the nature and causes of human development.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Modeling exogenous moral norms</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper considers the possibility of a robust and general formulation of a model of choice for the representation of a variety of moral norms. It starts by reviewing several recent models of deontological (or rule-based) norms that retain the basic elements of the economic model of choice. It briefly examines the achievements and drawbacks of each model, and while no model is identified as the most accurate or robust, the most appealing aspects of each model contribute to the construction of a tout-ensemble utility function proposed in the final section. This representation of preferences aims to incorporate the most common qualities of both consequentialist and deontological moral norms in order to represent decision making under their influence.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2014 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10666</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10666</guid>
      <author>Tippit, Ross, A</author>
      <dc:creator>Tippit, Ross, A</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper considers the possibility of a robust and general formulation of a model of choice for the representation of a variety of moral norms. It starts by reviewing several recent models of deontological (or rule-based) norms that retain the basic elements of the economic model of choice. It briefly examines the achievements and drawbacks of each model, and while no model is identified as the most accurate or robust, the most appealing aspects of each model contribute to the construction of a tout-ensemble utility function proposed in the final section. This representation of preferences aims to incorporate the most common qualities of both consequentialist and deontological moral norms in order to represent decision making under their influence.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Social mechanisms and social causation</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The aim of this paper is to examine the notion of social mechanisms by comparison with the notions of evolutionary and physical mechanisms. It is argued that social mechanisms are based on trends, and not lawlike regularities, so that social mechanisms are different from mechanisms in the natural sciences. Taking as an example of social causation the abolition of the slave trade, this paper argues that social mechanisms should be incorporated in Weber's wider notion of adequate causation in order to achieve their explanatory purpose.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2014 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10665</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10665</guid>
      <author>Weinert, Friedel</author>
      <dc:creator>Weinert, Friedel</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The aim of this paper is to examine the notion of social mechanisms by comparison with the notions of evolutionary and physical mechanisms. It is argued that social mechanisms are based on trends, and not lawlike regularities, so that social mechanisms are different from mechanisms in the natural sciences. Taking as an example of social causation the abolition of the slave trade, this paper argues that social mechanisms should be incorporated in Weber's wider notion of adequate causation in order to achieve their explanatory purpose.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of David Stuckler and Sanjay Basu, The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills, New York, Basic Books, 2013, hb, 240 pp., $26.99, ISBN 9780465063987</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2014 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10664</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10664</guid>
      <author>Tamames, Jorge</author>
      <dc:creator>Tamames, Jorge</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Ole Bjerg, Making Money: The Philosophy of Crisis Capitalism, London: Verso, 2014, 256 pp., pb, £19.99, ISBN 9781781682654</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2014 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10663</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10663</guid>
      <author>Papadopoulos, Georgios</author>
      <dc:creator>Papadopoulos, Georgios</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Cheryle Desha and Karlso ‘Charlie’ Hargroves, Higher Education and Sustainable Development: A model for curriculum renewal, London: Routledge, 2014, 268 pp., hb, $180.00, 9781844078592, pb, $49.95, ISBN 9781844078608</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2014 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10662</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10662</guid>
      <author>Di Collalto, R, Edward</author>
      <dc:creator>Di Collalto, R, Edward</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Dividing a cake (or) Distributional values in the measurement of economic inequality: an expository note</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Distributional judgments'-judgments on the extent of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth-are routinely made by economists in exercises aimed at comparing inequalities in alternative situations. Yet the measurement of inequality is informed by certain nuances, which it would do well to be attentive to. In particular, the values underlying measurement protocols are not always made explicit, which tends to lend a somewhat misleading semblance of 'value-neutrality' to the activity of measurement. It is argued, with specific reference to the problem of inequality measurement, that such an orientation can compromise the possibility of accurate diagnosis and appropriate policy prescription. There is little that is original in this article, and much that is owed to the pioneering contributions of Serge-Chritophe Kolm. The emphasis throughout is on explicating an important issue through a deliberate effort at achieving simplicity in both argument and expression.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2014 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10661</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10661</guid>
      <author>Subramanian, S</author>
      <dc:creator>Subramanian, S</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Distributional judgments'-judgments on the extent of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth-are routinely made by economists in exercises aimed at comparing inequalities in alternative situations. Yet the measurement of inequality is informed by certain nuances, which it would do well to be attentive to. In particular, the values underlying measurement protocols are not always made explicit, which tends to lend a somewhat misleading semblance of 'value-neutrality' to the activity of measurement. It is argued, with specific reference to the problem of inequality measurement, that such an orientation can compromise the possibility of accurate diagnosis and appropriate policy prescription. There is little that is original in this article, and much that is owed to the pioneering contributions of Serge-Chritophe Kolm. The emphasis throughout is on explicating an important issue through a deliberate effort at achieving simplicity in both argument and expression.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Behavioural controversy concerning homo economicus: a Humean perspective</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In his monumental masterpiece, A Treatise on Human Nature, which explains the methodology of human reasoning concerning matters of fact and describes the roles that passions and morals play in it, Hume arrives at an enormously interesting maxim: An academic controversy cannot continue for long unless the disputants assign different meanings to the major terms employed in the debate. This theory has been applied in this paper to examine the behavioural criticisms about Homo Economicus (HE), the pivotal perception in the neoclassical microeconomic model.To achieve this objective, the paper discusses the origin and evolution of the concept, reviews behavioural criticisms, summarises the main tenets of Hume's philosophy of human knowledge and finally examines the behavioural opinions from Hume's perspective. The paper concludes that Hume's theory convincingly explains the reason why the HE controversy is continuing for over half century-a fact that both the mainstream and behavioural economists are ignoring.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2014 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10660</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10660</guid>
      <author>Elahi, Khandakar</author>
      <dc:creator>Elahi, Khandakar</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In his monumental masterpiece, A Treatise on Human Nature, which explains the methodology of human reasoning concerning matters of fact and describes the roles that passions and morals play in it, Hume arrives at an enormously interesting maxim: An academic controversy cannot continue for long unless the disputants assign different meanings to the major terms employed in the debate. This theory has been applied in this paper to examine the behavioural criticisms about Homo Economicus (HE), the pivotal perception in the neoclassical microeconomic model.To achieve this objective, the paper discusses the origin and evolution of the concept, reviews behavioural criticisms, summarises the main tenets of Hume's philosophy of human knowledge and finally examines the behavioural opinions from Hume's perspective. The paper concludes that Hume's theory convincingly explains the reason why the HE controversy is continuing for over half century-a fact that both the mainstream and behavioural economists are ignoring.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Growth theory after Keynes, part II: 75 years of obstruction by the mainstream economics culture</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Part I of this essay explained the sequence of events that enabled the neoclassical paradigm to regain its dominant position in mainstream economics following serious challenges by ‘Keynesian’ economists. This second essay seeks to answer the question of why the economics profession was so willing to sustain the neoclassical paradigm in the face of the reality-based challenges by ‘Keynesian’ economists like Harrod and Domar. The answer is sought in the culture of economics, the history of science in general, and the study of power in the field of political economy. This article draws heavily on the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who divides culture into habitus (procedures and dispositions) and doxa (more abstract beliefs and philosophies), in order to provide insight into how culture affects economic thinking. Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence helps to explain how a narrower neoclassical growth model was enthusiastically accepted as a replacement for the ‘Keynesian’ Harrod-Domar growth model. Financial and business interests clearly understood the power of culture and they used their accumulated wealth to support the neoliberal doxa and neoclassical habitus that would induce economists to willingly provide intellectual cover for policies that benefitted those financial and business interests. We conclude with a discussion on how the history of thought on economic development might have evolved if the Keynesian paradigm, and its dynamic Harrod-Domar model, had prevailed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2014 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10659</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10659</guid>
      <author>van den Berg, Hendrik</author>
      <dc:creator>van den Berg, Hendrik</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Part I of this essay explained the sequence of events that enabled the neoclassical paradigm to regain its dominant position in mainstream economics following serious challenges by ‘Keynesian’ economists. This second essay seeks to answer the question of why the economics profession was so willing to sustain the neoclassical paradigm in the face of the reality-based challenges by ‘Keynesian’ economists like Harrod and Domar. The answer is sought in the culture of economics, the history of science in general, and the study of power in the field of political economy. This article draws heavily on the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who divides culture into habitus (procedures and dispositions) and doxa (more abstract beliefs and philosophies), in order to provide insight into how culture affects economic thinking. Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence helps to explain how a narrower neoclassical growth model was enthusiastically accepted as a replacement for the ‘Keynesian’ Harrod-Domar growth model. Financial and business interests clearly understood the power of culture and they used their accumulated wealth to support the neoliberal doxa and neoclassical habitus that would induce economists to willingly provide intellectual cover for policies that benefitted those financial and business interests. We conclude with a discussion on how the history of thought on economic development might have evolved if the Keynesian paradigm, and its dynamic Harrod-Domar model, had prevailed.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Unusual Humean issues in materialistic political economy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Capitalism as we know it presents typical dialectical features that isolate it from nature, in which real oppositions make evolution revolutionary: A dialectical metaphysics replaces the free flow of events allowing capitalist relationships but preventing the practice of materialism. Some radically sceptical issues in Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and A Treatise of Human Nature come useful here. A materialistic approach with complete (i.e., non-dialectical) ruptures in fact dovetails with Hume's argument on the unpredictability of nature and the predictability of human social activities. As a consequence, a thus renewed materialistic political economy concerned with the concrete must work out its own categories dynamically, to discard them once they have been proved metaphysical.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2014 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10658</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10658</guid>
      <author>Micocci, Andrea</author>
      <dc:creator>Micocci, Andrea</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Capitalism as we know it presents typical dialectical features that isolate it from nature, in which real oppositions make evolution revolutionary: A dialectical metaphysics replaces the free flow of events allowing capitalist relationships but preventing the practice of materialism. Some radically sceptical issues in Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and A Treatise of Human Nature come useful here. A materialistic approach with complete (i.e., non-dialectical) ruptures in fact dovetails with Hume's argument on the unpredictability of nature and the predictability of human social activities. As a consequence, a thus renewed materialistic political economy concerned with the concrete must work out its own categories dynamically, to discard them once they have been proved metaphysical.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Resilient Liberalism in Europe’s Political Economy, edited by Vivien A. Schmidt and Mark Thatcher, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 469 pp., $32.99, ISBN 9781107613973</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2013 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10655</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10655</guid>
      <author>Pheiffer, Chantel, F</author>
      <dc:creator>Pheiffer, Chantel, F</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Mark Blyth, Austerity. The History of a Dangerous Idea, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 304 pp., hb, $16.95, ISBN 9780199828302</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2013 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10657</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10657</guid>
      <author>Blanco, Juan, Camilo</author>
      <dc:creator>Blanco, Juan, Camilo</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of The Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology, edited by John B. Davis and D. Wade Hands, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2011, hb, 542 pp., ISBN 9781848447547</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2013 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10656</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10656</guid>
      <author>Ovidia Vreja, Lucia</author>
      <dc:creator>Ovidia Vreja, Lucia</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Research note on an experimental approach to the intrinsic motivations of corruption</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Even though most of the causes of corruption are easily identifiable at the macro level, there is considerable disagreement when it comes to the intrinsic motivations leading people to engage in this activity. The present paper tries to shed light on the aspect concerning the correlation between corruption and individual performance. This is useful for understanding the dynamics of common events like medical students attempting to bribe their way towards becoming a doctor, or companies bribing public officials to obtain licenses to build public highways, buildings, or provide electricity and water. However, corruption's secretive nature makes it difficult to obtain trustworthy qualitative data on this subject. Hence, the study addresses the issue in the lab, through an experiment based on a bribery game. The results show that there is a significant correlation between performance and propensity to engage in a corrupt activity, opening the way for an improvement in the allocation of resources to reduce this negative phenomenon.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2013 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10654</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10654</guid>
      <author>Burdea, Valeria</author>
      <dc:creator>Burdea, Valeria</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Even though most of the causes of corruption are easily identifiable at the macro level, there is considerable disagreement when it comes to the intrinsic motivations leading people to engage in this activity. The present paper tries to shed light on the aspect concerning the correlation between corruption and individual performance. This is useful for understanding the dynamics of common events like medical students attempting to bribe their way towards becoming a doctor, or companies bribing public officials to obtain licenses to build public highways, buildings, or provide electricity and water. However, corruption's secretive nature makes it difficult to obtain trustworthy qualitative data on this subject. Hence, the study addresses the issue in the lab, through an experiment based on a bribery game. The results show that there is a significant correlation between performance and propensity to engage in a corrupt activity, opening the way for an improvement in the allocation of resources to reduce this negative phenomenon.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The ethics of New Development Economics: is the Experimental Approach to Development Economics morally wrong?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The 2000s have witnessed the arrival and growing popularity of randomized controlled experiments (RCTs) in Development Economics. Whilst this new way of conducting research on development has unfolded important insights, the ethical challenge it provokes has not yet been systematically examined. The present article aims at filling this gap by providing the first ad hoc discussion of the moral issues that accompany the use of RCTs in Development Economics. Claiming that this new research agenda needs its own, specific set of ethical guidelines, we expose the six ethical problems that these experiments potentially provoke and that should therefore be carefully assessed by ethics committees before an RCT is launched and by scholarly journals before its results are published.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2013 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10653</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10653</guid>
      <author>Baele, Stéphane, J</author>
      <dc:creator>Baele, Stéphane, J</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The 2000s have witnessed the arrival and growing popularity of randomized controlled experiments (RCTs) in Development Economics. Whilst this new way of conducting research on development has unfolded important insights, the ethical challenge it provokes has not yet been systematically examined. The present article aims at filling this gap by providing the first ad hoc discussion of the moral issues that accompany the use of RCTs in Development Economics. Claiming that this new research agenda needs its own, specific set of ethical guidelines, we expose the six ethical problems that these experiments potentially provoke and that should therefore be carefully assessed by ethics committees before an RCT is launched and by scholarly journals before its results are published.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>On the problem of scale: Spinozistic sovereignty as the logical foundation of constitutional economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper argues that sovereignty, as envisaged by Spinoza, is the logical foundation of constitutional economics. Constitutional constructs such as sovereignty weave an evolutionary dialectic between different organizational scales (the local, national, and global). This dialectic continues to wreak havoc at the local scale, and can be interrupted only through explicit constitutional constraints on the size of jurisdictions. The paper argues for more emphasis on constitutional orders in the spirit of Spinoza’s understanding of sovereignty. This entails preference for federal polities in which sovereignty is shared between different cities rather states where once capital cities dominate.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2013 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10652</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10652</guid>
      <author>Gussen, Benjamen F.</author>
      <dc:creator>Gussen, Benjamen F.</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper argues that sovereignty, as envisaged by Spinoza, is the logical foundation of constitutional economics. Constitutional constructs such as sovereignty weave an evolutionary dialectic between different organizational scales (the local, national, and global). This dialectic continues to wreak havoc at the local scale, and can be interrupted only through explicit constitutional constraints on the size of jurisdictions. The paper argues for more emphasis on constitutional orders in the spirit of Spinoza’s understanding of sovereignty. This entails preference for federal polities in which sovereignty is shared between different cities rather states where once capital cities dominate.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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      <title>Fairness through regulation? Reflections on a cosmopolitan approach to global finance</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In the aftermath of the last financial crisis a strong message prevails that 'something' has to be changed in the manner global finance is governed. What exactly this 'something' entails and what could constitute the 'common ground' of anticipated change is more difficult to determine. Many envisage future improvements of global financial governance by evoking deliberative democracy, political equality and cosmopolitanism. As financial regulation is the main instrument through which global finance is shaped and governed nowadays, these principles should then be transmitted to regulatory arrangements. This paper focuses on a new conceptual approach to regulatory and governance issues in global finance, by employing the philosophical idea of cosmopolitanism. It argues that although as a concept, cosmopolitanism cannot mitigate all the flaws attributed to contemporary finance, its development and extension to international financial regulation that is promulgated by institutions of the global financial system, would represent a worthwhile endeavour in making global finance more accountable and just in the eyes of many.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2013 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10651</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10651</guid>
      <author>Beroš, Marta, Božina</author>
      <author>Beroš, Marin</author>
      <dc:creator>Beroš, Marta, Božina</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Beroš, Marin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In the aftermath of the last financial crisis a strong message prevails that 'something' has to be changed in the manner global finance is governed. What exactly this 'something' entails and what could constitute the 'common ground' of anticipated change is more difficult to determine. Many envisage future improvements of global financial governance by evoking deliberative democracy, political equality and cosmopolitanism. As financial regulation is the main instrument through which global finance is shaped and governed nowadays, these principles should then be transmitted to regulatory arrangements. This paper focuses on a new conceptual approach to regulatory and governance issues in global finance, by employing the philosophical idea of cosmopolitanism. It argues that although as a concept, cosmopolitanism cannot mitigate all the flaws attributed to contemporary finance, its development and extension to international financial regulation that is promulgated by institutions of the global financial system, would represent a worthwhile endeavour in making global finance more accountable and just in the eyes of many.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Growth theory after Keynes, part I: the unfortunate suppression of the Harrod-Domar model</title>
      <description><![CDATA[After Harrod and Domar independently developed a dynamic Keynesian circular flow model to illustrate the instability of a growing economy, mainstream economists quickly reduced their model to a supply side-only growth model, which they subsequently rejected as too simplistic and replaced with Solow's neoclassical growth model. The rejection process of first diminishing the model and then replaced it with a neoclassical alternative was similar to how the full Keynesian macroeconomic paradigm was diminished into IS-LM analysis and then replaced by a simplistic neoclassical framework that largely ignored the demand side of the economy. Furthermore, subsequent work by mainstream economists has resulted in a logically inconsistent framework for analyzing economic growth; the popular endogenous growth models, which use Schumpeter's concept of profit-driven creative destruction to explain the technological change that Solow left as exogenous, are not logically compatible with the Solow model.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2013 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10650</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10650</guid>
      <author>van den Berg, Hendrik</author>
      <dc:creator>van den Berg, Hendrik</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[After Harrod and Domar independently developed a dynamic Keynesian circular flow model to illustrate the instability of a growing economy, mainstream economists quickly reduced their model to a supply side-only growth model, which they subsequently rejected as too simplistic and replaced with Solow's neoclassical growth model. The rejection process of first diminishing the model and then replaced it with a neoclassical alternative was similar to how the full Keynesian macroeconomic paradigm was diminished into IS-LM analysis and then replaced by a simplistic neoclassical framework that largely ignored the demand side of the economy. Furthermore, subsequent work by mainstream economists has resulted in a logically inconsistent framework for analyzing economic growth; the popular endogenous growth models, which use Schumpeter's concept of profit-driven creative destruction to explain the technological change that Solow left as exogenous, are not logically compatible with the Solow model.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Pranab Bardhan, Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2010, 172pp, hb, ISBN 9780691129945</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2013 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10649</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10649</guid>
      <author>Bablon, Géraud</author>
      <dc:creator>Bablon, Géraud</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of James E. Alvey, A Short History of Ethics and Economics: The Greeks, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, x+184 pp, hb, ISBN 9781847202017</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2013 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10648</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10648</guid>
      <author>Bîgu, Dragoș</author>
      <dc:creator>Bîgu, Dragoș</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of The Social Sciences and Democracy, edited by Jeroen Van Bouwel, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 268 pp., £58 hb, ISBN 9780230224391</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2013 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10647</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10647</guid>
      <author>Negru, Ioana</author>
      <dc:creator>Negru, Ioana</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The economic consequences of homo economicus: neoclassical economic theory and the fallacy of market optimality</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This essay presents a critique of the standard ascension from the rational agent to the optimal market in economic theory. Critiques of homo economicus are found unsatisfactory on grounds that its employment allows for the prediction of essential features of actual markets. Using this same criterion we introduce Gary Becker’s essay, ‘Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory,’ which demonstrated that the same features of markets could be derived from non-rational behaviour. Thus, non-rationality is equally predictive but is less restrictive than rationality. Once the assumption of rationality is relaxed, the concept of market optimality (though not market order) must also be sacrificed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2013 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10646</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10646</guid>
      <author>Calnitsky, David</author>
      <author>Dupuy-Spencer, Asher</author>
      <dc:creator>Calnitsky, David</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Dupuy-Spencer, Asher</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This essay presents a critique of the standard ascension from the rational agent to the optimal market in economic theory. Critiques of homo economicus are found unsatisfactory on grounds that its employment allows for the prediction of essential features of actual markets. Using this same criterion we introduce Gary Becker’s essay, ‘Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory,’ which demonstrated that the same features of markets could be derived from non-rational behaviour. Thus, non-rationality is equally predictive but is less restrictive than rationality. Once the assumption of rationality is relaxed, the concept of market optimality (though not market order) must also be sacrificed.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The missing link: From Kautilya's The Arthashastra to modern economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to provide evidence supporting the thesis that Kautilya was the first political economist; second, to verify that a systematic study of political economy has begun long before the ideas and works of Adam Smith. It was in the works of Kautilya (around 375 B.C.). In order to validate the aims of our study, we look for evidence in his Arthashatra of rational behaviour, self-interest motivation, and market elements of a traditional commercial society. Providing a sound interpretation of Kautilya's main arguments, we demonstrate that his is no less a systematic study in political economy than Smith's The Wealth of Nations. Economics is a science that tries to offer policies and practices for creating and enriching a nation's wealth, and in that sense, the Arthashastra (literal translation being The Science of Wealth) represents the first systematic manual of political economy. The development of economics as a science must take cognition of the economic principles and ideas presented in The Arthashastra so as to reveal the true origins of economic thought and its evolution. It is only by understanding methodological problems in a historical perspective we can understand the modern methodological and conceptual issues.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2013 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10645</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10645</guid>
      <author>Škare, Marinko</author>
      <dc:creator>Škare, Marinko</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to provide evidence supporting the thesis that Kautilya was the first political economist; second, to verify that a systematic study of political economy has begun long before the ideas and works of Adam Smith. It was in the works of Kautilya (around 375 B.C.). In order to validate the aims of our study, we look for evidence in his Arthashatra of rational behaviour, self-interest motivation, and market elements of a traditional commercial society. Providing a sound interpretation of Kautilya's main arguments, we demonstrate that his is no less a systematic study in political economy than Smith's The Wealth of Nations. Economics is a science that tries to offer policies and practices for creating and enriching a nation's wealth, and in that sense, the Arthashastra (literal translation being The Science of Wealth) represents the first systematic manual of political economy. The development of economics as a science must take cognition of the economic principles and ideas presented in The Arthashastra so as to reveal the true origins of economic thought and its evolution. It is only by understanding methodological problems in a historical perspective we can understand the modern methodological and conceptual issues.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Money and value: a synthesis of the state theory of money and original institutional economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The paper proposes a synthesis of original institutional economics and in particular of the work of John R. Commons with the state theory of money, constructing a theoretical framework for the analysis of economic value in relation to money. The argument developed resists the naturalistic, individualistic, neoclassical analysis of value, proposing an account based on antagonism and negotiation framed by social institutions and more specifically by the institution of money. Money plays an active role in the process of the constitution of the system of prices, creating possibilities of mediation in the conflicts around the distribution of social production and contributing towards the establishment of 'reasonable value' in economic transactions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2013 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10644</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10644</guid>
      <author>Papadopoulos, Georgios</author>
      <dc:creator>Papadopoulos, Georgios</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The paper proposes a synthesis of original institutional economics and in particular of the work of John R. Commons with the state theory of money, constructing a theoretical framework for the analysis of economic value in relation to money. The argument developed resists the naturalistic, individualistic, neoclassical analysis of value, proposing an account based on antagonism and negotiation framed by social institutions and more specifically by the institution of money. Money plays an active role in the process of the constitution of the system of prices, creating possibilities of mediation in the conflicts around the distribution of social production and contributing towards the establishment of 'reasonable value' in economic transactions.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Subjective preferences and alternative costs</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The present paper is an exploration of the economics of subjectivism and opportunity or alternative costs. Most contemporary economists pay lip service to these concepts, but when push comes to shove, all too often they jettison them. We shall illustrate this lapse from basic economics with a challenge that has been perplexing several modern economists: why do people always walk on staircases, but only sometimes on escalators. Landsburg (2002) misunderstood the reason people only sometimes walk on escalators, whereas they always walk on stairs. Garrison (2009) tackled the same problem, with somewhat different results. Both of them, however, are guilty of a failure to use what is perhaps the most fundamental concept in the economist’s toolkit – opportunity cost, known to an immense number of non-economists by the aphorism ‘There’s no such thing as a free lunch.’ This oversight resulted in his (their) failure to explain why people only sometimes walk on escalators, in contradistinction to the fact that they always walk on staircases.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2013 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10643</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10643</guid>
      <author>Barnett Il, William</author>
      <author>Block, Walter, E</author>
      <dc:creator>Barnett Il, William</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Block, Walter, E</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The present paper is an exploration of the economics of subjectivism and opportunity or alternative costs. Most contemporary economists pay lip service to these concepts, but when push comes to shove, all too often they jettison them. We shall illustrate this lapse from basic economics with a challenge that has been perplexing several modern economists: why do people always walk on staircases, but only sometimes on escalators. Landsburg (2002) misunderstood the reason people only sometimes walk on escalators, whereas they always walk on stairs. Garrison (2009) tackled the same problem, with somewhat different results. Both of them, however, are guilty of a failure to use what is perhaps the most fundamental concept in the economist’s toolkit – opportunity cost, known to an immense number of non-economists by the aphorism ‘There’s no such thing as a free lunch.’ This oversight resulted in his (their) failure to explain why people only sometimes walk on escalators, in contradistinction to the fact that they always walk on staircases.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The ‘desire for money:’ Aristotelian blind spot in the field of economics? A French heterodox point of view</title>
      <description><![CDATA[If the field of economics has today become the archetype for determinism in the social sciences, it comes at the price of a form of objectivity founded on the complex process of the reduction and naturalization of a certain type of social relation, a process best described via the real approach or the ‘approach by value.’ A radical critique of this process requires the deconstruction of this dominant approach, characterized by the articulation of neoclassical theory and economic liberalism. It is only once the repression of the desire for money, a repression constitutive of false economic objectivity, has been denounced that the standard model can then be subject to such a critique. This will in turn open the possibility of an economic theory which is radically anti-naturalist.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2013 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10642</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10642</guid>
      <author>Sobel, Richard</author>
      <dc:creator>Sobel, Richard</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[If the field of economics has today become the archetype for determinism in the social sciences, it comes at the price of a form of objectivity founded on the complex process of the reduction and naturalization of a certain type of social relation, a process best described via the real approach or the ‘approach by value.’ A radical critique of this process requires the deconstruction of this dominant approach, characterized by the articulation of neoclassical theory and economic liberalism. It is only once the repression of the desire for money, a repression constitutive of false economic objectivity, has been denounced that the standard model can then be subject to such a critique. This will in turn open the possibility of an economic theory which is radically anti-naturalist.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Vito Tanzi, Government versus Markets -The Changing Economic Role of the State, New</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10640</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10640</guid>
      <author>Landes, Xavier</author>
      <dc:creator>Landes, Xavier</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Paul Turpin, The Moral Rhetoric of Political Economy: Justice and Modern Economic Thought, Routledge, London &amp; New York, 2011, pp. 163</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10641</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10641</guid>
      <author>Bălan, Sergiu</author>
      <dc:creator>Bălan, Sergiu</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Between a rock and a hard place: second thoughts on Laibman's Deep History and the theory of punctuated equilibrium with regard to intellectual evolution</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In this article I reconsider Laibman’s Deep History (2007) in the light of Niles Eldredge and Stephan Jay Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium. I argue that the theory of punctuated equilibrium explains (1) why conceptions of inevitability and directionality in intellectual evolution may not be as useful as Laibman thinks they are in the context of social evolution and (2) why stasis (that is, intellectual path dependence) in intellectual evolution does not allow different pathways of thought to converge.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10639</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10639</guid>
      <author>Yalcintas, Altug</author>
      <dc:creator>Yalcintas, Altug</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In this article I reconsider Laibman’s Deep History (2007) in the light of Niles Eldredge and Stephan Jay Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium. I argue that the theory of punctuated equilibrium explains (1) why conceptions of inevitability and directionality in intellectual evolution may not be as useful as Laibman thinks they are in the context of social evolution and (2) why stasis (that is, intellectual path dependence) in intellectual evolution does not allow different pathways of thought to converge.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Deep History: a rejoinder</title>
      <description><![CDATA[International audience]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10638</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10638</guid>
      <author>Laibman, David</author>
      <dc:creator>Laibman, David</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[International audience]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Observing productivity: what it might mean to be productive when viewed through the lens of Complexity Theory</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The paper tries to explore options and preconditions for a theoretically thoroughly grounded conception of productivity that is able to account for its observer-dependency and thereby meets the needs of a dynamic and highly differentiated modern society. It does so in respect to insights from Cybernetics and Complexity theory, thereby taking up charges about the contradiction of economic productivity and the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In respect to epistemological consequences of contemporary levels of productivity, a seemingly paradoxical constraint is put forward: the constraint that productivity is conditioned on being observed as such, with the observer in its turn being conditioned on productivity. The assumption is that this paradoxical constitution helps to keep productivity adaptive to the changes it itself incites in economy.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10637</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10637</guid>
      <author>Füllsack, Manfred</author>
      <dc:creator>Füllsack, Manfred</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The paper tries to explore options and preconditions for a theoretically thoroughly grounded conception of productivity that is able to account for its observer-dependency and thereby meets the needs of a dynamic and highly differentiated modern society. It does so in respect to insights from Cybernetics and Complexity theory, thereby taking up charges about the contradiction of economic productivity and the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In respect to epistemological consequences of contemporary levels of productivity, a seemingly paradoxical constraint is put forward: the constraint that productivity is conditioned on being observed as such, with the observer in its turn being conditioned on productivity. The assumption is that this paradoxical constitution helps to keep productivity adaptive to the changes it itself incites in economy.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Competitive markets, collective action, and the Big Box Retailer problem</title>
      <description><![CDATA[I use a stylized scenario - the Big Box Retailer Problem - to demonstrate that the presence of behavioural interdependence in economic markets may result in deficient outcomes that are both stable and supported by ongoing participant behaviour. I present a theoretical discussion of social dilemmas and use the Big Box Retailer Problem to illustrate that these characteristics - stability and ongoing support - cannot be reliably employed as indicators of outcome efficiency. Equally important is the conclusion that upfront costs and the ongoing necessity of monitoring and encouraging contributory behaviour are not reliable indicators of the relative inefficiency of outcomes associated with collective action. Questions are raised regarding the ethical responsibilities of business educators and the implications of social dilemmas for corporate social responsibility research.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10636</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10636</guid>
      <author>Beal, Brent, D</author>
      <dc:creator>Beal, Brent, D</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[I use a stylized scenario - the Big Box Retailer Problem - to demonstrate that the presence of behavioural interdependence in economic markets may result in deficient outcomes that are both stable and supported by ongoing participant behaviour. I present a theoretical discussion of social dilemmas and use the Big Box Retailer Problem to illustrate that these characteristics - stability and ongoing support - cannot be reliably employed as indicators of outcome efficiency. Equally important is the conclusion that upfront costs and the ongoing necessity of monitoring and encouraging contributory behaviour are not reliable indicators of the relative inefficiency of outcomes associated with collective action. Questions are raised regarding the ethical responsibilities of business educators and the implications of social dilemmas for corporate social responsibility research.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Hegelian dialectics of global imbalances</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Traditional narratives of external imbalances have focused on the analysis of national accounts, trade flows, and financial flows. They have generated two opposing views of the current situation of the world economy: on one side, a prudent, if not pessimistic view considers large imbalances as evidence of problems with the international monetary and financial system, and symptoms of domestic distortions (mainly in the United States and China). On the other side, a relaxed, if not optimistic view suggests that global imbalances are not anomalies but simply the predictable outcome of a world with increasingly globalized financial flows in search of the right mix of risks and returns. This paper offers a critical analysis of these competing explanations of the United States-China imbalances and suggests a way of reconciling them. The paper uses Hegel’s parable of the development of self-consciousness to explain the dynamics between the two countries. Hegel may not have been a great philosopher of history but his study of lordship and bondage provides a good framework for analyzing the dialectics of recognition and acknowledgement that currently characterizes the macroeconomic relationships between the United States and China.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10635</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10635</guid>
      <author>Monga, Célestin</author>
      <dc:creator>Monga, Célestin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Traditional narratives of external imbalances have focused on the analysis of national accounts, trade flows, and financial flows. They have generated two opposing views of the current situation of the world economy: on one side, a prudent, if not pessimistic view considers large imbalances as evidence of problems with the international monetary and financial system, and symptoms of domestic distortions (mainly in the United States and China). On the other side, a relaxed, if not optimistic view suggests that global imbalances are not anomalies but simply the predictable outcome of a world with increasingly globalized financial flows in search of the right mix of risks and returns. This paper offers a critical analysis of these competing explanations of the United States-China imbalances and suggests a way of reconciling them. The paper uses Hegel’s parable of the development of self-consciousness to explain the dynamics between the two countries. Hegel may not have been a great philosopher of history but his study of lordship and bondage provides a good framework for analyzing the dialectics of recognition and acknowledgement that currently characterizes the macroeconomic relationships between the United States and China.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A theory of planning horizons (2): the foundation for an ethical economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The concept of planning horizons serves as a measure of many unsettled aspects of economic analysis. First and foremost, the notion is ordinal: we speak of ‘horizon effects’ as directional shifts in planning horizons without tallying ‘wits’ or calibrating horizonal axes of change. Second, the derivation of horizon effects is inductive; we simply assert their inherence in the range of factors subsumed within the imagined projections behind all choice. The planning horizon is set wherever surprise supplants expectation; the horizon occurs at the outer range of accurate anticipation, to which we lack clear epistemological access. Planning horizons – horizon effects – suggest a new foundation for an ethical economics of conscience, social maturation and growth.The idea of planning horizons invites a distinction of foresight from myopia in economic constructions. But time horizons are only one aspect of our planning horizons: to see ahead in time we must embrace all relevant causal effects. Foresight depends on knowledge of how reality actually works, which is a matter more of degree than ‘truth’; the planning horizon offers an index of our ‘rational bounds.’ Our range of anticipation is also related to our internalization of social and ecological externalities in our decisions, so to the scope of our ethical conscience and to our sense of human community. Indeed, the organizational health and integrity of our society is horizonal in this sense.The aim of this paper is to explore and develop the concept of planning horizons in its intellectual origins and economic concerns. Its philosophic conceptual roots, methodological underpinnings, psychological insights and economic implications are outlined to show why an economics of planning horizons offers an ethical economics of interdependent dynamic complex systems. With standard doctrines seen as a special case in a larger horizonal frame, social theory embraces an ethical economics with dissimilar institutional implications favoring cooperation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2012 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10634</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10634</guid>
      <author>Jennings, Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings, Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The concept of planning horizons serves as a measure of many unsettled aspects of economic analysis. First and foremost, the notion is ordinal: we speak of ‘horizon effects’ as directional shifts in planning horizons without tallying ‘wits’ or calibrating horizonal axes of change. Second, the derivation of horizon effects is inductive; we simply assert their inherence in the range of factors subsumed within the imagined projections behind all choice. The planning horizon is set wherever surprise supplants expectation; the horizon occurs at the outer range of accurate anticipation, to which we lack clear epistemological access. Planning horizons – horizon effects – suggest a new foundation for an ethical economics of conscience, social maturation and growth.The idea of planning horizons invites a distinction of foresight from myopia in economic constructions. But time horizons are only one aspect of our planning horizons: to see ahead in time we must embrace all relevant causal effects. Foresight depends on knowledge of how reality actually works, which is a matter more of degree than ‘truth’; the planning horizon offers an index of our ‘rational bounds.’ Our range of anticipation is also related to our internalization of social and ecological externalities in our decisions, so to the scope of our ethical conscience and to our sense of human community. Indeed, the organizational health and integrity of our society is horizonal in this sense.The aim of this paper is to explore and develop the concept of planning horizons in its intellectual origins and economic concerns. Its philosophic conceptual roots, methodological underpinnings, psychological insights and economic implications are outlined to show why an economics of planning horizons offers an ethical economics of interdependent dynamic complex systems. With standard doctrines seen as a special case in a larger horizonal frame, social theory embraces an ethical economics with dissimilar institutional implications favoring cooperation.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The evolution of merchant moral thought in Tokugawa Japan</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The Tokugawa Era of Japan is known for its domination by the shogunate, or warrior bureaucracy. While samurai capture the popular imagination, the merchant class of this era was changing their cultural narrative as well. The regime, officially Neo-Confucian, considered trade a vulgar and corrupting activity, but among commoners, especially in Osaka, a culture arose celebrating the virtue of commerce. Merchant scholars and commoners assailed the orthodoxy by putting forth alternate interpretations of Confucianism, and later by abandoning the entire Confucian framework. Their primary goal was to explore the nature of virtue and commerce, and justify their own place in the world. As a side effect, the marriage of virtue to commerce allowed a nexus of long-term relationships to arise, based in Osaka.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10625</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10625</guid>
      <author>Langrill, Ryan</author>
      <dc:creator>Langrill, Ryan</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Tokugawa Era of Japan is known for its domination by the shogunate, or warrior bureaucracy. While samurai capture the popular imagination, the merchant class of this era was changing their cultural narrative as well. The regime, officially Neo-Confucian, considered trade a vulgar and corrupting activity, but among commoners, especially in Osaka, a culture arose celebrating the virtue of commerce. Merchant scholars and commoners assailed the orthodoxy by putting forth alternate interpretations of Confucianism, and later by abandoning the entire Confucian framework. Their primary goal was to explore the nature of virtue and commerce, and justify their own place in the world. As a side effect, the marriage of virtue to commerce allowed a nexus of long-term relationships to arise, based in Osaka.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Jose Huerta de Soto, The Austrian School. Market Order and Entrepreneurial Creativity, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, 129 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10633</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10633</guid>
      <author>Ion, Irina</author>
      <dc:creator>Ion, Irina</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of David Roodman, Due Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance, Center for Global Development, 2012, 365 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10632</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10632</guid>
      <author>Sholar, Annie</author>
      <dc:creator>Sholar, Annie</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Branko Milanovic, The Haves and the Have-Nots: A Brief and Idiosyncratic History of Global Inequality, Basic Books, 2011, 258 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10631</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10631</guid>
      <author>Karin, Elizabeth</author>
      <dc:creator>Karin, Elizabeth</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, London, 2011, pp. 385</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10630</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10630</guid>
      <author>Josan, Andrei</author>
      <dc:creator>Josan, Andrei</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari and Hubert Zimmerman (editors), Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change, Routledge, 2010, pp. 216</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10629</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10629</guid>
      <author>Dao, Linh</author>
      <dc:creator>Dao, Linh</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy, W. W. Norton &amp; Company, 2010, 361 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10628</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10628</guid>
      <author>Cohen, Kathryn</author>
      <dc:creator>Cohen, Kathryn</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty, Public Affairs, 2012, 303 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10627</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10627</guid>
      <author>Cockrell, Hannah</author>
      <dc:creator>Cockrell, Hannah</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review of Amitava Krishna Dutt and Benjamin Radcliff (eds.), Happiness, Economics and Politics. Towards a Multi-Disciplinary Approach, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009, 362 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10626</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10626</guid>
      <author>Nicolae, Elena, E</author>
      <dc:creator>Nicolae, Elena, E</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Behavioural Procedural Models - a multipurpose mechanistic account</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In this paper we outline an epistemological defence of what we call Behavioural Procedural Models (BPMs), which represent the processes of individual decisions that lead to relevant economic patterns as psychologically (rather than rationally) driven. Their general structure, and the way in which they may be incorporated to a multipurpose view of models, where the representational and interventionist goals are combined, is shown. It is argued that BPMs may provide “mechanistic-based explanations” in the sense defended by Hedström and Ylikoski (2010), which involve invariant regularities in Woodward’s sense. Such mechanisms provide a causal sort of explanation of anomalous economic patterns, which allow for extra market intervention and manipulability in order to correct and improve some key individual decisions. This capability sets the basis for the so called libertarian paternalism (Sunstein and Thaler 2003).]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10624</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10624</guid>
      <author>Ivarola, Leonardo</author>
      <author>Marqués, Gustavo</author>
      <dc:creator>Ivarola, Leonardo</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Marqués, Gustavo</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In this paper we outline an epistemological defence of what we call Behavioural Procedural Models (BPMs), which represent the processes of individual decisions that lead to relevant economic patterns as psychologically (rather than rationally) driven. Their general structure, and the way in which they may be incorporated to a multipurpose view of models, where the representational and interventionist goals are combined, is shown. It is argued that BPMs may provide “mechanistic-based explanations” in the sense defended by Hedström and Ylikoski (2010), which involve invariant regularities in Woodward’s sense. Such mechanisms provide a causal sort of explanation of anomalous economic patterns, which allow for extra market intervention and manipulability in order to correct and improve some key individual decisions. This capability sets the basis for the so called libertarian paternalism (Sunstein and Thaler 2003).]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The economist as shaman: revisioning our role for a sustainable, provisioning economy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In view of the problems heterodox economists have faced in predicting, explaining and finding solutions to the financial and ecological crises facing humanity, the paper takes a wide-angle view of the question of what the role of an economist might be in a sustainable society. I argue that the role of an economist is one of an intermediary between people and the resources they need for survival, a role that in less rationalist societies might have been performed by a priest or shaman. I propose three central responsibilities for an economist in a sustainable society: supporting a process of re-embedding the economy in the environment; negotiating a respectful—even reverential—relationship between humans and non-human species; ensuring a means of acquiring resources that minimises the entropic impact of the human community.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10623</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10623</guid>
      <author>Cato, Molly, Scott</author>
      <dc:creator>Cato, Molly, Scott</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In view of the problems heterodox economists have faced in predicting, explaining and finding solutions to the financial and ecological crises facing humanity, the paper takes a wide-angle view of the question of what the role of an economist might be in a sustainable society. I argue that the role of an economist is one of an intermediary between people and the resources they need for survival, a role that in less rationalist societies might have been performed by a priest or shaman. I propose three central responsibilities for an economist in a sustainable society: supporting a process of re-embedding the economy in the environment; negotiating a respectful—even reverential—relationship between humans and non-human species; ensuring a means of acquiring resources that minimises the entropic impact of the human community.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Complexity and the culture of economics: a sociological and inter-disciplinary analysis</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper offers a sociological explanation for why the field of economics has so severely restricted the scope of its analysis to the point where it failed to foresee the financial crises, economic recessions, and other large shifts in economic activity that have characterized the global economy in recent decades. This paper's analysis of the culture of economics draws heavily on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, the French sociologist who developed a useful framework with which to analyze the culture of an intellectual field like economics. Specifically, the paper describes how the neo-liberal doxa supports the restrictive neoclassical (marginalist) modeling approach that is a central element of the habitus of mainstream economics. Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence shows how the orthodox economics culture perpetuates itself even in the face of the complete failure of the culture's favored neoclassical and rational expectations models to anticipate recent macroeconomic crises. The paper concludes with some thoughts on how this understanding of the culture of economics can enable economists to free themselves from the oppressive culture of mainstream economics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10622</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10622</guid>
      <author>van den Berg, Hendrik</author>
      <dc:creator>van den Berg, Hendrik</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper offers a sociological explanation for why the field of economics has so severely restricted the scope of its analysis to the point where it failed to foresee the financial crises, economic recessions, and other large shifts in economic activity that have characterized the global economy in recent decades. This paper's analysis of the culture of economics draws heavily on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, the French sociologist who developed a useful framework with which to analyze the culture of an intellectual field like economics. Specifically, the paper describes how the neo-liberal doxa supports the restrictive neoclassical (marginalist) modeling approach that is a central element of the habitus of mainstream economics. Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence shows how the orthodox economics culture perpetuates itself even in the face of the complete failure of the culture's favored neoclassical and rational expectations models to anticipate recent macroeconomic crises. The paper concludes with some thoughts on how this understanding of the culture of economics can enable economists to free themselves from the oppressive culture of mainstream economics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A theory of planning horizons (1): market design in a post-neoclassical world</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The neoclassical case supporting competitive frames and market solutions has failed to promote stable world-wide economic development. Other approaches in economics incorporate social culture, increasing returns, market power, ecological limits and complementarity, yielding broader applications for development theory. In this paper a theory of planning horizons is introduced to raise some meaningful questions about the traditional view with respect to its substitution, decreasing returns and independence assumptions. Suppositions of complementarity, increasing returns and interdependence suggest that competition is inefficient by upholding a myopic culture resistant to learning. Growth – though long believed to rise from markets and competitive values – may not derive from these sources. Instead, as civilizations advance, shifting from material wants to higher-order intangible output, they evolve from market tradeoffs (substitution and scarcity) into realms of common need (complementarity and abundance). The policy implications of horizonal theory are explored, with respect to regulatory aims and economic concerns. Such an approach emphasizes strict constraints against entry barriers, ecological harm, market power abuse and ethical lapses. Social cohesion – not competition – is sought as a means to extend horizons and thereby increase efficiency, equity and ecological health. The overriding importance of horizon effects for regulatory assessment dominates other orthodox standards in economics and law. Reframing economics along horizonal lines suggests some meaningful insight on the proper design of economic systems.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10621</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10621</guid>
      <author>Jennings, Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings, Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The neoclassical case supporting competitive frames and market solutions has failed to promote stable world-wide economic development. Other approaches in economics incorporate social culture, increasing returns, market power, ecological limits and complementarity, yielding broader applications for development theory. In this paper a theory of planning horizons is introduced to raise some meaningful questions about the traditional view with respect to its substitution, decreasing returns and independence assumptions. Suppositions of complementarity, increasing returns and interdependence suggest that competition is inefficient by upholding a myopic culture resistant to learning. Growth – though long believed to rise from markets and competitive values – may not derive from these sources. Instead, as civilizations advance, shifting from material wants to higher-order intangible output, they evolve from market tradeoffs (substitution and scarcity) into realms of common need (complementarity and abundance). The policy implications of horizonal theory are explored, with respect to regulatory aims and economic concerns. Such an approach emphasizes strict constraints against entry barriers, ecological harm, market power abuse and ethical lapses. Social cohesion – not competition – is sought as a means to extend horizons and thereby increase efficiency, equity and ecological health. The overriding importance of horizon effects for regulatory assessment dominates other orthodox standards in economics and law. Reframing economics along horizonal lines suggests some meaningful insight on the proper design of economic systems.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Review essay on David Laibman, Deep History: A Study in Social Evolution and Human Potential</title>
      <description><![CDATA[While historical materialism and evolutionism provide similar explanations and ideas regarding the cause of long-term social change, the two theories are rarely used in conjunction with one another. In Deep History, the author David Laibman addresses some of the standard questions of evolutionary social theory and attempts to bridge the two concepts, by showing that historical and materialist explanations are present in both Marxian and evolutionary interpretations of history. His goal: develop a Marxist theory of history from an evolutionist perspective, and surmount the traditional confines of historical materialism, so as to embrace evolutionary conceptions in explaining social change. However, the unbalanced research methodology limits the reach and depth of Laibman's contribution. The two main shortcomings of his work are discussed in the following sections: The Audience Problem and The Evolutionary Problem.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2011 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10620</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10620</guid>
      <author>Yalcintas, Altug</author>
      <dc:creator>Yalcintas, Altug</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[While historical materialism and evolutionism provide similar explanations and ideas regarding the cause of long-term social change, the two theories are rarely used in conjunction with one another. In Deep History, the author David Laibman addresses some of the standard questions of evolutionary social theory and attempts to bridge the two concepts, by showing that historical and materialist explanations are present in both Marxian and evolutionary interpretations of history. His goal: develop a Marxist theory of history from an evolutionist perspective, and surmount the traditional confines of historical materialism, so as to embrace evolutionary conceptions in explaining social change. However, the unbalanced research methodology limits the reach and depth of Laibman's contribution. The two main shortcomings of his work are discussed in the following sections: The Audience Problem and The Evolutionary Problem.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Implications of the Foucauldian decentralization of economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This essay aims to explore Foucault's project of decentralizing economics and to hint on some implications. It also makes a comparative analysis between Foucault's project and the projects similar to his design and aim. I argue that Foucault's critique of the idea of economics as a science is stronger than that of the critiques which challenge the status of economics as a science by exposing its deep fictional, literary or narrative content and style. I argue that the strength of Foucault's decentralization project lies in the fact that he does not refer to the discursive content of economics in order to demonstrate that it is not a science. Instead, he unveils its epistemological conditions the character of which deeply haunts the sketch of economics as a science. Foucault undertakes decentralization both at the formal and historical level. At the formal level he shows that there are underlying epistemological conditions that govern the formation of discourses including economics in the West. At the historical level he demonstrates that there is no trace of economics up to the eighteenth century in the West. This fact, that economics is governed by modern Western epistemological conditions, encourages me to question the aim of teaching economics in societies such as Pakistan which are not part of the Western civilization.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2011 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10619</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10619</guid>
      <author>Ali, Zulfiqar</author>
      <dc:creator>Ali, Zulfiqar</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This essay aims to explore Foucault's project of decentralizing economics and to hint on some implications. It also makes a comparative analysis between Foucault's project and the projects similar to his design and aim. I argue that Foucault's critique of the idea of economics as a science is stronger than that of the critiques which challenge the status of economics as a science by exposing its deep fictional, literary or narrative content and style. I argue that the strength of Foucault's decentralization project lies in the fact that he does not refer to the discursive content of economics in order to demonstrate that it is not a science. Instead, he unveils its epistemological conditions the character of which deeply haunts the sketch of economics as a science. Foucault undertakes decentralization both at the formal and historical level. At the formal level he shows that there are underlying epistemological conditions that govern the formation of discourses including economics in the West. At the historical level he demonstrates that there is no trace of economics up to the eighteenth century in the West. This fact, that economics is governed by modern Western epistemological conditions, encourages me to question the aim of teaching economics in societies such as Pakistan which are not part of the Western civilization.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An inquiry into the explanatory virtues of transaction cost economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we offer a methodological reflection on how the explanatory virtues of economic theories can be assessed in a systematic way. Second, we use that theoretical apparatus to study the explanatory virtues of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE, henceforth). Precisely, we are primarily interested in assessing the progress within TCE with respect to its explanatory power rather than directly comparing TCE's explanatory virtues to alternative theories. The paper offers also some general insights into the way we compare economic theories.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2011 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10618</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10618</guid>
      <author>Hardt, Lukasz</author>
      <dc:creator>Hardt, Lukasz</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we offer a methodological reflection on how the explanatory virtues of economic theories can be assessed in a systematic way. Second, we use that theoretical apparatus to study the explanatory virtues of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE, henceforth). Precisely, we are primarily interested in assessing the progress within TCE with respect to its explanatory power rather than directly comparing TCE's explanatory virtues to alternative theories. The paper offers also some general insights into the way we compare economic theories.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Christian ethics of socio­economic development promoted by the Catholic Social Teaching</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper highlights the relationship between economic science and Christian moral in order to analyze the idea of socioeconomic development promoted by the Catholic Social Teaching (CST). In the first period leading up to the Second Vatican Council (1891-1962), from Pope Leo XIII to Pope John XXIII, the idea of development was connected both to technical and industrial progress, and to the universal values of justice, charity, and truth, which national communities were asked to follow. During the Conciliar period (1962-1979), the concept of development assumes a social and economic dimension, and so it becomes one of the main pillars of Catholic Social Teaching, which introduces the earliest definition of integral human development. Ultimately, in the post-Conciliar phase (1979-2009) including Benedict XVI's pontificate, the idea of integral human development reaches its maturity by incorporating the complexity of real-world economic interactions. Finally, this paper shows how the ethics bolstered by the Catholic Social Teaching is characterized by two distinct but complementary lines of thought: moral rules for both political action, and for socioeconomic issues.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2011 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10617</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10617</guid>
      <author>Bucciarelli, Edgardo</author>
      <author>Mattoscio, Nicola</author>
      <author>Persico, Tony, E</author>
      <dc:creator>Bucciarelli, Edgardo</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Mattoscio, Nicola</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Persico, Tony, E</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper highlights the relationship between economic science and Christian moral in order to analyze the idea of socioeconomic development promoted by the Catholic Social Teaching (CST). In the first period leading up to the Second Vatican Council (1891-1962), from Pope Leo XIII to Pope John XXIII, the idea of development was connected both to technical and industrial progress, and to the universal values of justice, charity, and truth, which national communities were asked to follow. During the Conciliar period (1962-1979), the concept of development assumes a social and economic dimension, and so it becomes one of the main pillars of Catholic Social Teaching, which introduces the earliest definition of integral human development. Ultimately, in the post-Conciliar phase (1979-2009) including Benedict XVI's pontificate, the idea of integral human development reaches its maturity by incorporating the complexity of real-world economic interactions. Finally, this paper shows how the ethics bolstered by the Catholic Social Teaching is characterized by two distinct but complementary lines of thought: moral rules for both political action, and for socioeconomic issues.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Finance contemporaine et postmodernisme: l’expression d’un capitalisme tardif</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper shows that the evolution of financial markets implies some features of the postmodernism, as for example, the emergence of a hyperreality or an over-exaggeration of the exchange. Computerization contributed to the development of what Baudrillard called a hyper-reality in which financial quotations are self-referent, i.e. they do not refer to an economic reality. Finance is now in post-modernity and this essay offers an analysis of this financial post-modernity.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2011 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10616</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10616</guid>
      <author>Schinckus, Christophe</author>
      <dc:creator>Schinckus, Christophe</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper shows that the evolution of financial markets implies some features of the postmodernism, as for example, the emergence of a hyperreality or an over-exaggeration of the exchange. Computerization contributed to the development of what Baudrillard called a hyper-reality in which financial quotations are self-referent, i.e. they do not refer to an economic reality. Finance is now in post-modernity and this essay offers an analysis of this financial post-modernity.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>From the search for natural laws to the discovery of contingent rules in economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In this article, the author defends the idea that one of the positive results of modern economic analysis is the conviction that there is no natural law in economics. Thus, the most thorough scientific research which has tried to provide an analytical foundation for the mythical invisible hand, the "general equilibrium paradigm," has finally shown that such an equilibration process cannot be formally demonstrated. Hence, we can say that economists cannot demonstrate the existence of a law of "supply and demand" but, more simply, can assert that some causal but contingent relations may exist between price, supply and demand. According to this result, the critical approach of Kenneth John Arrow concludes with the necessity of social and moral rule (for the good functioning of the market). It is, thus, necessary to assume the contingent nature of economic rules, and the absence of natural law, and consequently, to modify economists' theoretical model.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2011 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10615</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10615</guid>
      <author>Postel, Nicolas</author>
      <dc:creator>Postel, Nicolas</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In this article, the author defends the idea that one of the positive results of modern economic analysis is the conviction that there is no natural law in economics. Thus, the most thorough scientific research which has tried to provide an analytical foundation for the mythical invisible hand, the "general equilibrium paradigm," has finally shown that such an equilibration process cannot be formally demonstrated. Hence, we can say that economists cannot demonstrate the existence of a law of "supply and demand" but, more simply, can assert that some causal but contingent relations may exist between price, supply and demand. According to this result, the critical approach of Kenneth John Arrow concludes with the necessity of social and moral rule (for the good functioning of the market). It is, thus, necessary to assume the contingent nature of economic rules, and the absence of natural law, and consequently, to modify economists' theoretical model.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ethics and economics, today and in the past</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Economics was traditionally viewed as part of a wider study of human things, including ethics. It has drifted away from ethics despite the fact that ethical considerations inevitably form part of economics. After a brief introduction, the second section outlines the state of play in the economics discipline. The third section deals with the ethical crisis of economics today. The fourth section presents two grand narratives of ethics and economics. The fifth section sketches Amartya Sen's critique of the mainstream and his alternative approach to economics. The sixth section provides some concluding comments.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2011 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10614</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10614</guid>
      <author>Alvey, James, E</author>
      <dc:creator>Alvey, James, E</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Economics was traditionally viewed as part of a wider study of human things, including ethics. It has drifted away from ethics despite the fact that ethical considerations inevitably form part of economics. After a brief introduction, the second section outlines the state of play in the economics discipline. The third section deals with the ethical crisis of economics today. The fourth section presents two grand narratives of ethics and economics. The fifth section sketches Amartya Sen's critique of the mainstream and his alternative approach to economics. The sixth section provides some concluding comments.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Critical Realism versus Social Constructivism in International Relations</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This article discusses the methodological differences between the British school and the American school of international relations. It attempts to demonstrate that Susan Strange, representative of the British school, could be considered a critical realist. The aim of the article is to show that her vision of international political economy fulfills the methodological reorientation initiated in economics by Tony Lawson at the end of the 90s. Strange's radical ontology claims that structural power determines human actions. The paper contrasts Strange's approach with that of John Ruggie, from the American school, who identifies himself as a social constructivist. Ruggie emphasizes the role of ideational factors in international relations and the constructed nature of social reality.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2011 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10611</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10611</guid>
      <author>Bobulescu, Roxana</author>
      <dc:creator>Bobulescu, Roxana</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This article discusses the methodological differences between the British school and the American school of international relations. It attempts to demonstrate that Susan Strange, representative of the British school, could be considered a critical realist. The aim of the article is to show that her vision of international political economy fulfills the methodological reorientation initiated in economics by Tony Lawson at the end of the 90s. Strange's radical ontology claims that structural power determines human actions. The paper contrasts Strange's approach with that of John Ruggie, from the American school, who identifies himself as a social constructivist. Ruggie emphasizes the role of ideational factors in international relations and the constructed nature of social reality.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>There are no such things as ‘commodities’: a research note</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This short paper is a note offering provisional results of my current research in philosophical economics and the philosophy of economics. It is offered in the spirit of promoting discussion of an interesting topic worthy of further investigation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2011 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10613</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10613</guid>
      <author>Read, Rupert</author>
      <dc:creator>Read, Rupert</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This short paper is a note offering provisional results of my current research in philosophical economics and the philosophy of economics. It is offered in the spirit of promoting discussion of an interesting topic worthy of further investigation.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>More than a sum of its parts: A Keynesian epistemology of statistics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The major theoretical insight of Keynes' General Theory is that aggregate quantities describing the state of an economy as a whole are irreducible to arithmetic summations of individual decisions. This breaks with the logic of classical political economy and establishes macroeconomics as the study of economy-wide dynamics, logically independent from any underlying theory of individual rationality. However, Keynes does have a theory of individual psychology that links expectations back up to aggregate quantities with robust statistical methods, which account for the fundamental uncertainty one faces in predicting the future. By comparing the theoretical structure of macroeconomics to that of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, this essay proposes a novel reading of Keynes' epistemology of statistical laws. On this view, statistical methods allow theoreticians to connect the mechanics of vast numbers of micro-scale entities to a macroscale dynamics, even in the absence of a fully determinate causal story. Keynes' belief that organic wholes emerge from the interactions of complex systems is a product of his early work on the development of statistical mechanics from kinetic theory. In light of this epistemological foundation, this essay shows how the neoclassical idea of supplying macroeconomics with microfoundations is inherently contradictory.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2011 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10612</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10612</guid>
      <author>Werle, Nicholas</author>
      <dc:creator>Werle, Nicholas</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The major theoretical insight of Keynes' General Theory is that aggregate quantities describing the state of an economy as a whole are irreducible to arithmetic summations of individual decisions. This breaks with the logic of classical political economy and establishes macroeconomics as the study of economy-wide dynamics, logically independent from any underlying theory of individual rationality. However, Keynes does have a theory of individual psychology that links expectations back up to aggregate quantities with robust statistical methods, which account for the fundamental uncertainty one faces in predicting the future. By comparing the theoretical structure of macroeconomics to that of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, this essay proposes a novel reading of Keynes' epistemology of statistical laws. On this view, statistical methods allow theoreticians to connect the mechanics of vast numbers of micro-scale entities to a macroscale dynamics, even in the absence of a fully determinate causal story. Keynes' belief that organic wholes emerge from the interactions of complex systems is a product of his early work on the development of statistical mechanics from kinetic theory. In light of this epistemological foundation, this essay shows how the neoclassical idea of supplying macroeconomics with microfoundations is inherently contradictory.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The capacity to choose: reformulating the concept of choice in economic theory</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Despite being conceived as a 'theory of rational choice', orthodox economics fails to ascribe to human beings the ability to choose in a meaningful sense, something philosophical approaches to economics have long noted and tried to remedy. Tony Lawson's critical realism is one attempt at a remedy. If, following Lawson, one conceives of choice as a 'capacity' of human beings, critical realist analysis suggests a distinction between humans' possession and their exercise of this capacity. If one can sustain this distinction, one should be able to distinguish cases in which agents actually exercise their capacity to choose from those in which they do not. Investigation of this distinction does not, however, lead to the desired distinction between such cases. Consequently, a reformulation of the notion of choice is required. An implication for economic theory - namely, the possibility of conceptualizing 'exploitation' - is discussed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2011 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10610</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10610</guid>
      <author>Peacock, Mark, S</author>
      <dc:creator>Peacock, Mark, S</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Despite being conceived as a 'theory of rational choice', orthodox economics fails to ascribe to human beings the ability to choose in a meaningful sense, something philosophical approaches to economics have long noted and tried to remedy. Tony Lawson's critical realism is one attempt at a remedy. If, following Lawson, one conceives of choice as a 'capacity' of human beings, critical realist analysis suggests a distinction between humans' possession and their exercise of this capacity. If one can sustain this distinction, one should be able to distinguish cases in which agents actually exercise their capacity to choose from those in which they do not. Investigation of this distinction does not, however, lead to the desired distinction between such cases. Consequently, a reformulation of the notion of choice is required. An implication for economic theory - namely, the possibility of conceptualizing 'exploitation' - is discussed.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Are egalitarians really vulnerable to the Levelling-Down Objection and the Divided World Example?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This essay is a quick critique of one aspect of Derek Parfit's criticism of Egalitarianism in his larger consideration of the claims of, and distinction between, Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. It reviews issues relating to the 'Levelling Down Objection' and the 'Divided World Example'. More specifically, it is argued that the Levelling Down Objection is a serious problem only for Pure Telic Egalitarianism, not for Pluralist Telic Egalitarianism; and that even in a Divided World, one can have an egalitarian justification for preferring an equal distribution of a smaller sum of wellbeing to an unequal distribution of a larger sum. By these means, it is contended that Parfit's claim of the vulnerability of Egalitarianism to the Levelling Down Objection and the Divided World Example is not sustainable.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2011 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10609</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10609</guid>
      <author>Subramanian, S</author>
      <dc:creator>Subramanian, S</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This essay is a quick critique of one aspect of Derek Parfit's criticism of Egalitarianism in his larger consideration of the claims of, and distinction between, Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. It reviews issues relating to the 'Levelling Down Objection' and the 'Divided World Example'. More specifically, it is argued that the Levelling Down Objection is a serious problem only for Pure Telic Egalitarianism, not for Pluralist Telic Egalitarianism; and that even in a Divided World, one can have an egalitarian justification for preferring an equal distribution of a smaller sum of wellbeing to an unequal distribution of a larger sum. By these means, it is contended that Parfit's claim of the vulnerability of Egalitarianism to the Levelling Down Objection and the Divided World Example is not sustainable.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Structures of knowledge in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic, 1731­-1980</title>
      <description><![CDATA[It is argued that the historiographical approaches prevalent in the Ottoman Empire and then in the Turkish Republic, observable in both academic and cultural production and implemented in the education system, were closely related to material transformations in politics and economics. It is further shown, however, that these relations were not of a one-way causality in either direction, but rather part of a singular whole. Debates over the construction of the past and the modernization project survive today in discussions arising from Turkey's possible candidacy for membership in the European Union.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Nov 2010 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10608</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10608</guid>
      <author>Güvenç-Salgârlâ, Sanem</author>
      <dc:creator>Güvenç-Salgârlâ, Sanem</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[It is argued that the historiographical approaches prevalent in the Ottoman Empire and then in the Turkish Republic, observable in both academic and cultural production and implemented in the education system, were closely related to material transformations in politics and economics. It is further shown, however, that these relations were not of a one-way causality in either direction, but rather part of a singular whole. Debates over the construction of the past and the modernization project survive today in discussions arising from Turkey's possible candidacy for membership in the European Union.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>"The dangerous classes": Hugo Grotius and seventeenth-century piracy as a primitive anti-systemic movement</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This essay discusses the historical and textual representations of piracy in the writings of Hugo Grotius, primarily De Indis/De iure praedae (1603-1608) and the Commentarius in Theses XI (c. 1600). Contrary to popular belief, Grotius, in stark contrast to Jean Bodin, was not an advocate of the constitutionally homogenous Nation-State. Rather, his central concept of divisible sovereignty, the lynchpin of the constitutional theory of his early writings, unambiguously presents us with the object of the heterogeneous State. In Grotian theory, the State may be "read" as a composite construction, with a residual degree of inalienable sovereignty accruing at each unit-level. Even if only unconsciously, Grotius describes a concurrent para-political subdivision of the state between institutional Government (the "magistrates") and civil society, one that constitutes an operational system of governance within the Nation-State. Like his contemporary Johannes Althusius, Grotius' theory allows for the emergence of a wholly "private," albeit lawful, mode of authority. This is most apparent in Grotius' treatment of the mercantile trading Company and its Privateering operations. The corporatist theory of sovereignty permits the Company's private agents of violence, the legally ambivalent Privateer/Pirate, to be invested with a requisite degree of sovereignty. The Grotian theory of divisible sovereignty, investing the seventeenth-century Pirate band with legal personality, serves as a vital historical precursor to the quasi-statist (trans-) national criminal cartels of the twenty-first century. The Grotian Pirate/Privateer/Just Avenger, therefore, is a "nomad": a liminal entity that simultaneously transverses both geographical and juro-political spaces, rendering him or herself in-determinable.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Nov 2010 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10607</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10607</guid>
      <author>Wilson, Eric</author>
      <dc:creator>Wilson, Eric</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This essay discusses the historical and textual representations of piracy in the writings of Hugo Grotius, primarily De Indis/De iure praedae (1603-1608) and the Commentarius in Theses XI (c. 1600). Contrary to popular belief, Grotius, in stark contrast to Jean Bodin, was not an advocate of the constitutionally homogenous Nation-State. Rather, his central concept of divisible sovereignty, the lynchpin of the constitutional theory of his early writings, unambiguously presents us with the object of the heterogeneous State. In Grotian theory, the State may be "read" as a composite construction, with a residual degree of inalienable sovereignty accruing at each unit-level. Even if only unconsciously, Grotius describes a concurrent para-political subdivision of the state between institutional Government (the "magistrates") and civil society, one that constitutes an operational system of governance within the Nation-State. Like his contemporary Johannes Althusius, Grotius' theory allows for the emergence of a wholly "private," albeit lawful, mode of authority. This is most apparent in Grotius' treatment of the mercantile trading Company and its Privateering operations. The corporatist theory of sovereignty permits the Company's private agents of violence, the legally ambivalent Privateer/Pirate, to be invested with a requisite degree of sovereignty. The Grotian theory of divisible sovereignty, investing the seventeenth-century Pirate band with legal personality, serves as a vital historical precursor to the quasi-statist (trans-) national criminal cartels of the twenty-first century. The Grotian Pirate/Privateer/Just Avenger, therefore, is a "nomad": a liminal entity that simultaneously transverses both geographical and juro-political spaces, rendering him or herself in-determinable.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The rise, maturity and geographic diffusion of the cotton industry, 1760-1900</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This article examines the trajectory of the cotton industry, including calico printing, over the period 1760-1900. From its beginnings in England as a leading industry of the capitalist world-economy, it spread geographically on a major scale to finally reach the United States and Japan. Over the long term, it is argued that as it expanded and competition increased, profit rates tended to fall, although unevenly.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Nov 2010 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10606</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10606</guid>
      <author>Molk, Florence</author>
      <dc:creator>Molk, Florence</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This article examines the trajectory of the cotton industry, including calico printing, over the period 1760-1900. From its beginnings in England as a leading industry of the capitalist world-economy, it spread geographically on a major scale to finally reach the United States and Japan. Over the long term, it is argued that as it expanded and competition increased, profit rates tended to fall, although unevenly.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>"This lofty mountain of silver could conquer the whole world": Potosí and the political ecology of underdevelopment, 1545-1800</title>
      <description><![CDATA[By the 1570's, Potosí, and its silver, had become the hub of a commodity revolution that reorganized Peru's peoples and landscapes to serve capital and empire. This was a decisive moment in the world ecological revolution of the long seventeenth century. Primitive accumulation in Peru was particularly successful: the mita's spatial program enabled the colonial state to marshal a huge supply of low-cost and tractable labor in the midst of sustained demographic contraction. The relatively centralized character of Peru's mining frontier facilitated imperial control in a way the more dispersed silver frontiers of New Spain did not. Historical capitalism has sustained itself on the basis of exploiting, and thereby undermining, a vast web of socio-ecological relations. As may be observed in colonial Peru, the commodity frontier strategy effected both the destruction and creation of premodern socio-ecological arrangements.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Nov 2010 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10605</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10605</guid>
      <author>Moore, Jason</author>
      <dc:creator>Moore, Jason</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[By the 1570's, Potosí, and its silver, had become the hub of a commodity revolution that reorganized Peru's peoples and landscapes to serve capital and empire. This was a decisive moment in the world ecological revolution of the long seventeenth century. Primitive accumulation in Peru was particularly successful: the mita's spatial program enabled the colonial state to marshal a huge supply of low-cost and tractable labor in the midst of sustained demographic contraction. The relatively centralized character of Peru's mining frontier facilitated imperial control in a way the more dispersed silver frontiers of New Spain did not. Historical capitalism has sustained itself on the basis of exploiting, and thereby undermining, a vast web of socio-ecological relations. As may be observed in colonial Peru, the commodity frontier strategy effected both the destruction and creation of premodern socio-ecological arrangements.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nonwaged peasants in the modern world-system: African households as dialectical units of capitalist exploitation and indigenous resistance, 1890-1930</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Colonialism did not transform African peasants into waged labor. A majority of peasants worked as forced laborers, often unpaid, and they returned to their agricultural household labor as soon as they completed work assignments mandated by the colonizers. Colonial Africans resided in mixed livelihood households in which nonwaged labor forms (both free and unfree) predominated, and very few became dependent on wages. For a majority of colonial Africans, informal sector activities, tenancy, sharecropping, and subsistence production on communal plots were not temporary nonwaged forms on an inevitable path toward proletarianization. Wage earning was not the primary mechanism through which these households were integrated into the modern world-system. Instead, these households primarily provided nonwaged labors to capitalist commodity chains that, in turn, extracted surpluses from them and externalized costs of production to them.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Nov 2010 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10604</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10604</guid>
      <author>Dunaway, Wilma, A</author>
      <dc:creator>Dunaway, Wilma, A</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Colonialism did not transform African peasants into waged labor. A majority of peasants worked as forced laborers, often unpaid, and they returned to their agricultural household labor as soon as they completed work assignments mandated by the colonizers. Colonial Africans resided in mixed livelihood households in which nonwaged labor forms (both free and unfree) predominated, and very few became dependent on wages. For a majority of colonial Africans, informal sector activities, tenancy, sharecropping, and subsistence production on communal plots were not temporary nonwaged forms on an inevitable path toward proletarianization. Wage earning was not the primary mechanism through which these households were integrated into the modern world-system. Instead, these households primarily provided nonwaged labors to capitalist commodity chains that, in turn, extracted surpluses from them and externalized costs of production to them.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Critiques and developments in world-systems analysis: an introduction to the special collection</title>
      <description><![CDATA[From its inception, the world-systems perspective was not only enormously influential in long-term, large-scale social research; it also attracted a set of serious critiques. These fell into the general areas of the emergence of the capitalist world-economy; reductionism in the mode of argument; surplus appropriation and accumulation, including the question of class; and the general exclusion of an analysis of any role for "culture." It is concrete developments in world-systems analysis over the past three decades, although not to the exclusion of explicit responses to critiques, that have gone a long way in addressing these concerns. They fall most notably into the areas of commodity chains, households, world-ecology, and the structures of knowledge.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Nov 2010 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10603</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10603</guid>
      <author>Lee, Richard, E</author>
      <dc:creator>Lee, Richard, E</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[From its inception, the world-systems perspective was not only enormously influential in long-term, large-scale social research; it also attracted a set of serious critiques. These fell into the general areas of the emergence of the capitalist world-economy; reductionism in the mode of argument; surplus appropriation and accumulation, including the question of class; and the general exclusion of an analysis of any role for "culture." It is concrete developments in world-systems analysis over the past three decades, although not to the exclusion of explicit responses to critiques, that have gone a long way in addressing these concerns. They fall most notably into the areas of commodity chains, households, world-ecology, and the structures of knowledge.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Schumpeter's theory of leadership: a brief sketch</title>
      <description><![CDATA[So far, it has hardly been recognized that the great Austrian thinker Joseph Alois Schumpeter had developed a general theory of leadership. In this paper, we analyze how leaders promote change by building on Schumpeter's understanding of entrepreneurial leadership which fuses the concepts of entrepreneurship and leadership. Also, we analyze Schumpeter's shift in emphasis regarding his leadership theory. Specifically, Schumpeter in his early works defined entrepreneurs as individuals whose acts have significant effects on firms. However, in his late works he seems to have realized the need to extend further the boundaries of his early approach, to account for social forces.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10597</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10597</guid>
      <author>Michaelides, Panayotis</author>
      <author>Kardasi, Ourania</author>
      <dc:creator>Michaelides, Panayotis</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Kardasi, Ourania</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[So far, it has hardly been recognized that the great Austrian thinker Joseph Alois Schumpeter had developed a general theory of leadership. In this paper, we analyze how leaders promote change by building on Schumpeter's understanding of entrepreneurial leadership which fuses the concepts of entrepreneurship and leadership. Also, we analyze Schumpeter's shift in emphasis regarding his leadership theory. Specifically, Schumpeter in his early works defined entrepreneurs as individuals whose acts have significant effects on firms. However, in his late works he seems to have realized the need to extend further the boundaries of his early approach, to account for social forces.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Review of Jean-François Ponsot and Sergio Rossi (eds), The Political Economy of Monetary Circuits: Tradition and Change in Post-Keynesian Economics, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 264 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Admittedly, economics first aims at solving empirical problems-for instance, what are the causes of unemployment?-and, to this purpose, it elaborates on the principles of the working of the economy. Now, this book suggests a modern conception of economics, called 'monetary analysis'. According to the latter, the fundamental principles of the working of the economy are inseparable from money, while this primacy of money entails a specific way of solving empirical problems.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10602</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10602</guid>
      <author>Stellian, Rémi</author>
      <dc:creator>Stellian, Rémi</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Admittedly, economics first aims at solving empirical problems-for instance, what are the causes of unemployment?-and, to this purpose, it elaborates on the principles of the working of the economy. Now, this book suggests a modern conception of economics, called 'monetary analysis'. According to the latter, the fundamental principles of the working of the economy are inseparable from money, while this primacy of money entails a specific way of solving empirical problems.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Review of Christian Arnsperger, Full Spectrum Economics. Towards an Inclusive and Emancipatory Social Science, Routledge, 2010, 277 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Many brilliant economists today do recognize that economics need to be reformed, but the vast majority of scientific works is still captive into the absolute rigor of the Cartesian paradigm and the finery of the Newtonian models. In this context, Christian Arnsperger's book aims to be a guide in the efforts to conceptually renew economics. As part of this endeavour, he pursues ambitiously to build a new sub-discipline within the economic science-Full Spectrum economics. The writing is mainly constructed on a critical and consistent review of the philosophical principals of scientific materialism and mainstream monism, on which Western Enlightenment was built, and of the current research methodologies applied in economics and founded on these principles. Enlightenment is disregarded as being based on mathematical formalism that looks for "characteristic universalis" (Descartes), absent from real world. The book is also a struggle to holism and transdisciplinarity, being indeed an enriching experience in logics, philosophy, psychology and economics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10601</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10601</guid>
      <author>Zgreabãn, Irina</author>
      <dc:creator>Zgreabãn, Irina</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Many brilliant economists today do recognize that economics need to be reformed, but the vast majority of scientific works is still captive into the absolute rigor of the Cartesian paradigm and the finery of the Newtonian models. In this context, Christian Arnsperger's book aims to be a guide in the efforts to conceptually renew economics. As part of this endeavour, he pursues ambitiously to build a new sub-discipline within the economic science-Full Spectrum economics. The writing is mainly constructed on a critical and consistent review of the philosophical principals of scientific materialism and mainstream monism, on which Western Enlightenment was built, and of the current research methodologies applied in economics and founded on these principles. Enlightenment is disregarded as being based on mathematical formalism that looks for "characteristic universalis" (Descartes), absent from real world. The book is also a struggle to holism and transdisciplinarity, being indeed an enriching experience in logics, philosophy, psychology and economics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Commentary on black political economy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The task of this essay is to introduce a comprehensible study of the economic condition of a black sub-altern population in the United States. The framework is informed by the monumental contribution to the field of political economy as developed by Lloyd Hogan in his 1984, Principles of Black Political Economy. Specifically, Hogan presents political economy as: "The study of a human population under going the act of social reproduction, over a protracted period of time, under a set of rules promulgated and enforced by a political state, within a bounded geographical domain." (Hogan, p.12)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10600</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10600</guid>
      <author>Haynes, Curtis</author>
      <dc:creator>Haynes, Curtis</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The task of this essay is to introduce a comprehensible study of the economic condition of a black sub-altern population in the United States. The framework is informed by the monumental contribution to the field of political economy as developed by Lloyd Hogan in his 1984, Principles of Black Political Economy. Specifically, Hogan presents political economy as: "The study of a human population under going the act of social reproduction, over a protracted period of time, under a set of rules promulgated and enforced by a political state, within a bounded geographical domain." (Hogan, p.12)]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>On technological change and stage evolution in the works of Seneca and Adam Smith</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The present paper investigates the links that connect Seneca and Adam Smith in relation to the concept of the technological change and the evolution of society. The Roman philosopher and jurist discusses extensively the technical achievements in various factors of production which are an outcome of the division of labour. The main question concerning the fact, if all inventions stem originally from the cogitations of philosophers, or, the common workman is exposed to the manufacturing process in his daily tasks appears also in Adam Smith's thought. The analysis shows Smith's classical roots and the significance of the Roman literature.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10599</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10599</guid>
      <author>Baloglou, Christos, P</author>
      <dc:creator>Baloglou, Christos, P</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The present paper investigates the links that connect Seneca and Adam Smith in relation to the concept of the technological change and the evolution of society. The Roman philosopher and jurist discusses extensively the technical achievements in various factors of production which are an outcome of the division of labour. The main question concerning the fact, if all inventions stem originally from the cogitations of philosophers, or, the common workman is exposed to the manufacturing process in his daily tasks appears also in Adam Smith's thought. The analysis shows Smith's classical roots and the significance of the Roman literature.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The internal consistency of perfect competition</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This article surveys some arguments brought forward in defense of the theory of perfect competition. While some critics propose that the theory of perfect competition, and thus also the theory of the firm, are logically flawed, (mainstream) economists defend their most popular textbook model by a series of apparently different arguments. Here it is examined whether these arguments are comparable, consistent and convincing from the point of view of philosophy of science.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10598</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10598</guid>
      <author>Kapeller, Jakob</author>
      <author>Pühringer, Stephan</author>
      <dc:creator>Kapeller, Jakob</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Pühringer, Stephan</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This article surveys some arguments brought forward in defense of the theory of perfect competition. While some critics propose that the theory of perfect competition, and thus also the theory of the firm, are logically flawed, (mainstream) economists defend their most popular textbook model by a series of apparently different arguments. Here it is examined whether these arguments are comparable, consistent and convincing from the point of view of philosophy of science.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Because I said so: the persistence of mainstream policy advice</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The current global crisis has shown the limitations of the mainstream approach. We trace the origins of the limitations of the dominant neoclassical views to the capital debates and to the rise to dominance of intertemporal general equilibrium. The limited use of the Arrow-Debreu model, which became dominant after the capital debates, in terms of policymaking, is central to understand the persistence of policy guided by the aggregative model. We use the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a case study of this perplexing continuity of policy advice. Given our survey, we conclude that even though the economy is in the midst of the worst capitalist crisis since the Great Depression, a significant paradigmatic shift in economics is extraordinarily unlikely.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10596</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10596</guid>
      <author>Cline, Nathaniel</author>
      <author>Ford, Kirsten</author>
      <author>Vernengo, Matías</author>
      <dc:creator>Cline, Nathaniel</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Ford, Kirsten</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Vernengo, Matías</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The current global crisis has shown the limitations of the mainstream approach. We trace the origins of the limitations of the dominant neoclassical views to the capital debates and to the rise to dominance of intertemporal general equilibrium. The limited use of the Arrow-Debreu model, which became dominant after the capital debates, in terms of policymaking, is central to understand the persistence of policy guided by the aggregative model. We use the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a case study of this perplexing continuity of policy advice. Given our survey, we conclude that even though the economy is in the midst of the worst capitalist crisis since the Great Depression, a significant paradigmatic shift in economics is extraordinarily unlikely.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Towards a critical realist-inspired economic methodology</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper argues that critical realism conceived as a meta-theory for scientific activities offers a consistent set of helpful philosophical resources from which a potentially fruitful position of economic methodology may be developed. When fully developed, a critical realist-inspired economic methodology may in turn underlabour for more concrete scientific undertakings, economic theorising and applied analyses. Adopting such a strategy for further advancement of the critical realist project would prove a much needed supplement to, or perhaps even substitute for, the currently dominating strategy of grand scale philosophical underlabouring aimed at reorienting more or less the whole discipline of economics. The main trust of the argument made then, is that critical realism comes with a constructive and practical potential that goes beyond critiques of mainstream economics and philosophical underlabouring for already existing schools of thought within economics and that it is time for this potential to be actualised.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10595</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10595</guid>
      <author>Davidsen, Bjørn-Ivar</author>
      <dc:creator>Davidsen, Bjørn-Ivar</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper argues that critical realism conceived as a meta-theory for scientific activities offers a consistent set of helpful philosophical resources from which a potentially fruitful position of economic methodology may be developed. When fully developed, a critical realist-inspired economic methodology may in turn underlabour for more concrete scientific undertakings, economic theorising and applied analyses. Adopting such a strategy for further advancement of the critical realist project would prove a much needed supplement to, or perhaps even substitute for, the currently dominating strategy of grand scale philosophical underlabouring aimed at reorienting more or less the whole discipline of economics. The main trust of the argument made then, is that critical realism comes with a constructive and practical potential that goes beyond critiques of mainstream economics and philosophical underlabouring for already existing schools of thought within economics and that it is time for this potential to be actualised.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Financial stability requires macroeconomic foundations of macroeconomics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Financial stability features prominently among the goals of several post-crisis macroeconomic policies around the world. Being a systemic characteristic, financial stability requires a systemic analysis, which only macroeconomics can offer logically. Yet, the current way of doing macroeconomics is not up to the task, as it is grounded on so-called microfoundations. Considering macroeconomics as the science of aggregating data obtained at microeconomic level can lead indeed to conclusions that are either misleading or wrong. This paper points out that the true foundations of macroeconomics are macroeconomic, and that understanding the working of monetary economies of production and exchange requires a conceptual rather than a mathematical treatment of economic issues at a systemic level.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10594</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10594</guid>
      <author>Rossi, Sergio</author>
      <dc:creator>Rossi, Sergio</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Financial stability features prominently among the goals of several post-crisis macroeconomic policies around the world. Being a systemic characteristic, financial stability requires a systemic analysis, which only macroeconomics can offer logically. Yet, the current way of doing macroeconomics is not up to the task, as it is grounded on so-called microfoundations. Considering macroeconomics as the science of aggregating data obtained at microeconomic level can lead indeed to conclusions that are either misleading or wrong. This paper points out that the true foundations of macroeconomics are macroeconomic, and that understanding the working of monetary economies of production and exchange requires a conceptual rather than a mathematical treatment of economic issues at a systemic level.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Malthus's idea of a moral and political science</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper discusses, first, the kind of Newtonian methodology Malthus had been exposed to at Cambridge; secondly, the views on algebra and the doctrine of proportions he inherited from MacLaurin and the contribution of his colleague Bewick Bewin in devising a special role for this doctrine in the moral sciences; thirdly, Malthus's ideas on language and the reasons for rejection of an artificial language for political economy. Then it discusses his idea of political economy as a moral science and his claims to be Adam Smith's true heir. The conclusion is that Hollander is right when he contends that Malthus's and Ricardo's methods, as contrasted with their methodologies, were just two opposite poles within one spectrum, but also that the Cantabrigian and Scottish tradition provided staple for a design of a moral and political science alternative to the Unitarian and the Benthamite programs.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10593</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10593</guid>
      <author>Cremaschi, Sergio</author>
      <dc:creator>Cremaschi, Sergio</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper discusses, first, the kind of Newtonian methodology Malthus had been exposed to at Cambridge; secondly, the views on algebra and the doctrine of proportions he inherited from MacLaurin and the contribution of his colleague Bewick Bewin in devising a special role for this doctrine in the moral sciences; thirdly, Malthus's ideas on language and the reasons for rejection of an artificial language for political economy. Then it discusses his idea of political economy as a moral science and his claims to be Adam Smith's true heir. The conclusion is that Hollander is right when he contends that Malthus's and Ricardo's methods, as contrasted with their methodologies, were just two opposite poles within one spectrum, but also that the Cantabrigian and Scottish tradition provided staple for a design of a moral and political science alternative to the Unitarian and the Benthamite programs.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The foundation of Marx's concept of value in the Manuscripts of 1844</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The aim of this paper is to show how Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, which stand as his first systematic study of classical economists, transform the concept of labour as it had been developed by political economy against mercantilism and physiocracy. The current interpretations of the Marxian theory of value are first reviewed. The analysis of the Manuscripts then shows that the contribution of Hegelian philosophy lies in the definition of social labour in total opposition to the orthodox conception. This issue leads to a reexamination of the significance of these Manuscripts for the Marxian concept of value and its source, general and abstract labour.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10584</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10584</guid>
      <author>Baronian, Laurent</author>
      <dc:creator>Baronian, Laurent</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The aim of this paper is to show how Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, which stand as his first systematic study of classical economists, transform the concept of labour as it had been developed by political economy against mercantilism and physiocracy. The current interpretations of the Marxian theory of value are first reviewed. The analysis of the Manuscripts then shows that the contribution of Hegelian philosophy lies in the definition of social labour in total opposition to the orthodox conception. This issue leads to a reexamination of the significance of these Manuscripts for the Marxian concept of value and its source, general and abstract labour.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Review of Marshall and Schumpeter on Evolution: Economic Sociology of Capitalist Development, Edited by Yuichi Shionoya and Tamotsu Nishizawa, Cheltenham UK, Edward Elgar, 2008, 285 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Joseph Alois Schumpeter (18831950) and Alfred Marshall (18421924) had more or less successfully delivered to humanity their vision about evolution and made connections between this and other concepts which deserve attention, such as development or capitalism. The volume Marshall and Schumpeter on Evolution: Economic Sociology of Capitalist Development is a tool for starting to understand these connections, and at the same time for observing the differences, if any, between the two.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10592</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10592</guid>
      <author>Stamate, Andreas</author>
      <dc:creator>Stamate, Andreas</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Joseph Alois Schumpeter (18831950) and Alfred Marshall (18421924) had more or less successfully delivered to humanity their vision about evolution and made connections between this and other concepts which deserve attention, such as development or capitalism. The volume Marshall and Schumpeter on Evolution: Economic Sociology of Capitalist Development is a tool for starting to understand these connections, and at the same time for observing the differences, if any, between the two.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Review of The Genesis of Innovation: Systemic Linkages between Knowledge and the Market, Edited by Blandine Laperche, Dimitri Uzunidis, Nick von Tunzelmann, Cheltenham UK, Edward Elgar, 2008, 285 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Though almost onecentury old, the Schumpeterian statement that innovation is the true driver of welfareenhancing economic development captures the essence of today's knowledge economy. In his acceptation innovation refers to new combinations conducive to new products, new production processes, new markets, new organizational forms, and the discovery of new resources. Currently the fierce global race challenges nationstates and transnational corporations (TNC) to engage in the management of innovation in order to secure competitive advantages, hence their recurrent initiatives in science and technology (S&T)/innovation policies, and regional development. In a bestcase scenario this endeavour produces innovative milieux underpinned by vibrant interactions among major players (companies, research organizations, local communities, regional and central governments, etc.), and integrates them into other networks spawning knowledge externalities.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10591</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10591</guid>
      <author>Gârdu, Dana</author>
      <dc:creator>Gârdu, Dana</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Though almost onecentury old, the Schumpeterian statement that innovation is the true driver of welfareenhancing economic development captures the essence of today's knowledge economy. In his acceptation innovation refers to new combinations conducive to new products, new production processes, new markets, new organizational forms, and the discovery of new resources. Currently the fierce global race challenges nationstates and transnational corporations (TNC) to engage in the management of innovation in order to secure competitive advantages, hence their recurrent initiatives in science and technology (S&T)/innovation policies, and regional development. In a bestcase scenario this endeavour produces innovative milieux underpinned by vibrant interactions among major players (companies, research organizations, local communities, regional and central governments, etc.), and integrates them into other networks spawning knowledge externalities.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Review of Moral Markets: the Critical Role of Values in the Economy, Edited by Paul J. Zak, Princeton/ Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2008, 386 pp</title>
      <description><![CDATA[It is well known that economics does not understand values. It turns out, however, that a main reason for this is that it has not understood markets either. This collection of literature reviews, essays, and original research from the fields of primatology, philosophy, law, and economics grapples with the vexed relationship of values and markets but doesn't quite succeed in addressing it. While there is plenty of wisdom scattered across the different contributions, as a book it fails in its interdisciplinary task of integrating these nuggets, and it fails also to include all the disciplines which would seem to be relevant sources of insight.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10590</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10590</guid>
      <author>Wells, Thomas</author>
      <dc:creator>Wells, Thomas</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[It is well known that economics does not understand values. It turns out, however, that a main reason for this is that it has not understood markets either. This collection of literature reviews, essays, and original research from the fields of primatology, philosophy, law, and economics grapples with the vexed relationship of values and markets but doesn't quite succeed in addressing it. While there is plenty of wisdom scattered across the different contributions, as a book it fails in its interdisciplinary task of integrating these nuggets, and it fails also to include all the disciplines which would seem to be relevant sources of insight.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A review of George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton University Press, 2009, 264 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10589</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10589</guid>
      <author>Ban, Cornel</author>
      <dc:creator>Ban, Cornel</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A review of David Colander, The Making of a European Economist, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2009, 190 pp.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[David Colander's book on The Making of a European Economist is somehow a natural continuation of his by now classic studies on economics education in the US and of his book The Making of an Economist, Redux [1]. The book is fascinating to read not only by someone like me who is not really an economist, but has been close to the field and has been teaching students of economics for a long time, but mainly by policy makers both in the field of higher education and in other fields like business where the larger aspects of societal changes are more and more apparent.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10588</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10588</guid>
      <author>Nicolae, Mariana</author>
      <dc:creator>Nicolae, Mariana</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[David Colander's book on The Making of a European Economist is somehow a natural continuation of his by now classic studies on economics education in the US and of his book The Making of an Economist, Redux [1]. The book is fascinating to read not only by someone like me who is not really an economist, but has been close to the field and has been teaching students of economics for a long time, but mainly by policy makers both in the field of higher education and in other fields like business where the larger aspects of societal changes are more and more apparent.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A new framework for the analysis of contemporary financial markets: the need for pluralistic approaches</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Interdisciplinary approaches are essential to properly evaluate an economic and financial system that is increasingly complex and globally interrelated. With reference to the work of the philosopher Peter Godfrey-Smith, it is argued that a more pronounced interdisciplinarity in the social sciences would enable a flourishing of pluralism in economics. By adopting clearly defined research strategies and objectives, scholars with different academic backgrounds can successfully work on common projects. A better integration of economic, social and behavioural sciences will favour the establishment of new frames of thinking and new analytical tools which are much needed in contemporary financial regulation. Financial markets, defined as competitive markets in financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, loans and derivatives, represent a research subject that may be analysed from a plurality of angles and frames, including a sociological one. In practice, such a plurality of perspectives could favour sustainable wealth creation and contribute to maximizing the benefits from economic globalization.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10587</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10587</guid>
      <author>Stefancic, Mitja</author>
      <dc:creator>Stefancic, Mitja</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Interdisciplinary approaches are essential to properly evaluate an economic and financial system that is increasingly complex and globally interrelated. With reference to the work of the philosopher Peter Godfrey-Smith, it is argued that a more pronounced interdisciplinarity in the social sciences would enable a flourishing of pluralism in economics. By adopting clearly defined research strategies and objectives, scholars with different academic backgrounds can successfully work on common projects. A better integration of economic, social and behavioural sciences will favour the establishment of new frames of thinking and new analytical tools which are much needed in contemporary financial regulation. Financial markets, defined as competitive markets in financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, loans and derivatives, represent a research subject that may be analysed from a plurality of angles and frames, including a sociological one. In practice, such a plurality of perspectives could favour sustainable wealth creation and contribute to maximizing the benefits from economic globalization.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Loanable funds, liquidity preference: structure, past and present</title>
      <description><![CDATA[We appraise the canonical RobertsonKeynes discussion from the structural axis of exogeneity/endogeneity of the interest rate. The interest rate is shown to be an exogenous variable. It is only with Keynes' contribution of liquidity preference and, specifically, the introduction of the liquidity preference of banks that no more than the possibility of endogenising the interest rate arises. Given the tenuousness of the resolution, we pose the ethical question: should the rate of interest be endogenised? On the other hand, Keynes' theorem that the rate of interest is a monetary variable is validated. Both money and the rate of interest are codetermined in a capitalist economy.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10586</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10586</guid>
      <author>Correa, Romar</author>
      <dc:creator>Correa, Romar</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[We appraise the canonical RobertsonKeynes discussion from the structural axis of exogeneity/endogeneity of the interest rate. The interest rate is shown to be an exogenous variable. It is only with Keynes' contribution of liquidity preference and, specifically, the introduction of the liquidity preference of banks that no more than the possibility of endogenising the interest rate arises. Given the tenuousness of the resolution, we pose the ethical question: should the rate of interest be endogenised? On the other hand, Keynes' theorem that the rate of interest is a monetary variable is validated. Both money and the rate of interest are codetermined in a capitalist economy.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Institutionalism as the way of unification of the heterodox theories</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In this article we seek to show that there is a common framework to the various approaches known as heterodox. This framework is the "institutionalism", which take into account the concrete institutions in which the economic process proceeds. To argue our thesis we deploy two types of justification. We begin with an historical justification which borrows from the history of the thought and will find in emblematic authors (Ricardo, Marx, Keynes, Polanyi) (1) the definition of a common object for an institutionalist political economy (the study of a "Monetary economy of capitalistic production"); (2) a common general standard of the economy like "an institutionalized process between men and environment" (against the definition of Robbins). Our second justification is a more epistemological one. We develop the way in which the institutionalist approach mobilizes the concepts of action and of institution. The goal of this article is to contribute to the emergence of a positive paradigm, common to the heterodox, which is not defined any more in hollow or negative in opposition to the neoclassic "main stream".]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10585</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10585</guid>
      <author>Postel, Nicolas</author>
      <author>Sobel, Richard</author>
      <dc:creator>Postel, Nicolas</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Sobel, Richard</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In this article we seek to show that there is a common framework to the various approaches known as heterodox. This framework is the "institutionalism", which take into account the concrete institutions in which the economic process proceeds. To argue our thesis we deploy two types of justification. We begin with an historical justification which borrows from the history of the thought and will find in emblematic authors (Ricardo, Marx, Keynes, Polanyi) (1) the definition of a common object for an institutionalist political economy (the study of a "Monetary economy of capitalistic production"); (2) a common general standard of the economy like "an institutionalized process between men and environment" (against the definition of Robbins). Our second justification is a more epistemological one. We develop the way in which the institutionalist approach mobilizes the concepts of action and of institution. The goal of this article is to contribute to the emergence of a positive paradigm, common to the heterodox, which is not defined any more in hollow or negative in opposition to the neoclassic "main stream".]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The social organisation of epistemology in macroeconomic policy work: the case of the IMF</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper reports an ethnographic study of work practices in the IMF, and IMF mission activity in particular. It will show how this work combines arithmetic, econometric and meeting skills with the adroit management of social processes that transform 'incomplete' or 'ambiguous numbers' into socially validated and hence 'objective for practical purposes' data. These data form the basis of epistemic certainty in the analytical work undertaken, and though this certainty is socially framed, it is treated as sufficient for substantive, robust and 'real world' macroeconomic policy making.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10583</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10583</guid>
      <author>Harper, Richard, H R</author>
      <dc:creator>Harper, Richard, H R</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper reports an ethnographic study of work practices in the IMF, and IMF mission activity in particular. It will show how this work combines arithmetic, econometric and meeting skills with the adroit management of social processes that transform 'incomplete' or 'ambiguous numbers' into socially validated and hence 'objective for practical purposes' data. These data form the basis of epistemic certainty in the analytical work undertaken, and though this certainty is socially framed, it is treated as sufficient for substantive, robust and 'real world' macroeconomic policy making.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Commentary on Teaching Economics with Podcasts, Literature and Movies</title>
      <description><![CDATA[For sure, economics is a technical subject, with an impressive vocabulary and an imposing methodology. At the same time, quite literally, it’s about bread and butter issues. And so, one of the challenges of teaching economics is to connect these two dimensions of the subject. In particular, the trick is to make meaningful connections that aren’t trivial. And so, it’s about enriching reliable textbooks with material that’s on this website and in these books.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10582</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10582</guid>
      <author>Moulder, James</author>
      <dc:creator>Moulder, James</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[For sure, economics is a technical subject, with an impressive vocabulary and an imposing methodology. At the same time, quite literally, it’s about bread and butter issues. And so, one of the challenges of teaching economics is to connect these two dimensions of the subject. In particular, the trick is to make meaningful connections that aren’t trivial. And so, it’s about enriching reliable textbooks with material that’s on this website and in these books.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A review of Ralph Harris in His Own Words, the Selected Writings of Lord Harris, Edited by Colin Robinson, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar and the Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008, 343 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[To many people market liberalism may seem a hard sell in our times, looking like a menace rather than an opportunity. It may require an extraordinary personality, shaped by a limitless altruism, to admit that the riches of a few could have been accumulated if more entrepreneurship existed. That was probably the lesson Schumpeter had drawn after leaving behind a bankrupt private bank in 1924, after a four-year stint as its president, and heading for academic recognition. Fact is that, if we count from the 1930s, more than eighty years of dominance of liberal thinking in the discipline of economics have left both ordinary people and scholars with a lingering sense of perplexity. Asking about the resilience of mainstream economics may sound tautological but noted thinkers did not refrain from doing the very same. John Stuart Mill knew that ideas had to wait for "circumstances to conspire in their favour" (p. 208) [1] and J.M. Keynes observed: "The power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas…soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous and for good or evil." Along the way, Hayek thought in his essay on intellectuals and socialism (1949), "it is no exaggeration to say that once the more active part of the intellectuals has been converted to a set of beliefs, the process by which these become generally accepted is almost automatic and irresistible" (p. 40).]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10581</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10581</guid>
      <author>Cojanu, Valentin</author>
      <dc:creator>Cojanu, Valentin</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[To many people market liberalism may seem a hard sell in our times, looking like a menace rather than an opportunity. It may require an extraordinary personality, shaped by a limitless altruism, to admit that the riches of a few could have been accumulated if more entrepreneurship existed. That was probably the lesson Schumpeter had drawn after leaving behind a bankrupt private bank in 1924, after a four-year stint as its president, and heading for academic recognition. Fact is that, if we count from the 1930s, more than eighty years of dominance of liberal thinking in the discipline of economics have left both ordinary people and scholars with a lingering sense of perplexity. Asking about the resilience of mainstream economics may sound tautological but noted thinkers did not refrain from doing the very same. John Stuart Mill knew that ideas had to wait for "circumstances to conspire in their favour" (p. 208) [1] and J.M. Keynes observed: "The power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas…soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous and for good or evil." Along the way, Hayek thought in his essay on intellectuals and socialism (1949), "it is no exaggeration to say that once the more active part of the intellectuals has been converted to a set of beliefs, the process by which these become generally accepted is almost automatic and irresistible" (p. 40).]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A review of Peter Söderbaum, Understanding Sustainability Economics. Towards Pluralism in Economics, London, Sterling/VA: earthscan, 2008, 158 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[It is almost impossible to read Söderbaum´s lucid critique of neoclassical economics and neoliberalism without having in mind the recent economic crisis as the background of his attack against the short-sightedness and inhuman corollaries of mainstream economics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10580</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10580</guid>
      <author>Zinn, Karl, Georg</author>
      <dc:creator>Zinn, Karl, Georg</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[It is almost impossible to read Söderbaum´s lucid critique of neoclassical economics and neoliberalism without having in mind the recent economic crisis as the background of his attack against the short-sightedness and inhuman corollaries of mainstream economics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A review of Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey, The Cult of Statistical Significance. How the Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice, and Lives, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2008, 320 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10579</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10579</guid>
      <author>Dusek, Tamás</author>
      <dc:creator>Dusek, Tamás</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The epistemology of modern finance</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Modern finance is a social science where the complexity of mathematical models compares to that of physics. The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework for the interpretation of mathematical models in finance, in order to determine the epistemological standards according to which financial theory must be assessed. The analysis enlightens the contrast between highly objective results and the radical uncertainty that governs the markets. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the reasons why finance models are relative and non-causal are deeply rooted in the nature of finance theory itself. An important consequence is that arbitrage-free model prices are reference prices and indicators of the economical features underlying mathematical models. As such, they can be used to structure and support final pricing and hedging decisions, but not to predict future market prices.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10578</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10578</guid>
      <author>de Scheemaekere, Xavier</author>
      <dc:creator>de Scheemaekere, Xavier</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Modern finance is a social science where the complexity of mathematical models compares to that of physics. The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework for the interpretation of mathematical models in finance, in order to determine the epistemological standards according to which financial theory must be assessed. The analysis enlightens the contrast between highly objective results and the radical uncertainty that governs the markets. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the reasons why finance models are relative and non-causal are deeply rooted in the nature of finance theory itself. An important consequence is that arbitrage-free model prices are reference prices and indicators of the economical features underlying mathematical models. As such, they can be used to structure and support final pricing and hedging decisions, but not to predict future market prices.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The inheritance of heterodox economic thought: an examination of history of economic thought textbooks</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The inheritance of heterodox economics hinges upon the degree to which the next generation is exposed to the history of the discipline's thought. The potential to include heterodox thought into the curriculum presents itself most easily through history of economic thought classes. The potential is limited by the professor, but it is also circumscribed by the material presented or withheld in history of economic thought textbooks. If included, the presentation of heterodox methodologies and philosophies impresses upon students the relevance and importance of pluralism and dissenting views and by consequence, the future course of the discipline. This research seeks to examine the presentation of heterodox economics in history of economic thought textbooks and to assess the amount of space dedicated to its study and further, to explore how textbook adoption impacts the inheritance and heritage of heterodox thought and philosophy.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10577</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10577</guid>
      <author>Wrenn, Mary, V</author>
      <dc:creator>Wrenn, Mary, V</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The inheritance of heterodox economics hinges upon the degree to which the next generation is exposed to the history of the discipline's thought. The potential to include heterodox thought into the curriculum presents itself most easily through history of economic thought classes. The potential is limited by the professor, but it is also circumscribed by the material presented or withheld in history of economic thought textbooks. If included, the presentation of heterodox methodologies and philosophies impresses upon students the relevance and importance of pluralism and dissenting views and by consequence, the future course of the discipline. This research seeks to examine the presentation of heterodox economics in history of economic thought textbooks and to assess the amount of space dedicated to its study and further, to explore how textbook adoption impacts the inheritance and heritage of heterodox thought and philosophy.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Six choice metaphors and their social implications</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The six metaphors analyzed in this paper unfold stepwise into an interdisciplinary systems framework based on planning horizons. The notion of planning horizons serves as an ordinal measure of rationality and organization, in a social systemic context of ecological interdependence. Each metaphor opens into the next to extend our understanding. The neighborhood store is where almost all neoclassical choices are made, with visible options spread on shelves and a budget allocated among them, maximizing its worth. The chessboard demands strategic contingency planning in an evolving context of incompletely projectable outcomes. A transportation network combines substitutes and complements into a static complex system, intertwined and non-decomposable, leaving economists with a problem of institutional choice. Love is a complementary good-virtually costless to produce and distribute, always in demand-that should be abundant, though it is scarce. The educational system brings inter-horizonal complementarities into our field of view, where contagion effects of longer horizons enhance complementarity at the expense of substitution, shifting the mix of interdependence away from conflicts to concerts of interest. Human ecology is a dynamic complex system of interactive phenomena opening into time, evolving constantly in its structure, relationships and diversity and demanding ethics in our relations. These six metaphors raise some pressing questions on the invisible limits of models standing on substitution applied where they have no place. Symptoms of failure reveal themselves in myopia, ecological loss and the rise of violence in society. Economic implications of these metaphors are reviewed to illustrate the basis for an interdisciplinary approach to social scientific constructions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10576</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10576</guid>
      <author>Jennings, Frederic, B</author>
      <dc:creator>Jennings, Frederic, B</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The six metaphors analyzed in this paper unfold stepwise into an interdisciplinary systems framework based on planning horizons. The notion of planning horizons serves as an ordinal measure of rationality and organization, in a social systemic context of ecological interdependence. Each metaphor opens into the next to extend our understanding. The neighborhood store is where almost all neoclassical choices are made, with visible options spread on shelves and a budget allocated among them, maximizing its worth. The chessboard demands strategic contingency planning in an evolving context of incompletely projectable outcomes. A transportation network combines substitutes and complements into a static complex system, intertwined and non-decomposable, leaving economists with a problem of institutional choice. Love is a complementary good-virtually costless to produce and distribute, always in demand-that should be abundant, though it is scarce. The educational system brings inter-horizonal complementarities into our field of view, where contagion effects of longer horizons enhance complementarity at the expense of substitution, shifting the mix of interdependence away from conflicts to concerts of interest. Human ecology is a dynamic complex system of interactive phenomena opening into time, evolving constantly in its structure, relationships and diversity and demanding ethics in our relations. These six metaphors raise some pressing questions on the invisible limits of models standing on substitution applied where they have no place. Symptoms of failure reveal themselves in myopia, ecological loss and the rise of violence in society. Economic implications of these metaphors are reviewed to illustrate the basis for an interdisciplinary approach to social scientific constructions.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economics and religion - a personalist perspective</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Traditionally, the reaction of many mainstream economists to the effort to integrate theology and economics demonstrated the difficulty of doing so in a way that could be broadly recognized as legitimate. This state of things is simply an indication of a broad consensus within the field of economics that methods, norms, and even concerns construed to be related to religious belief have no place in the scientific study of economics.Recently, the situation seems to be changing, however. A decade ago, a group of Christian Catholic social thinkers engaged in dialogue with free-market economists concerning the morality of market activity. As a result, this interdisciplinary exchange inspired the conception of a new subdiscipline that sought to synthesize central aspects of theology and economics, thereby giving rise to a new body of scholarship termed economic personalism. The general idea is to promote a humane economic order that benefits from market activity but does not reduce the human person to just another element in economic phenomena.This paper suggests that, under such circumstances, the Christian-Orthodox contribution to further development of this new field of investigation could consist in bringing forward the teaching of the Holy Fathers of Eastern Tradition. It is argued that, in this way, the moral dimension which dominantly defines the Catholic vision of the human person could be surpassed and even transfigured by the spiritual dimension which fully inform the Orthodox vision. Moreover, this pre-eminence of the spiritual determinants of the human person is expected to result in a number of significant changes concerning the way economic personalism is currently conceived (in terms of its subject matter, basic conceptual principles, and general mission).]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10575</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10575</guid>
      <author>Petre Comşa, Fr</author>
      <author>Munteanu, Costea</author>
      <dc:creator>Petre Comşa, Fr</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Munteanu, Costea</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Traditionally, the reaction of many mainstream economists to the effort to integrate theology and economics demonstrated the difficulty of doing so in a way that could be broadly recognized as legitimate. This state of things is simply an indication of a broad consensus within the field of economics that methods, norms, and even concerns construed to be related to religious belief have no place in the scientific study of economics.Recently, the situation seems to be changing, however. A decade ago, a group of Christian Catholic social thinkers engaged in dialogue with free-market economists concerning the morality of market activity. As a result, this interdisciplinary exchange inspired the conception of a new subdiscipline that sought to synthesize central aspects of theology and economics, thereby giving rise to a new body of scholarship termed economic personalism. The general idea is to promote a humane economic order that benefits from market activity but does not reduce the human person to just another element in economic phenomena.This paper suggests that, under such circumstances, the Christian-Orthodox contribution to further development of this new field of investigation could consist in bringing forward the teaching of the Holy Fathers of Eastern Tradition. It is argued that, in this way, the moral dimension which dominantly defines the Catholic vision of the human person could be surpassed and even transfigured by the spiritual dimension which fully inform the Orthodox vision. Moreover, this pre-eminence of the spiritual determinants of the human person is expected to result in a number of significant changes concerning the way economic personalism is currently conceived (in terms of its subject matter, basic conceptual principles, and general mission).]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Not anything goes: a case for a restricted pluralism</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The current discussion on theoretical and methodological pluralism is plagued with confusions and misunderstandings. Some problems arise because an appropriate framework for conducting a fruitful discussion about these issues is still lacking. Many other problems derive from the fact that a rational pluralist should be both tolerant with the many different points of view and able to discriminate among them. In the first and second sections we use some of Mäki's ideas for developing a general framework for discussing pluralism and apply it to the ongoing debate on theoretical and methodological pluralism, showing its strong compromise with demarcationism. In the third section a looser framework for approaching pluralism is outlined, and a detailed discussion of Caldwell's critical pluralism is conducted, pointing out its achievements and some of its shortcomings. The fourth section provides an outline of what a sound notion of restricted pluralism should encompass for avoiding "anything goes".]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10571</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10571</guid>
      <author>Marqués, Gustavo</author>
      <author>Weisman, Diego</author>
      <dc:creator>Marqués, Gustavo</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Weisman, Diego</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The current discussion on theoretical and methodological pluralism is plagued with confusions and misunderstandings. Some problems arise because an appropriate framework for conducting a fruitful discussion about these issues is still lacking. Many other problems derive from the fact that a rational pluralist should be both tolerant with the many different points of view and able to discriminate among them. In the first and second sections we use some of Mäki's ideas for developing a general framework for discussing pluralism and apply it to the ongoing debate on theoretical and methodological pluralism, showing its strong compromise with demarcationism. In the third section a looser framework for approaching pluralism is outlined, and a detailed discussion of Caldwell's critical pluralism is conducted, pointing out its achievements and some of its shortcomings. The fourth section provides an outline of what a sound notion of restricted pluralism should encompass for avoiding "anything goes".]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Book review: Akop P. Nazaretyan, Anthropology of violence and culture of self-organization. Essays in evolutionary historical psychology, 2nd edition, Moscow, URSS, 2008, 256 pages (in Russian)</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10574</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10574</guid>
      <author>Korotayev, Andrey</author>
      <dc:creator>Korotayev, Andrey</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Book review: Cristina Neesham, Human and social progress: projects and perspectives, VDM Verlag , Saarbrücken, 2008, 220 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10573</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10573</guid>
      <author>Moulder, James</author>
      <dc:creator>Moulder, James</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Book review: Gilles Dostaler, Keynes and his battles, Edgar Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, 2007, 384 pages</title>
      <description><![CDATA[-]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10572</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10572</guid>
      <author>Maniu, Mircea, T</author>
      <dc:creator>Maniu, Mircea, T</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[-]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>"Social embeddedness": how new economic sociology goes into the offensive and meets the own roots</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The argument of social embeddedness has become one of the most celebrated metaphors in economic sociology. The attempt connected to that term is the elaboration of a solid basis for economic sociology as discipline within the concert of economics and further social sciences. The paper argues that the embeddedness argument is strategically on a necessary way to highlight the academic importance of institutional and sociological thought for debating phenomena of economic life since, as it is argued within the paper, such ambitions meet also very clearly with recent tendencies within economics which are commonly considered to be tendencies towards heterodox economics. Aim of the paper is to embed such discussion within a broader history of economic and sociological thought in order to demonstrate that recent developments meet with elements of discussion which were already used by classical authors at the beginning of the 20 th century. In this respect a lot of the recent offensive of economic sociology meets with classical bases of its own academic development which seems to have become hidden or partly forgotten.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10570</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10570</guid>
      <author>Bögenhold, Dieter</author>
      <dc:creator>Bögenhold, Dieter</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The argument of social embeddedness has become one of the most celebrated metaphors in economic sociology. The attempt connected to that term is the elaboration of a solid basis for economic sociology as discipline within the concert of economics and further social sciences. The paper argues that the embeddedness argument is strategically on a necessary way to highlight the academic importance of institutional and sociological thought for debating phenomena of economic life since, as it is argued within the paper, such ambitions meet also very clearly with recent tendencies within economics which are commonly considered to be tendencies towards heterodox economics. Aim of the paper is to embed such discussion within a broader history of economic and sociological thought in order to demonstrate that recent developments meet with elements of discussion which were already used by classical authors at the beginning of the 20 th century. In this respect a lot of the recent offensive of economic sociology meets with classical bases of its own academic development which seems to have become hidden or partly forgotten.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Methodology and the practice of economists - a philosophical approach</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Practicing academic economists are reported to pay little attention to work being done by economic methodologists. This is an unfortunate situation for the sub-field of economic methodology as well as for the discipline of economics at large. If the sub-field of economic methodology does not succeed in communicating with practitioners of the larger discipline of which it is a part, its rationale is seriously brought into question. And when practitioners of a scientific discipline do not pay heed to methodological questions, the discipline is destined to stagnation and possible degeneration. In order to contribute to an amelioration of the noted unfortunate state of affairs, this paper argues the case for purposeful philosophically informed approaches through which economic methodologists may prove themselves helpful and valuable to the practitioners of the discipline. A scheme of descriptive-critical analyses of economic texts is set forth as a means of enhancing academic economists' awareness of, and interest in, philosophical questions embedded in, and vital to, their practices. Moreover, it is argued, and exemplified, how philosophically minded methodologists may contribute constructively to processes directed towards establishing and developing economic theories and analyses.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10569</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10569</guid>
      <author>Davidsen, Bjørn-Ivar</author>
      <dc:creator>Davidsen, Bjørn-Ivar</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Practicing academic economists are reported to pay little attention to work being done by economic methodologists. This is an unfortunate situation for the sub-field of economic methodology as well as for the discipline of economics at large. If the sub-field of economic methodology does not succeed in communicating with practitioners of the larger discipline of which it is a part, its rationale is seriously brought into question. And when practitioners of a scientific discipline do not pay heed to methodological questions, the discipline is destined to stagnation and possible degeneration. In order to contribute to an amelioration of the noted unfortunate state of affairs, this paper argues the case for purposeful philosophically informed approaches through which economic methodologists may prove themselves helpful and valuable to the practitioners of the discipline. A scheme of descriptive-critical analyses of economic texts is set forth as a means of enhancing academic economists' awareness of, and interest in, philosophical questions embedded in, and vital to, their practices. Moreover, it is argued, and exemplified, how philosophically minded methodologists may contribute constructively to processes directed towards establishing and developing economic theories and analyses.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The knowledge economy/society: the latest example of "Measurement without theory"?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The world has embraced a set of concepts (knowledge driven growth) which are seen as the 'core of future growth and wellbeing' without any commonly agreed notion of what they are, how they might be measured, and crucially therefore, how they actually do (or might) affect economic growth and social wellbeing. The theory of how the mechanism works lacks important detail.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10568</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10568</guid>
      <author>Oxley, Les</author>
      <author>Walker, Paul</author>
      <author>Thorns, David</author>
      <author>Wang, Hong</author>
      <dc:creator>Oxley, Les</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Walker, Paul</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Thorns, David</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Wang, Hong</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The world has embraced a set of concepts (knowledge driven growth) which are seen as the 'core of future growth and wellbeing' without any commonly agreed notion of what they are, how they might be measured, and crucially therefore, how they actually do (or might) affect economic growth and social wellbeing. The theory of how the mechanism works lacks important detail.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Incentives and reflective equilibrium in distributive justice debates</title>
      <description><![CDATA[For the last thirty years one of the dominant economic policies has been the cutting of the top marginal tax rates. While this policy has been partly motivated by the self-interest of high income earners, it also has had considerable theoretical support from a wide range of distributive justice theorists starting with John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971. Rawls argued that if the incentives created by inequality maximized the position of the least advantaged then they were morally justified. There have been many variants of this position since. The most common theme of them is that incentives to work harder and innovate, although creating inequality, are morally justified because of the greater good generated by the resultant increase in GDP. The main policy instrument available to governments to create such incentive has been the cutting of the top marginal income rates and this has been done systematically across all industrialized nations.The method of wide reflective equilibrium requires us to use the best consensus from economics in our reasoning about distributive justice. The systematic cutting of tax rates over thirty years has provided a reasonable experiment on the thesis that such cutting provides an overall increased labor supply and resultant increase in GDP. The suggestion of this paper is that a reasonable consensus can now be reached that, over the ranges of inequality and GDP that we have had over the last 50 years and are likely to have over the next 50 years, such incentives do not provide the claimed benefits. Hence, we are getting increased inequality for no compensating benefit.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10567</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10567</guid>
      <author>Lamont, Julian</author>
      <dc:creator>Lamont, Julian</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[For the last thirty years one of the dominant economic policies has been the cutting of the top marginal tax rates. While this policy has been partly motivated by the self-interest of high income earners, it also has had considerable theoretical support from a wide range of distributive justice theorists starting with John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971. Rawls argued that if the incentives created by inequality maximized the position of the least advantaged then they were morally justified. There have been many variants of this position since. The most common theme of them is that incentives to work harder and innovate, although creating inequality, are morally justified because of the greater good generated by the resultant increase in GDP. The main policy instrument available to governments to create such incentive has been the cutting of the top marginal income rates and this has been done systematically across all industrialized nations.The method of wide reflective equilibrium requires us to use the best consensus from economics in our reasoning about distributive justice. The systematic cutting of tax rates over thirty years has provided a reasonable experiment on the thesis that such cutting provides an overall increased labor supply and resultant increase in GDP. The suggestion of this paper is that a reasonable consensus can now be reached that, over the ranges of inequality and GDP that we have had over the last 50 years and are likely to have over the next 50 years, such incentives do not provide the claimed benefits. Hence, we are getting increased inequality for no compensating benefit.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>From a 'Moral Philosopher' to a 'Poor' Economist</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The roots of modern 'Economics' are deeply buried in the moral and political philosophy of the ancient philosophers. The journey of an economist from the pedestal of a 'moral philosopher' to a state of 'poor economist' is rather long. Through the Middle Ages the 'natural law' approach to economics and sociology held firm. The 'socio-economic rationalism' of the Stoics helped this approach to develop into a 'social science' that later took the form of 'moral philosophy' of the 18 th century philosophers. Since then Economics has been enriched by scientific thought of many. While Marshall and his Principles made the study of Economics popular at universities, Keynes provided a theoretical platform to the governments for their full employment policies ensuring an unprecedented economic growth for a quarter century during the postwar years. For more than a century now Economics has witnessed tremendous progress in methods and contents. Unfortunately, over the last two decades it has come under fire. Is there a new transformation underway or Economics has lost its lustre? This short essay tries to address some of such issues.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10558</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10558</guid>
      <author>Sharma, Soumitra</author>
      <dc:creator>Sharma, Soumitra</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The roots of modern 'Economics' are deeply buried in the moral and political philosophy of the ancient philosophers. The journey of an economist from the pedestal of a 'moral philosopher' to a state of 'poor economist' is rather long. Through the Middle Ages the 'natural law' approach to economics and sociology held firm. The 'socio-economic rationalism' of the Stoics helped this approach to develop into a 'social science' that later took the form of 'moral philosophy' of the 18 th century philosophers. Since then Economics has been enriched by scientific thought of many. While Marshall and his Principles made the study of Economics popular at universities, Keynes provided a theoretical platform to the governments for their full employment policies ensuring an unprecedented economic growth for a quarter century during the postwar years. For more than a century now Economics has witnessed tremendous progress in methods and contents. Unfortunately, over the last two decades it has come under fire. Is there a new transformation underway or Economics has lost its lustre? This short essay tries to address some of such issues.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Dialectics and the Austrian School: A Surprising Commonality in the Methodology of Heterodox Economics?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper is prompted by the concluding comments to a recent paper (Denis "Hypostatisation"), which suggests that the neoclassical use of the concept of equilibrium expresses a formal mode of thought. Heterodox tendencies from Marxian to Austrian and Post Keynesian economics, that paper continues, exemplify a dialectical mode of thought in their common rejection of neoclassical equilibrium theorising. Heterodox currents in economics are-particularly in terms of their analysis and policy prescription-often as divided amongst themselves as they are from the orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the present paper suggests, there may be something profound uniting these disparate heterodox trends: the adoption of a dialectical method. The paper draws on the work of Sciabarra ("Marx", "Total"), who argues that Marxian and Austrian economics are intellectual cousins sharing a methodological approach. He suggests that making process primary, which we might expect of Austrian economists, is the essence of dialectics, which we might identify with Marxism. If that is the case, then perhaps (a) we can only understand the method of neoclassical economics by contrasting it with a dialectical approach, and (b) we can explore methodological common ground between the various heterodox currents by examining their attitude, both implicit and explicit, to dialectics. Pluralism in economics requires, not merely toleration-though indeed it does require that-but mutual engagement, a conversation. For that to take place we need an understanding of what divides and unites the various approaches. This paper is offered as a contribution to the development of that mutual understanding.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10566</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10566</guid>
      <author>Denis, Andy</author>
      <dc:creator>Denis, Andy</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper is prompted by the concluding comments to a recent paper (Denis "Hypostatisation"), which suggests that the neoclassical use of the concept of equilibrium expresses a formal mode of thought. Heterodox tendencies from Marxian to Austrian and Post Keynesian economics, that paper continues, exemplify a dialectical mode of thought in their common rejection of neoclassical equilibrium theorising. Heterodox currents in economics are-particularly in terms of their analysis and policy prescription-often as divided amongst themselves as they are from the orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the present paper suggests, there may be something profound uniting these disparate heterodox trends: the adoption of a dialectical method. The paper draws on the work of Sciabarra ("Marx", "Total"), who argues that Marxian and Austrian economics are intellectual cousins sharing a methodological approach. He suggests that making process primary, which we might expect of Austrian economists, is the essence of dialectics, which we might identify with Marxism. If that is the case, then perhaps (a) we can only understand the method of neoclassical economics by contrasting it with a dialectical approach, and (b) we can explore methodological common ground between the various heterodox currents by examining their attitude, both implicit and explicit, to dialectics. Pluralism in economics requires, not merely toleration-though indeed it does require that-but mutual engagement, a conversation. For that to take place we need an understanding of what divides and unites the various approaches. This paper is offered as a contribution to the development of that mutual understanding.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>From Fragmentation to Ontologically Reflexive Pluralism</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Considerable attention has recently been directed towards the analysis of pluralism in social science, not least in economics. Plurality is often taken as a mark of pluralism. But it is not the same thing, and often indicates little more than a disconnected fragmentation of contributions to a topic. We believe, in fact, that such fragmentation is rife in modern social theorising, and identify numerous causes. We subsequently examine the possibility of using an ontologically reflexive form of pluralism to achieve a greater degree of theoretical integration between various strands of thought than has hitherto been the case. We conclude by stressing the need to be aware of ontological presuppositions in social theorising. Our motivation is a concern with advancing a 'the pluralist project' in which, where feasible, an integration of ideas takes centre stage.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10565</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10565</guid>
      <author>Bigo, Vinca</author>
      <author>Negru, Ioana</author>
      <dc:creator>Bigo, Vinca</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Negru, Ioana</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Considerable attention has recently been directed towards the analysis of pluralism in social science, not least in economics. Plurality is often taken as a mark of pluralism. But it is not the same thing, and often indicates little more than a disconnected fragmentation of contributions to a topic. We believe, in fact, that such fragmentation is rife in modern social theorising, and identify numerous causes. We subsequently examine the possibility of using an ontologically reflexive form of pluralism to achieve a greater degree of theoretical integration between various strands of thought than has hitherto been the case. We conclude by stressing the need to be aware of ontological presuppositions in social theorising. Our motivation is a concern with advancing a 'the pluralist project' in which, where feasible, an integration of ideas takes centre stage.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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    <item>
      <title>Classifying Heterodoxy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper draws upon the scholarship of interdisciplinarity to argue that Economics, like all disciplines, should be open to a wide range of theories and methods, and the study of all relevant phenomena. A classification of the different methods and theory types used by scholars identifies key strengths and weaknesses of each. Different schools of heterodox [that is, non-neoclassical] economics, as well as neoclassical economics itself, emphasize different sets of theory and method. Each thus has a unique contribution to make to a holistic understanding of the economy. At present, different heterodox schools, like neoclassical economics itself, tend to act as if it were thought that their theory and method were superior. This paper urges a quite different attitude: different heterodox schools, as well as neoclassical economics, should be seen as complements rather than substitutes. That is, the insights of different schools of thought within Economics can and should be integrated just as disciplinary insights are integrated within interdisciplinary scholarship. The classification also identifies valuable theory types not presently embraced by any heterodox approach. Heterodoxy needs also to embrace the causal linkages between economic and diverse non-economic phenomena; the paper outlines a strategy for organizing the complex understandings that emerge from such a project. Some might recoil at the complexity of an academic enterprise that embraces such a wide range of phenomena, theory, and method; this paper shows how these diverse investigations can be organized in terms of the classifications presented such that all economists could readily appreciate the contributions of others. The paper also makes suggestions regarding the daily practice of heterodox economists, and draws lessons for heterodoxy from interdisciplinary research practice.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10564</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10564</guid>
      <author>Szostak, Rick</author>
      <dc:creator>Szostak, Rick</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper draws upon the scholarship of interdisciplinarity to argue that Economics, like all disciplines, should be open to a wide range of theories and methods, and the study of all relevant phenomena. A classification of the different methods and theory types used by scholars identifies key strengths and weaknesses of each. Different schools of heterodox [that is, non-neoclassical] economics, as well as neoclassical economics itself, emphasize different sets of theory and method. Each thus has a unique contribution to make to a holistic understanding of the economy. At present, different heterodox schools, like neoclassical economics itself, tend to act as if it were thought that their theory and method were superior. This paper urges a quite different attitude: different heterodox schools, as well as neoclassical economics, should be seen as complements rather than substitutes. That is, the insights of different schools of thought within Economics can and should be integrated just as disciplinary insights are integrated within interdisciplinary scholarship. The classification also identifies valuable theory types not presently embraced by any heterodox approach. Heterodoxy needs also to embrace the causal linkages between economic and diverse non-economic phenomena; the paper outlines a strategy for organizing the complex understandings that emerge from such a project. Some might recoil at the complexity of an academic enterprise that embraces such a wide range of phenomena, theory, and method; this paper shows how these diverse investigations can be organized in terms of the classifications presented such that all economists could readily appreciate the contributions of others. The paper also makes suggestions regarding the daily practice of heterodox economists, and draws lessons for heterodoxy from interdisciplinary research practice.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Plurality in Orthodox and Heterodox Economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Several observers have noted signs of a growing plurality in mainstream economics. At the same time there has been a growing emphasis in heterodox economics on commonality. The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of plurality in economics in order to make sense of these characterisations, and to consider the issues raised by this plurality. The critical factor is to distinguish between plurality at the level of theory and evidence, at the level of methodological approach (plurality of methods), and at the meta-methodological level (a plurality of methodologies). First it is argued that, while there is plurality at the level of theory and even of type of evidence in orthodox economics, there continues to be monism in terms of methodological approach, and in attitude to methodological alternatives. In heterodox economics, the commonality of methodological approach does not go far before emerging pluralistically into a variety of approaches. Indeed there is, at the meta-methodological level, a range of arguments in heterodox economics for a plurality of methodologies, that is, a recognition that it is legitimate (if not inevitable) that there is more than one approach to economics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10563</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10563</guid>
      <author>Dow, Sheila, C</author>
      <dc:creator>Dow, Sheila, C</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Several observers have noted signs of a growing plurality in mainstream economics. At the same time there has been a growing emphasis in heterodox economics on commonality. The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of plurality in economics in order to make sense of these characterisations, and to consider the issues raised by this plurality. The critical factor is to distinguish between plurality at the level of theory and evidence, at the level of methodological approach (plurality of methods), and at the meta-methodological level (a plurality of methodologies). First it is argued that, while there is plurality at the level of theory and even of type of evidence in orthodox economics, there continues to be monism in terms of methodological approach, and in attitude to methodological alternatives. In heterodox economics, the commonality of methodological approach does not go far before emerging pluralistically into a variety of approaches. Indeed there is, at the meta-methodological level, a range of arguments in heterodox economics for a plurality of methodologies, that is, a recognition that it is legitimate (if not inevitable) that there is more than one approach to economics.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pluralism versus Heterodoxy in Economics and the Social Sciences</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Pluralism is the concept that there is no single methodology that is always the correct one for discovering scientific truths, so multiple approaches and methodologies are required for a complete scientific understanding of a subject. Heterodoxy refers to those approaches to a subject that are outside of the generally accepted mainstream. While pluralism and heterodoxy are not necessarily inconsistent, heterodox economists tend to follow one particular methodology or school of thought rather than taking an eclectic approach to economic understanding, and heterodox economists often criticize approaches other than their own. Thus, in most cases, heterodox economists, by defending their own schools of thought and critiquing other approaches, are not pluralistic. The paper advocates a pluralistic approach to the social sciences over the more narrow approaches typically promoted by heterodox schools of thought.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10562</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10562</guid>
      <author>Holcombe, Randall, G</author>
      <dc:creator>Holcombe, Randall, G</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Pluralism is the concept that there is no single methodology that is always the correct one for discovering scientific truths, so multiple approaches and methodologies are required for a complete scientific understanding of a subject. Heterodoxy refers to those approaches to a subject that are outside of the generally accepted mainstream. While pluralism and heterodoxy are not necessarily inconsistent, heterodox economists tend to follow one particular methodology or school of thought rather than taking an eclectic approach to economic understanding, and heterodox economists often criticize approaches other than their own. Thus, in most cases, heterodox economists, by defending their own schools of thought and critiquing other approaches, are not pluralistic. The paper advocates a pluralistic approach to the social sciences over the more narrow approaches typically promoted by heterodox schools of thought.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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      <title>Methodological Monism in Economics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The aim of the paper is to give an outline of the relation between general epistemology and the epistemology of economics. The epistemology of economics can be treated starting from the 'general epistemology of science' and from the subject of the investigation, namely the problems of economics itself. Starting from the general or subject-independent epistemology one can make an attempt to adapt to economics various methodological approaches which were practically created to take only the subject of physics or mathematics into consideration. The characteristic feature of this mentality is often methodological monism, a doctrine which implicitly or explicitly states the unity of epistemology in all disciplines. In methodological writings of economics, beside the supporters of some general epistemological viewpoints, there are serious critics of them on behalf of methodologists who start their researches based on economics. Methodological pluralism does not reject the importation of methodological ideas from other branches of knowledge in an aprioristic way. However, the uncritical adoption of the methodology of physical sciences or 'general' methodology leads to the realm of inadequacy and dogmatism. According to methodological pluralism, every research has to choose its methods and methodology conforming to the nature of its own problems. The theoretical consequences of methodological monism are not always obvious. Inappropriate methodology can lead to inappropriate theories and inappropriate practical decisions. The negative consequences of formalism will be illustrated by some spatial economic issues in the field of money and price theory, such as the empirical empty doctrine of purchasing power parity and the theory of optimal currency areas. Since neoclassical mainstream is monist, therefore the critique of monism is at the same time the critique of the method of neoclassical mainstream.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10561</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10561</guid>
      <author>Dusek, Tamás</author>
      <dc:creator>Dusek, Tamás</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The aim of the paper is to give an outline of the relation between general epistemology and the epistemology of economics. The epistemology of economics can be treated starting from the 'general epistemology of science' and from the subject of the investigation, namely the problems of economics itself. Starting from the general or subject-independent epistemology one can make an attempt to adapt to economics various methodological approaches which were practically created to take only the subject of physics or mathematics into consideration. The characteristic feature of this mentality is often methodological monism, a doctrine which implicitly or explicitly states the unity of epistemology in all disciplines. In methodological writings of economics, beside the supporters of some general epistemological viewpoints, there are serious critics of them on behalf of methodologists who start their researches based on economics. Methodological pluralism does not reject the importation of methodological ideas from other branches of knowledge in an aprioristic way. However, the uncritical adoption of the methodology of physical sciences or 'general' methodology leads to the realm of inadequacy and dogmatism. According to methodological pluralism, every research has to choose its methods and methodology conforming to the nature of its own problems. The theoretical consequences of methodological monism are not always obvious. Inappropriate methodology can lead to inappropriate theories and inappropriate practical decisions. The negative consequences of formalism will be illustrated by some spatial economic issues in the field of money and price theory, such as the empirical empty doctrine of purchasing power parity and the theory of optimal currency areas. Since neoclassical mainstream is monist, therefore the critique of monism is at the same time the critique of the method of neoclassical mainstream.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pluralism and Heterodoxy: Introduction to the Special Issue</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper introduces a special issue of the journal devoted to work presented at two recent conferences of the Association for Heterodox Economics (AHE). The AHE is an organisation which advocates and provides a forum for non-mainstream approaches to economics. Recent conferences have focused on pluralism. Pluralism is a variegated concept with multiple motivations and arguments in its favour. Such arguments tend to be ontological and epistemological, but may also be pedagogical. Pluralism has been advocated as a moniker preferable to heterodoxy which might be adopted by non-mainstream economists. However, it is problematic. The papers which comprise the remainder of this issue illustrate that point. The papers are discussed in turn and contrasted.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10560</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10560</guid>
      <author>Mearman, Andrew</author>
      <dc:creator>Mearman, Andrew</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper introduces a special issue of the journal devoted to work presented at two recent conferences of the Association for Heterodox Economics (AHE). The AHE is an organisation which advocates and provides a forum for non-mainstream approaches to economics. Recent conferences have focused on pluralism. Pluralism is a variegated concept with multiple motivations and arguments in its favour. Such arguments tend to be ontological and epistemological, but may also be pedagogical. Pluralism has been advocated as a moniker preferable to heterodoxy which might be adopted by non-mainstream economists. However, it is problematic. The papers which comprise the remainder of this issue illustrate that point. The papers are discussed in turn and contrasted.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Developmental Freedom and Social Order: Rethinking the Relation between Work and Equality</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This essay points to an institutional account of our existential interest in work as a missing piece in welfare analysis. In contrast with social liberals in the postwar era, both liberal economic and egalitarian discourses today espouse a narrowly atomistic account of human nature and the modern economy. Therefore they are unable to take account of the institutional bases of economic development, individual autonomy and social order, and the way these connect. The essay shows that a patterning of distributional outcomes is a reality in both deregulated and densely governed capitalist economies, but that only the latter offers real scope for social and individual choice. The influence of the atomistic account on liberal egalitarian thought however has produced an unambitious, imprecise, and in the case of welfare contractualism, a coercive, account of both individual freedom and social community. What is needed is a more explicit inclusion of a temporal dimension in welfare and economic analysis and a more differentiated framework of pluralist governance.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10559</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10559</guid>
      <author>Haagh, Louise</author>
      <dc:creator>Haagh, Louise</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This essay points to an institutional account of our existential interest in work as a missing piece in welfare analysis. In contrast with social liberals in the postwar era, both liberal economic and egalitarian discourses today espouse a narrowly atomistic account of human nature and the modern economy. Therefore they are unable to take account of the institutional bases of economic development, individual autonomy and social order, and the way these connect. The essay shows that a patterning of distributional outcomes is a reality in both deregulated and densely governed capitalist economies, but that only the latter offers real scope for social and individual choice. The influence of the atomistic account on liberal egalitarian thought however has produced an unambitious, imprecise, and in the case of welfare contractualism, a coercive, account of both individual freedom and social community. What is needed is a more explicit inclusion of a temporal dimension in welfare and economic analysis and a more differentiated framework of pluralist governance.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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      <title>Economics, the Structures of Knowledge, and the Quest for a More Substantively Rational World</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The "structures of knowledge" designates the long-term intellectual and institutional division in knowledge production, the arena of cognition and intentionality (the "socio-cultural") that we recognize as the relational hierarchy between the sciences and the humanities, or the "two cultures", and it is just as integral to the development of the modern world as the realms of material production and distribution (the "economic") or of decision making and coercion (the "political"). The modern discipline of economics emerged from a medium-term restructuring of the structures of knowledge in the late nineteenth century along with the other, multiple, social sciences between the sciences and the humanities each with proprietary subject matters, theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches. The contemporary crisis in the field of knowledge production is part of the overall exhaustion of the processes reproducing the structures of the modern world-system. Contemporary economics in this "far-from-equilibrium" world should be well placed to contribute to an understanding of the alternative futures available today. But this would entail a reexamination of its inherited theoretical approaches and methodological practices.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10554</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10554</guid>
      <author>Lee, Richard, E.</author>
      <dc:creator>Lee, Richard, E.</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The "structures of knowledge" designates the long-term intellectual and institutional division in knowledge production, the arena of cognition and intentionality (the "socio-cultural") that we recognize as the relational hierarchy between the sciences and the humanities, or the "two cultures", and it is just as integral to the development of the modern world as the realms of material production and distribution (the "economic") or of decision making and coercion (the "political"). The modern discipline of economics emerged from a medium-term restructuring of the structures of knowledge in the late nineteenth century along with the other, multiple, social sciences between the sciences and the humanities each with proprietary subject matters, theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches. The contemporary crisis in the field of knowledge production is part of the overall exhaustion of the processes reproducing the structures of the modern world-system. Contemporary economics in this "far-from-equilibrium" world should be well placed to contribute to an understanding of the alternative futures available today. But this would entail a reexamination of its inherited theoretical approaches and methodological practices.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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      <title>European Historical Economics and Globalisation</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Globalisation is here considered as the increasing specialisation or complexity that accompanies extension of spatially limited markets to include larger and larger sections of the world. To the extent that the enlargement of one market brings contact with others, the process is one of market integration. This paper focuses on two millennia of globalisation so defined, from the perspective of the European economies. It shows that there have been several waves of globalisation linked with rising productivity and prosperity, followed by long economic contractions. Expansions took place within new frameworks for internal and external security and the disintegration of these regimes typically reversed the process. Higher incomes were the reward for accepting the greater vulnerability of stronger interdependency.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10555</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10555</guid>
      <author>Foreman-Peck, James</author>
      <dc:creator>Foreman-Peck, James</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Globalisation is here considered as the increasing specialisation or complexity that accompanies extension of spatially limited markets to include larger and larger sections of the world. To the extent that the enlargement of one market brings contact with others, the process is one of market integration. This paper focuses on two millennia of globalisation so defined, from the perspective of the European economies. It shows that there have been several waves of globalisation linked with rising productivity and prosperity, followed by long economic contractions. Expansions took place within new frameworks for internal and external security and the disintegration of these regimes typically reversed the process. Higher incomes were the reward for accepting the greater vulnerability of stronger interdependency.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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    <item>
      <title>On Ethics and the Economics of Development</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper examines the implications of some of the growing literature at the borderline of ethics and economics for development debates. It argues that this literature has already had considerable impact on development economics, particularly as a result of work on well-being and capabilities. Other areas where there has been considerable growth include population ethics and the area which explores the link between the contractarian tradition in moral philosophy and game theory. Work here has had less impact on development economics, and there is considerable scope for more work. Finally, both ethics and economics have been criticised for taking too abstract a view of human beings. Each has begun to take on this line of criticism and work which responds to it in various ways - such as by taking account of issues relating to identity, allowing for hard choices and fuzziness - is relevant to development.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10556</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10556</guid>
      <author>Qizilbash, Mozaffar</author>
      <dc:creator>Qizilbash, Mozaffar</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper examines the implications of some of the growing literature at the borderline of ethics and economics for development debates. It argues that this literature has already had considerable impact on development economics, particularly as a result of work on well-being and capabilities. Other areas where there has been considerable growth include population ethics and the area which explores the link between the contractarian tradition in moral philosophy and game theory. Work here has had less impact on development economics, and there is considerable scope for more work. Finally, both ethics and economics have been criticised for taking too abstract a view of human beings. Each has begun to take on this line of criticism and work which responds to it in various ways - such as by taking account of issues relating to identity, allowing for hard choices and fuzziness - is relevant to development.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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    <item>
      <title>Globalisation, the state and economic justice</title>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper explores the potential for states to act as agents of economic justice in an era of 'globalisation'. After providing a critical review of debates about both economic justice and globalisation, the paper suggests that states retain an important degree of policy-making autonomy-should they care to exercise it. Following this I make a rather unfashionable argument which claims that, if economic justice is actually to be achieved in the contemporary era, it may be up to states to provide it. For the current structures of global governance are not only often ineffective, but they may actually entrench inequality and injustice. In the absence of a just global order, individual states may have to rely on their own efforts to achieve what economic equality they can.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10557</link>
      <guid>https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10557</guid>
      <author>Beeson, Mark</author>
      <dc:creator>Beeson, Mark</dc:creator>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This paper explores the potential for states to act as agents of economic justice in an era of 'globalisation'. After providing a critical review of debates about both economic justice and globalisation, the paper suggests that states retain an important degree of policy-making autonomy-should they care to exercise it. Following this I make a rather unfashionable argument which claims that, if economic justice is actually to be achieved in the contemporary era, it may be up to states to provide it. For the current structures of global governance are not only often ineffective, but they may actually entrench inequality and injustice. In the absence of a just global order, individual states may have to rely on their own efforts to achieve what economic equality they can.]]></content:encoded>
      <slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
    </item>
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