Alexandru Popovici - Relation of Carl Menger's philosophy of economics to Auguste Comte's positivism

jpe:10033 - Journal of Philosophical Economics, December 15, 2022, Volume XV - https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10033
Relation of Carl Menger's philosophy of economics to Auguste Comte's positivismArticle

Authors: Alexandru Popovici 1

  • 1 Romanian-American University

The conception of the founder of the Austrian School, in his book on the philosophy of social sciences, has been described, by the supporters of this school, as a total methodological individualism, upholding the absolute specificity of these sciences to those of nature, and as rejecting the use of mathematics in economics. In fact, the human individual was, for Carl Menger, only the fundamental element of socioeconomic structures. Economic theory was to be inspired by the "atomism" of the natural sciences and to determine the causes, effects and laws of the studied phenomena, with the aim of predicting and controlling them. Empirical study had to unite with conceptual abstraction and mathematics, in proportions determined by the simplicity or complexity of the field of research. These characteristics of the conception of C. Manger, like similar others, make us assume an important (but unconfessed) influence of A. Comte's positivism. However, to prove it, we will try to restore his true philosophy of science, warped by the neo-positivism of the energetist physicists and of the Vienna Circle.


Volume: Volume XV
Section: The Economists’ Philosophy Day – A Journal of Philosophical Economics celebration of philosophical reflection in the economic science
Published on: December 15, 2022
Accepted on: October 3, 2022
Submitted on: September 13, 2022
Keywords: philosophy of sciences,philosophy of economics,Austrian School,positivism,historicism,holism,natural laws,social laws,scientific methods,methodological individualism,[SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences

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