Mark Peacock - On Amartya Sen's concept of sympathy

jpe:10723 - Journal of Philosophical Economics, May 14, 2019, Volume XII Issue 2 -
On Amartya Sen's concept of sympathy

Authors: Mark Peacock

    This paper examines Amartya Sen's concept of sympathy and the oversimplified, ambiguous and sometimes erroneous interpretations of this concept by Sen's interpreters. In the first section, two types of sympathy can be found in Sen's 'Rational fools' essay-a contemplative and an active type of which the former has conceptual primacy. Following this, active sympathy is examined to ascertain what Sen means by 'actions based on sympathy' and why he deems these to be 'egoistic'. Sen's understanding of egoism means that sympathy is not straightforwardly assimilable to the orthodox theory of rational choice. The section after that analyses the place of altruism in Sen's work and ascertains that altruism can be aligned both with sympathy and commitment, depending on the definition one uses. The final section compares sympathy and commitment and establishes that they are to be distinguished, not according to the welfare a person expects to obtain from making choices, but according to the reason which motivates that person to make a choice.

    Volume: Volume XII Issue 2
    Section: Articles
    Published on: May 14, 2019
    Imported on: December 28, 2022
    Keywords: rational fools,Amartya Sen,sympathy,egoism,commitment,altruism,[SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences


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